People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1906)
People v. Jaffe is a foundational case in criminal attempt doctrine, especially on the defense of legal impossibility.
Can a defendant be convicted of an attempt to receive stolen property when, at the time of receipt, the property is not in fact stolen, though the defendant believes it is?
Legal impossibility is a defense to attempt. To constitute a criminal attempt, the defendant must intend to commit a crime and perform an act that would constitute the crime if the circumstances were as they actually are. If, even if fully carried out exactly as the defendant intends, the act would not be a crime because an essential legal element is missing (e.g., the property is not in fact "stolen"), there is no attempt liability.
No. The conviction for attempt to receive stolen property was reversed. Because the goods were not in fact stolen at the time of receipt, receiving them would not have been a crime even if the defendant completed his intended conduct; thus, legal impossibility barred attempt liability.
People v. Jaffe is the classic statement that legal impossibility is a complete defense to attempt: if the act, even if consummated, would not be criminal due to the legal status of attendant circumstances, there is no attempt. The case is frequently contrasted with factual impossibility (e.g., trying to pick an empty pocket), which generally is not a defense. Jaffe has been criticized and limited; many jurisdictions, influenced by the Model Penal Code, would impose attempt liability so long as the defendant would have committed a crime if the facts were as he believed them to be. In New York, later statutory reform and People v. Dlugash shifted the law toward that MPC approach, effectively abrogating Jaffe's rule. For law students, Jaffe provides a clear framework for analyzing impossibility issues and a historical baseline against which modern reforms are measured.