Dissent in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California
17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334 (1976) (1976) · Supreme Court of California
Tarasoff established the duty of mental health professionals to protect identifiable third parties from serious harm threatened by their patients. The court's famous holding that the protective privilege ends where the public peril begins created a landmark duty to warn or protect that has been adopted in some form by the vast majority of American jurisdictions.
What was the dissent in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California?
Justice Clark dissented, arguing that the duty to warn would undermine the therapeutic relationship, deter patients from seeking treatment, and discourage therapists from treating potentially dangerous patients. He contended that the duty was unworkable because therapists cannot reliably predict violent behavior and that the majority's ruling would ultimately cause more harm than it prevented.
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Case Overview
Facts
Prosenjit Poddar, a graduate student at UC Berkeley, confided to his psychologist, Dr. Lawrence Moore, at the university counseling center that he intended to kill Tatiana Tarasoff, a fellow student who had rejected his romantic advances. Dr. Moore notified campus police, who briefly detained Poddar but released him when he appeared rational. No warning was given to Tarasoff or her family. Two months later, Poddar killed Tarasoff.
Majority Holding
The court held that when a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of the profession should determine, that a patient presents a serious danger of violence to a foreseeable victim, the therapist incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger. This duty may be discharged by warning the intended victim, notifying the police, or taking other reasonable steps. The protective privilege of therapist-patient confidentiality ends where the public peril begins.
Majority Reasoning
The court reasoned that the special relationship between a therapist and patient creates a duty of care extending to identifiable third parties threatened by the patient. Drawing on the general principle that one who is in a special relationship with a dangerous person may owe a duty to third parties, the court held that therapists must balance patient confidentiality against public safety. The court rejected the argument that imposing such a duty would deter patients from seeking treatment, finding that the risk of violence to identifiable victims outweighed the potential impact on the therapeutic relationship. The court emphasized that the public policy favoring protection of life outweighs the policy favoring confidentiality in communications.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Clark dissented, arguing that the duty to warn would undermine the therapeutic relationship, deter patients from seeking treatment, and discourage therapists from treating potentially dangerous patients. He contended that the duty was unworkable because therapists cannot reliably predict violent behavior and that the majority's ruling would ultimately cause more harm than it prevented.
Key Quotes
“The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.”
“When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger.”
“The public policy favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.”
Impact and Legacy
Tarasoff is one of the most influential tort cases of the twentieth century. Nearly every state has adopted some form of the Tarasoff duty, either through judicial decisions or legislation, though the scope of the duty varies significantly by jurisdiction. The case fundamentally changed the practice of psychotherapy and created an ongoing tension between patient confidentiality and the duty to protect. It has been extended in some jurisdictions to other professionals and relationships where one party has knowledge of a foreseeable risk to identifiable third parties.
Exam Relevance
Tarasoff is tested extensively on exams, particularly in questions about special relationships and the duty to act. Students should be prepared to analyze when a duty to warn or protect arises, who qualifies as a foreseeable victim, and what steps satisfy the duty. It also appears in questions about the limits of duty and the tension between confidentiality and public safety.
Study Tips
- Know the elements of the Tarasoff duty: a special relationship, knowledge of a serious threat, and an identifiable victim.
- Understand the difference between the initial 'duty to warn' holding and the broader 'duty to protect' from the rehearing.
- Be prepared to discuss the policy tension between patient confidentiality and public safety.
- Know that the scope of Tarasoff varies by jurisdiction — some states limit it to identifiable victims, others extend it to foreseeable victims, and some have legislatively modified the duty.
Read the Full Case Analysis
View the complete brief for Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.
More Torts Dissents
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (1928)
Judge Andrews wrote a vigorous dissent arguing that negligence is not relative to the individual but rather is a matter of whether the defendant's conduct was unreasonable. He advocated a broader proximate cause analysis, arguing that everyone owes a duty of care to the world at large and that liability should extend to all injuries that are the proximate result of negligent conduct, not just those to foreseeable plaintiffs.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924 (1980) (1980)
Justice Richardson dissented, arguing that the majority abandoned the fundamental tort requirement of causation. He contended that market share liability imposes liability on defendants who may not have caused the plaintiff's injury and that the judicial branch should not create such radical new theories of liability. He argued this was properly a matter for legislative action.
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
517 U.S. 559 (1996) (1996)
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Due Process Clause does not provide a substantive right to a particular standard of punitive damages and that the three-guidepost test was unworkable and lacked foundation in the Constitution's text or history. Justice Ginsburg also dissented, arguing that the Court should defer to state procedures for controlling excessive verdicts.
Katko v. Briney
183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971) (1971)
Justice Larson dissented, arguing that the majority's rule allowed trespassers and thieves to sue property owners who attempted to protect their property. He contended that property owners should have broader rights to defend their homes and possessions, particularly when they have been repeatedly victimized by break-ins.
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.
109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910) (1910)
Justice Lewis dissented, arguing that the damage was caused by the storm, not by the defendant's conduct, and that the defendant should not be liable for an act of God. He contended that the defendant had no realistic alternative and should not be penalized for acting reasonably in an emergency.
Thing v. La Chusa
48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814 (1989) (1989)
Justice Broussard dissented, arguing that the majority's strict rules were arbitrary and that a mother who arrives at the scene moments after the accident and sees her injured child suffers the same type of emotional distress as one who witnesses the accident itself. He argued that the flexible Dillon approach better served the interests of justice.