Dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (1928) · New York Court of Appeals
Palsgraf is the foundational case on proximate cause and duty in negligence law. It established that a defendant owes a duty of care only to foreseeable plaintiffs and that negligence in the air, so to speak, does not create liability to everyone harmed. The case remains the starting point for virtually every discussion of duty and proximate cause in American tort law.
What was the dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.?
Judge Andrews wrote a vigorous dissent arguing that negligence is not relative to the individual but rather is a matter of whether the defendant's conduct was unreasonable. He advocated a broader proximate cause analysis, arguing that everyone owes a duty of care to the world at large and that liability should extend to all injuries that are the proximate result of negligent conduct, not just those to foreseeable plaintiffs.
Source: Read Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. on Google Scholar
Case Overview
Facts
Mrs. Palsgraf was standing on a platform at the defendant's railroad station. Two men ran to catch a departing train, and a railroad guard pushed one of them aboard, causing a package he was carrying to fall onto the tracks. The package contained fireworks, which exploded, sending shockwaves down the platform that knocked over a set of scales, which struck and injured Mrs. Palsgraf.
Majority Holding
The court held that the defendant railroad was not liable because there was no negligence toward the plaintiff specifically. Negligence requires a duty owed to the particular plaintiff, and because the harm to Mrs. Palsgraf was not a foreseeable result of the guard's conduct, no duty existed. The defendant's conduct, though possibly negligent toward the man with the package, was not negligent as to Mrs. Palsgraf.
Majority Reasoning
Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Cardozo reasoned that negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest — the violation of a right. The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation. The guard's conduct may have been a wrong to the man carrying the package, but it was not a wrong to Mrs. Palsgraf, standing far away. The orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would not extend to her. Without a duty owed to the plaintiff, there could be no negligence and no liability.
The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Andrews wrote a vigorous dissent arguing that negligence is not relative to the individual but rather is a matter of whether the defendant's conduct was unreasonable. He advocated a broader proximate cause analysis, arguing that everyone owes a duty of care to the world at large and that liability should extend to all injuries that are the proximate result of negligent conduct, not just those to foreseeable plaintiffs.
Key Quotes
“The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension.”
“Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a right.”
“The orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of the duty.”
Impact and Legacy
Palsgraf became the dominant American approach to duty analysis in negligence, establishing the foreseeability framework that most jurisdictions follow. It profoundly shaped the development of the Restatement of Torts and continues to be one of the most cited and debated cases in tort law. The tension between the Cardozo majority and the Andrews dissent continues to animate scholarly and judicial debate about the proper scope of negligence liability.
Exam Relevance
Palsgraf appears on exams whenever there is a chain of events leading to an unforeseeable plaintiff's injury. Students should be prepared to analyze both the Cardozo duty-based approach and the Andrews proximate cause approach, and to argue which framework better resolves the question of liability in a given fact pattern.
Study Tips
- Master the distinction between the Cardozo approach (duty limits liability to foreseeable plaintiffs) and the Andrews approach (proximate cause limits liability based on directness and remoteness).
- Remember that Cardozo treats duty as a threshold question, while Andrews treats it as a question of proximate cause — both reach the same practical territory but from different doctrinal angles.
- Be prepared to apply both approaches to novel fact patterns and explain why a court might prefer one over the other.
- Connect Palsgraf to the broader duty analysis, including the relationship between foreseeability, duty, and proximate cause.
Read the Full Case Analysis
View the complete brief for Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.
More Torts Dissents
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924 (1980) (1980)
Justice Richardson dissented, arguing that the majority abandoned the fundamental tort requirement of causation. He contended that market share liability imposes liability on defendants who may not have caused the plaintiff's injury and that the judicial branch should not create such radical new theories of liability. He argued this was properly a matter for legislative action.
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California
17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334 (1976) (1976)
Justice Clark dissented, arguing that the duty to warn would undermine the therapeutic relationship, deter patients from seeking treatment, and discourage therapists from treating potentially dangerous patients. He contended that the duty was unworkable because therapists cannot reliably predict violent behavior and that the majority's ruling would ultimately cause more harm than it prevented.
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
517 U.S. 559 (1996) (1996)
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Due Process Clause does not provide a substantive right to a particular standard of punitive damages and that the three-guidepost test was unworkable and lacked foundation in the Constitution's text or history. Justice Ginsburg also dissented, arguing that the Court should defer to state procedures for controlling excessive verdicts.
Katko v. Briney
183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971) (1971)
Justice Larson dissented, arguing that the majority's rule allowed trespassers and thieves to sue property owners who attempted to protect their property. He contended that property owners should have broader rights to defend their homes and possessions, particularly when they have been repeatedly victimized by break-ins.
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.
109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910) (1910)
Justice Lewis dissented, arguing that the damage was caused by the storm, not by the defendant's conduct, and that the defendant should not be liable for an act of God. He contended that the defendant had no realistic alternative and should not be penalized for acting reasonably in an emergency.
Thing v. La Chusa
48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814 (1989) (1989)
Justice Broussard dissented, arguing that the majority's strict rules were arbitrary and that a mother who arrives at the scene moments after the accident and sees her injured child suffers the same type of emotional distress as one who witnesses the accident itself. He argued that the flexible Dillon approach better served the interests of justice.