Dissent in Snyder v. Phelps
562 U.S. 443 (2011) (2011) · Supreme Court of the United States
Snyder v. Phelps held that the First Amendment protects even deeply offensive speech on matters of public concern from tort liability. The Court ruled that members of the Westboro Baptist Church could not be held liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress for their protests near a military funeral, because the speech addressed matters of public concern on public land in a peaceful manner.
What was the dissent in Snyder v. Phelps?
Justice Alito dissented, arguing that the First Amendment does not give anyone the right to brutalize a grieving father at his son's funeral. He contended that the protesters specifically targeted the Snyder family and that their speech was not merely commentary on public issues but was designed to inflict maximum emotional harm on a vulnerable individual. He argued the Court's decision effectively provided no remedy for the most egregious forms of personal attack.
Case Overview
Facts
Members of the Westboro Baptist Church picketed near the funeral of Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, who was killed in Iraq. The protesters carried signs with messages such as 'God Hates Fags,' 'Thank God for Dead Soldiers,' and 'You're Going to Hell.' The protest took place on public land approximately 1,000 feet from the church where the funeral was held, in compliance with local law. Snyder's father, Albert Snyder, sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy.
Majority Holding
The Court held that the First Amendment protects speech on matters of public concern from tort liability for IIED, even when the speech is deeply offensive and causes severe emotional distress. Because the Westboro protesters' speech addressed matters of public concern (the political and moral conduct of the United States, the fate of the nation, and homosexuality in the military) and was conducted peacefully on public land, it was entitled to special protection under the First Amendment.
Majority Reasoning
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, reasoned that speech on matters of public concern occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values and is entitled to special protection. The content, form, and context of the speech must be examined to determine whether it addresses a public concern. While the speech was undoubtedly hurtful and offensive, it addressed broad public issues rather than being directed at private matters concerning Snyder personally. The protesters complied with police instructions and local ordinances. Allowing tort liability for such speech would chill public debate on important issues. The Court emphasized that the point of all speech protection is to shield just those choices of content that in someone's eyes are misguided or even hurtful.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Alito dissented, arguing that the First Amendment does not give anyone the right to brutalize a grieving father at his son's funeral. He contended that the protesters specifically targeted the Snyder family and that their speech was not merely commentary on public issues but was designed to inflict maximum emotional harm on a vulnerable individual. He argued the Court's decision effectively provided no remedy for the most egregious forms of personal attack.
Key Quotes
“Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and — as it did here — inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker.”
“As a Nation we have chosen a different course — to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”
“The point of all speech protection... is to shield just those choices of content that in someone's eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.”
Impact and Legacy
Snyder v. Phelps reinforced the robust protection afforded to speech on matters of public concern, even when that speech is deeply offensive and hurtful. The case clarified that the public concern inquiry focuses on the content, form, and context of the speech. It has been cited in numerous cases involving offensive public protests and has influenced the boundaries of tort liability for speech-related harms. The decision also prompted legislative responses, including federal and state laws creating buffer zones around funerals.
Exam Relevance
Snyder is tested in the intersection of torts and the First Amendment. Students should be prepared to analyze the public concern test, apply it to different types of speech, and discuss how it limits IIED and other tort claims. The case also raises important questions about the balance between free speech and personal dignity.
Study Tips
- Know the public concern test: courts examine the content, form, and context of the speech to determine whether it addresses a matter of public concern.
- Understand that speech on public concern receives special First Amendment protection, even when deeply offensive.
- Compare Snyder with Hustler v. Falwell — both involve offensive speech and IIED, but Snyder involves a private plaintiff rather than a public figure.
- Be prepared to discuss Justice Alito's dissent and the argument that targeted personal attacks should not be protected even if they touch on public issues.
Read the Full Case Analysis
View the complete brief for Snyder v. Phelps including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.
More Torts Dissents
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Judge Andrews wrote a vigorous dissent arguing that negligence is not relative to the individual but rather is a matter of whether the defendant's conduct was unreasonable. He advocated a broader proximate cause analysis, arguing that everyone owes a duty of care to the world at large and that liability should extend to all injuries that are the proximate result of negligent conduct, not just those to foreseeable plaintiffs.
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