396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (Supreme Court of Michigan 1976)
Farwell v. Keaton is a cornerstone torts case on the no-duty-to-rescue rule and its exceptions.
Does a companion who voluntarily undertakes to aid an injured friend during a common social venture have a legal duty to exercise reasonable care, including obtaining or summoning medical assistance, such that failure to do so can constitute negligence?
While there is generally no affirmative duty to rescue, a duty arises when: (1) a defendant voluntarily undertakes to render aid to a person who is helpless or in peril, in which case the defendant must exercise reasonable care in the undertaking and may be liable if discontinuing aid leaves the person worse off; and (2) a special relationship exists that justifies imposing an affirmative duty to act, including companions engaged in a common undertaking, who have a duty to render reasonable assistance such as seeking medical care when injury is known or reasonably apparent. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314, 324.
Yes. The defendant owed Farwell a duty to exercise reasonable care once he undertook to aid him and, as a companion in a common social venture, had an affirmative duty to seek or summon medical assistance. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with the recognition of that duty.
Farwell is a leading case on affirmative duties in tort law. It operationalizes the Restatement's voluntary undertaking doctrine and broadens the catalog of special relationships to include companions engaged in a common venture, thereby providing a framework for when the law requires bystanders to move from inaction to action. For students, it is essential for understanding how duty can arise without initial fault, how foreseeability and reliance inform the duty analysis, and how courts cabin such duties to avoid creating an unlimited rescue obligation.