Farwell and the defendant were young companions spending an evening together socializing. After an encounter with a group of young men at a drive-in, Farwell was chased and severely beaten, sustaining a serious head injury. The defendant found Farwell semiconscious beneath a vehicle, placed him in a car, and proceeded to drive around for approximately two hours, intermittently attempting to revive him and applying ice to a visible swelling. Rather than taking Farwell to a hospital or notifying his family or authorities, the defendant eventually parked in the driveway of Farwell's grandparents' home, left Farwell unconscious in the back seat covered with blankets, and departed without directly alerting anyone to Farwell's condition. Farwell was discovered the next morning and died from an epidural hematoma that, according to medical testimony, would likely have been survivable with timely medical intervention. Farwell's estate sued, alleging that the defendant negligently failed to secure needed medical assistance after voluntarily undertaking to aid Farwell and while engaged with him in a common social venture.
Does a companion who voluntarily undertakes to aid an injured friend during a common social venture have a legal duty to exercise reasonable care, including obtaining or summoning medical assistance, such that failure to do so can constitute negligence?
While there is generally no affirmative duty to rescue, a duty arises when: (1) a defendant voluntarily undertakes to render aid to a person who is helpless or in peril, in which case the defendant must exercise reasonable care in the undertaking and may be liable if discontinuing aid leaves the person worse off; and (2) a special relationship exists that justifies imposing an affirmative duty to act, including companions engaged in a common undertaking, who have a duty to render reasonable assistance such as seeking medical care when injury is known or reasonably apparent. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314, 324.
Yes. The defendant owed Farwell a duty to exercise reasonable care once he undertook to aid him and, as a companion in a common social venture, had an affirmative duty to seek or summon medical assistance. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with the recognition of that duty.
The court began with the common law rule that one ordinarily has no duty to rescue another. It then identified two well-recognized exceptions applicable on the record. First, by taking charge of Farwell—removing him from beneath the car, placing him in a vehicle, driving him around for hours, and attempting rudimentary first aid—the defendant voluntarily undertook to aid a helpless person. Under Restatement § 324, one who undertakes aid must act with reasonable care and may not abandon the effort in a way that increases the risk of harm. The defendant's actions created reliance and foreclosed other sources of help for Farwell; leaving him unconscious in a car without notifying family or emergency personnel unreasonably increased the danger that his treatable injury would become fatal. Second, the court found a special relationship sufficient to impose an affirmative duty to act: the parties were companions in a common social undertaking. Their companionship and joint venture created mutual expectations of minimal aid in the face of serious injury, at least to the extent of summoning medical assistance. The defendant knew or had reason to know that Farwell was seriously injured—he observed significant head trauma and prolonged unconsciousness—making it foreseeable that failure to secure medical attention would result in grave harm. Medical testimony supported causation by indicating that timely treatment likely would have saved Farwell's life. Policy considerations also supported the imposition of duty. Recognizing a limited duty to seek aid in such circumstances promotes socially desirable conduct without imposing an unbounded obligation to rescue. The court emphasized that it was not creating a general Good Samaritan duty; rather, it was enforcing reasonable care where a defendant had both undertaken aid and stood in a relationship justifying an expectation to act. A dissent cautioned against expanding affirmative duties, but the majority concluded that the relationship and undertaking here warranted liability.
Farwell is a leading case on affirmative duties in tort law. It operationalizes the Restatement's voluntary undertaking doctrine and broadens the catalog of special relationships to include companions engaged in a common venture, thereby providing a framework for when the law requires bystanders to move from inaction to action. For students, it is essential for understanding how duty can arise without initial fault, how foreseeability and reliance inform the duty analysis, and how courts cabin such duties to avoid creating an unlimited rescue obligation.
Farwell v. Keaton clarifies that while the common law does not obligate bystanders to intervene in every emergency, duties can arise when someone takes charge of an injured person or when a relationship justifies an expectation of minimal aid. In such cases, reasonable steps—especially summoning medical assistance—are legally required, and failure to take them can sound in negligence.