Master Michigan Supreme Court recognizes a duty to aid arising from a voluntary undertaking and from companions engaged in a common social venture. with this comprehensive case brief.
Farwell v. Keaton is a cornerstone torts case on the no-duty-to-rescue rule and its exceptions. The general common law principle imposes no affirmative duty to help another in peril absent a special relationship or the defendant having created the risk. Farwell illuminates two critical exceptions: (1) when a defendant voluntarily undertakes to render aid, a duty arises to act with reasonable care and not to leave the person worse off; and (2) when the parties are companions engaged in a common undertaking, a special relationship can give rise to a duty to provide reasonable assistance, such as summoning medical help.
The case is frequently taught to show how courts use Restatement principles and policy to delineate the boundaries of affirmative duties. It also demonstrates the interplay among duty, breach, causation, and foreseeability in failure-to-act scenarios, offering a rich platform for issue-spotting on exams and for understanding how courts balance moral intuitions, social expectations, and administrability concerns.
396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (Supreme Court of Michigan 1976)
Farwell and the defendant were young companions spending an evening together socializing. After an encounter with a group of young men at a drive-in, Farwell was chased and severely beaten, sustaining a serious head injury. The defendant found Farwell semiconscious beneath a vehicle, placed him in a car, and proceeded to drive around for approximately two hours, intermittently attempting to revive him and applying ice to a visible swelling. Rather than taking Farwell to a hospital or notifying his family or authorities, the defendant eventually parked in the driveway of Farwell’s grandparents’ home, left Farwell unconscious in the back seat covered with blankets, and departed without directly alerting anyone to Farwell’s condition. Farwell was discovered the next morning and died from an epidural hematoma that, according to medical testimony, would likely have been survivable with timely medical intervention. Farwell’s estate sued, alleging that the defendant negligently failed to secure needed medical assistance after voluntarily undertaking to aid Farwell and while engaged with him in a common social venture.
Does a companion who voluntarily undertakes to aid an injured friend during a common social venture have a legal duty to exercise reasonable care, including obtaining or summoning medical assistance, such that failure to do so can constitute negligence?
While there is generally no affirmative duty to rescue, a duty arises when: (1) a defendant voluntarily undertakes to render aid to a person who is helpless or in peril, in which case the defendant must exercise reasonable care in the undertaking and may be liable if discontinuing aid leaves the person worse off; and (2) a special relationship exists that justifies imposing an affirmative duty to act, including companions engaged in a common undertaking, who have a duty to render reasonable assistance such as seeking medical care when injury is known or reasonably apparent. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314, 324.
Yes. The defendant owed Farwell a duty to exercise reasonable care once he undertook to aid him and, as a companion in a common social venture, had an affirmative duty to seek or summon medical assistance. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with the recognition of that duty.
The court began with the common law rule that one ordinarily has no duty to rescue another. It then identified two well-recognized exceptions applicable on the record. First, by taking charge of Farwell—removing him from beneath the car, placing him in a vehicle, driving him around for hours, and attempting rudimentary first aid—the defendant voluntarily undertook to aid a helpless person. Under Restatement § 324, one who undertakes aid must act with reasonable care and may not abandon the effort in a way that increases the risk of harm. The defendant’s actions created reliance and foreclosed other sources of help for Farwell; leaving him unconscious in a car without notifying family or emergency personnel unreasonably increased the danger that his treatable injury would become fatal. Second, the court found a special relationship sufficient to impose an affirmative duty to act: the parties were companions in a common social undertaking. Their companionship and joint venture created mutual expectations of minimal aid in the face of serious injury, at least to the extent of summoning medical assistance. The defendant knew or had reason to know that Farwell was seriously injured—he observed significant head trauma and prolonged unconsciousness—making it foreseeable that failure to secure medical attention would result in grave harm. Medical testimony supported causation by indicating that timely treatment likely would have saved Farwell’s life. Policy considerations also supported the imposition of duty. Recognizing a limited duty to seek aid in such circumstances promotes socially desirable conduct without imposing an unbounded obligation to rescue. The court emphasized that it was not creating a general Good Samaritan duty; rather, it was enforcing reasonable care where a defendant had both undertaken aid and stood in a relationship justifying an expectation to act. A dissent cautioned against expanding affirmative duties, but the majority concluded that the relationship and undertaking here warranted liability.
Farwell is a leading case on affirmative duties in tort law. It operationalizes the Restatement’s voluntary undertaking doctrine and broadens the catalog of special relationships to include companions engaged in a common venture, thereby providing a framework for when the law requires bystanders to move from inaction to action. For students, it is essential for understanding how duty can arise without initial fault, how foreseeability and reliance inform the duty analysis, and how courts cabin such duties to avoid creating an unlimited rescue obligation.
No. The court reaffirmed the general no-duty-to-rescue rule. Duty arose because the defendant both undertook to aid a helpless person and stood in a special relationship as a companion in a common social venture. The holding requires reasonable steps, such as summoning medical help, in these limited contexts.
The court drew on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324, which imposes a duty of reasonable care on those who voluntarily take charge of a helpless person and restricts abandoning the aid, and § 314, which outlines the general no-duty rule and special relationships that create affirmative duties.
Medical evidence indicated that prompt medical care likely would have saved Farwell. Because the defendant delayed and then left Farwell without notifying anyone, a jury could find that the breach—failing to secure timely assistance—was a proximate cause of death.
The court characterized the parties as companions engaged in a common venture, a relationship that carries an expectation of minimal aid when serious injury occurs. This justified imposing an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps, like calling for medical help.
Likely yes. Promptly summoning medical assistance would have satisfied the duty of reasonable care arising from both the undertaking and the relationship. Liability in Farwell stemmed from the failure to take such basic steps and the resulting delay in treatment.
Good Samaritan statutes typically provide immunity for ordinary negligence in rendering emergency aid; they do not eliminate duties arising from an undertaking or special relationship. Farwell’s core principle—that once you undertake aid you must act reasonably—generally coexists with those statutes.
Farwell v. Keaton clarifies that while the common law does not obligate bystanders to intervene in every emergency, duties can arise when someone takes charge of an injured person or when a relationship justifies an expectation of minimal aid. In such cases, reasonable steps—especially summoning medical assistance—are legally required, and failure to take them can sound in negligence.
For students and practitioners, Farwell is a touchstone for analyzing affirmative duty problems. It illustrates how courts integrate Restatement principles, foreseeability, reliance, and social policy to determine when the law moves from moral suasion to legal obligation in rescue scenarios.