Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S. Ct. 746, 145 L. Ed. 2d 756 (2000)
Smith v. Robbins is a cornerstone case in appellate criminal procedure that addresses what appointed counsel must do when they determine an indigent defendant's first appeal as of right presents no nonfrivolous issues.
Does California's Wende procedure for appointed counsel who find no arguable appellate issues satisfy the Constitution, or does Anders v. California prescribe the exclusive process? Additionally, did Robbins demonstrate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel under Strickland by showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's performance, he would have prevailed on appeal?
Anders v. California prescribes one permissible method, but not the only constitutionally required method, to protect an indigent defendant's right to counsel on a first appeal as of right. A state may adopt a different procedure so long as it affords adequate and effective appellate review—ensuring that the defendant has counsel, the appellate court (not counsel) ultimately determines frivolousness after an independent review, and nonfrivolous issues receive adversarial briefing. Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are governed by Strickland v. Washington: the defendant must show deficient performance and a reasonable probability of a different appellate outcome; no presumption of prejudice applies merely because counsel filed a Wende-type brief or did not raise every nonfrivolous issue (see also Jones v. Barnes and Penson v. Ohio).
The Court held that California's Wende procedure is constitutionally adequate and that Anders is not the exclusive method for handling appeals counsel deems frivolous. Robbins failed to establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because he did not show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, he would have prevailed on appeal. The Court reversed the grant of habeas relief.
Smith v. Robbins is a leading case on the constitutional parameters of appellate procedure for indigent defendants. It confirms that Anders is a permissible—but not mandatory—template, giving states flexibility to adopt different mechanisms that still ensure meaningful review and the assistance of counsel. The case also cements Strickland as the standard for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and rejects any categorical presumption of prejudice when counsel pursues a Wende-type filing. For students and practitioners, Robbins delineates the constitutional floor for appellate advocacy, highlights the role of independent judicial review in screening frivolous appeals, and underscores that success on ineffective-assistance claims requires a concrete showing of likely appellate success absent counsel's alleged errors.