Master New York's high court recognized legal impossibility as a complete defense to attempt, reversing a conviction for attempting to receive stolen property where the goods were not in fact stolen. with this comprehensive case brief.
People v. Jaffe is a foundational case in criminal attempt doctrine, especially on the defense of legal impossibility. The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant cannot be convicted of attempting to receive stolen property when, at the time of the transaction, the goods were no longer stolen—even if the defendant believed and intended to receive stolen goods. The decision draws a sharp line between culpable intent and the legal status of the circumstances that would make the intended act criminal.
The case has lasting pedagogical importance because it articulates the classic distinction between legal impossibility (a defense) and factual impossibility (typically not a defense). While many modern jurisdictions, following the Model Penal Code, have rejected Jaffe’s approach and would uphold attempt liability if the crime would have been completed as the defendant believed the facts to be, Jaffe remains a touchstone for understanding historical common-law limits on attempt liability and for framing exam-ready analyses of impossibility problems.
People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1906)
The defendant, Jaffe, arranged to purchase bolts of cloth that he believed had been stolen. In actuality, although the goods had been previously taken, they had been recovered by the true owner and were under the control of law enforcement before the purported sale to Jaffe. Working with the police, an intermediary delivered the goods to Jaffe while representing that they were stolen. Jaffe accepted the goods and paid for them, believing he was receiving stolen property. He was arrested and charged—not with the completed offense of receiving stolen property, since the goods were no longer stolen—but with attempting to receive stolen property, knowing it to have been stolen. He was convicted at trial, and the conviction was affirmed by the intermediate appellate court. The New York Court of Appeals granted review.
Can a defendant be convicted of an attempt to receive stolen property when, at the time of receipt, the property is not in fact stolen, though the defendant believes it is?
Legal impossibility is a defense to attempt. To constitute a criminal attempt, the defendant must intend to commit a crime and perform an act that would constitute the crime if the circumstances were as they actually are. If, even if fully carried out exactly as the defendant intends, the act would not be a crime because an essential legal element is missing (e.g., the property is not in fact "stolen"), there is no attempt liability.
No. The conviction for attempt to receive stolen property was reversed. Because the goods were not in fact stolen at the time of receipt, receiving them would not have been a crime even if the defendant completed his intended conduct; thus, legal impossibility barred attempt liability.
The court began with the statutory offense of receiving stolen property, which requires both the receipt of property and that the property be "stolen"—an objective legal status—along with the receiver’s knowledge of that status. The statute presupposes the property is in fact stolen; mere belief that it is stolen does not satisfy the legal element. When the owner (or law enforcement on the owner’s behalf) regains control of the property, it ceases to be "stolen," and receipt of it cannot violate the statute. Turning to attempt, the court emphasized that an attempt requires an intent to commit a crime plus conduct tending to its commission that would culminate in a crime if not interrupted. Here, even if Jaffe completed everything he set out to do—receive the goods believing them to be stolen—his act would not have amounted to a crime because the goods were not stolen in law. The barrier to conviction was not a factual miscalculation (such as an empty pocket or a broken weapon), but an absence of a necessary legal element. The court refused to allow the defendant’s culpable mental state to convert non-criminal conduct into a crime; courts cannot create crimes by punishing morally blameworthy intentions unmoored from legally proscribed acts. Accordingly, because the intended conduct, if completed under the actual circumstances, would not constitute the offense, legal impossibility precluded an attempt conviction.
People v. Jaffe is the classic statement that legal impossibility is a complete defense to attempt: if the act, even if consummated, would not be criminal due to the legal status of attendant circumstances, there is no attempt. The case is frequently contrasted with factual impossibility (e.g., trying to pick an empty pocket), which generally is not a defense. Jaffe has been criticized and limited; many jurisdictions, influenced by the Model Penal Code, would impose attempt liability so long as the defendant would have committed a crime if the facts were as he believed them to be. In New York, later statutory reform and People v. Dlugash shifted the law toward that MPC approach, effectively abrogating Jaffe’s rule. For law students, Jaffe provides a clear framework for analyzing impossibility issues and a historical baseline against which modern reforms are measured.
Legal impossibility arises when the intended act, even if fully carried out, would not constitute a crime because an essential legal element is missing (e.g., the property is not legally "stolen"). Factual impossibility occurs when external facts prevent completion (e.g., the pocket is empty or the gun malfunctions) but the completed act would have been a crime if the facts were as the actor believes. Jaffe treats legal impossibility as a defense, while factual impossibility generally is not.
Likely not. Under the Model Penal Code § 5.01, a defendant is guilty of attempt if he acts with the required culpability and engages in conduct that would be a crime if the circumstances were as he believes them to be. Because Jaffe believed the goods were stolen and took substantial steps to receive them, he could be guilty of attempt under the MPC approach, notwithstanding the goods’ actual legal status.
As a statement of common-law impossibility, Jaffe is historically important, but New York has since moved toward the MPC position. Through statutory reform and subsequent decisions (notably People v. Dlugash), New York recognizes attempt liability even when the offense was impossible under the actual circumstances, so long as the crime would have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be. Thus, Jaffe’s strict legal impossibility defense has been effectively abrogated in New York.
The receiving-stolen-property statute requires that the property be stolen as a matter of law, not merely believed to be stolen. Once the goods were recovered and under the owner’s control, they were no longer stolen. Because the statute’s legal element was missing, no matter what the defendant believed, the completed act could not satisfy the offense; therefore, there could be no attempt.
People v. Rojas (Cal.) rejected Jaffe’s strict legal impossibility rule and upheld attempt liability for receiving property believed to be stolen even when it was not. People v. Dlugash (N.Y.) moved New York toward the MPC’s "as the actor believes" test, limiting Jaffe. Together, these cases show the doctrinal shift away from legal impossibility as a complete defense in many jurisdictions.
On an exam, (1) identify whether the impossibility is legal or factual; (2) state the jurisdiction’s rule (common law/Jaffe vs. MPC/modern statutes); (3) apply the test: would the act be a crime if completed under actual circumstances (Jaffe) or as the defendant believed them to be (MPC)?; and (4) tie the analysis to the missing legal element (e.g., property not legally "stolen").
People v. Jaffe crystallizes the traditional common-law boundary of attempt liability: culpable intent alone does not create a crime where the objective legal elements are absent. The decision underscores that legal impossibility—where the intended act, even if fully consummated, would not be criminal—precludes conviction for attempt.
Modern criminal law has largely migrated away from Jaffe’s strict rule, favoring the Model Penal Code’s focus on the actor’s beliefs about the circumstances. Nevertheless, Jaffe remains essential for understanding the evolution of attempt doctrine, the legal/factual impossibility distinction, and for framing clear, jurisdiction-sensitive analyses on exams and in practice.