Robbins, an indigent criminal defendant in California, was convicted and sought a first appeal as of right with appointed counsel. After reviewing the record, his appointed appellate counsel concluded there were no nonfrivolous issues to raise. Following California's procedure under People v. Wende, counsel filed a brief that summarized the case and facts, informed the court that counsel had found no arguable issues, and advised Robbins of his right to file a supplemental pro se brief. Counsel did not seek to withdraw and remained available to brief any issues the appellate court might identify. The California Court of Appeal independently reviewed the entire record, allowed Robbins to submit a pro se filing, and ultimately affirmed the conviction, finding no arguable issues. After state review concluded, Robbins filed federal habeas petitions arguing that California's Wende procedure violated Anders v. California and deprived him of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to identify and raise meritorious claims. The Ninth Circuit granted relief in relevant part, concluding the Wende process failed to meet Anders's requirements. The State, through the warden (Smith), sought and obtained Supreme Court review.
Does California's Wende procedure for appointed counsel who find no arguable appellate issues satisfy the Constitution, or does Anders v. California prescribe the exclusive process? Additionally, did Robbins demonstrate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel under Strickland by showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's performance, he would have prevailed on appeal?
Anders v. California prescribes one permissible method, but not the only constitutionally required method, to protect an indigent defendant's right to counsel on a first appeal as of right. A state may adopt a different procedure so long as it affords adequate and effective appellate review—ensuring that the defendant has counsel, the appellate court (not counsel) ultimately determines frivolousness after an independent review, and nonfrivolous issues receive adversarial briefing. Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are governed by Strickland v. Washington: the defendant must show deficient performance and a reasonable probability of a different appellate outcome; no presumption of prejudice applies merely because counsel filed a Wende-type brief or did not raise every nonfrivolous issue (see also Jones v. Barnes and Penson v. Ohio).
The Court held that California's Wende procedure is constitutionally adequate and that Anders is not the exclusive method for handling appeals counsel deems frivolous. Robbins failed to establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because he did not show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, he would have prevailed on appeal. The Court reversed the grant of habeas relief.
1) Anders not exclusive: The Court explained that Anders established a prophylactic framework to protect a defendant's right to counsel and fair review on appeal; it did not set forth a rigid constitutional mandate. The constitutional floor is that an indigent appellant receive the effective assistance of counsel and that the appellate court—not counsel—make the ultimate determination whether an appeal is frivolous after a full examination of the record. So long as those protections are met, states may craft reasonable alternatives. 2) Adequacy of Wende: California's Wende procedure requires counsel who finds no arguable issues to file a brief setting out the case and facts, to advise the client of the right to submit a pro se supplemental brief, and to remain available to brief any issue the court might identify. The California Court of Appeal then conducts an independent review of the entire record. The Supreme Court found this process sufficient because it preserves the adversarial role of counsel (counsel does not abandon the client), prompts judicial, not counsel, determination of frivolousness, and guarantees record-based screening for potential errors. In some respects, the Wende procedure is more protective than Anders because it keeps counsel on the case rather than authorizing withdrawal at the outset. 3) No per se prejudice; Strickland governs: Turning to Robbins's ineffective-assistance claim, the Court rejected any automatic presumption of prejudice under United States v. Cronic. Counsel did not entirely fail to subject the case to adversarial testing; instead, counsel reviewed the record, filed a Wende brief, and remained available. Under Strickland, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must show deficient performance and prejudice defined as a reasonable probability of prevailing on appeal but for counsel's errors. The Court emphasized Jones v. Barnes: competent appellate counsel need not raise every colorable claim, and strategic selection of issues is a hallmark of effective advocacy. Applying that standard, the Court concluded Robbins had not demonstrated that the omitted arguments would likely have changed the outcome of his appeal. 4) Disposition: Because California's procedure satisfies constitutional requirements and Robbins failed to meet Strickland's prejudice prong, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's grant of habeas relief.
Smith v. Robbins is a leading case on the constitutional parameters of appellate procedure for indigent defendants. It confirms that Anders is a permissible—but not mandatory—template, giving states flexibility to adopt different mechanisms that still ensure meaningful review and the assistance of counsel. The case also cements Strickland as the standard for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and rejects any categorical presumption of prejudice when counsel pursues a Wende-type filing. For students and practitioners, Robbins delineates the constitutional floor for appellate advocacy, highlights the role of independent judicial review in screening frivolous appeals, and underscores that success on ineffective-assistance claims requires a concrete showing of likely appellate success absent counsel's alleged errors.
Smith v. Robbins both respects and refines Anders by confirming that the Constitution does not bind states to a single method for handling potentially frivolous appeals by indigent defendants. California's Wende procedure—counsel's summary filing, notice to the client, counsel's continued representation, and the appellate court's independent review—satisfies the constitutional floor of effective assistance and meaningful appellate scrutiny.