445 U.S. 573 (1980)
Payton v. New York is a bedrock Fourth Amendment case that draws a bright constitutional line at the doorway of the home.
Does the Fourth Amendment permit police to make a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to effect a routine felony arrest in the absence of exigent circumstances?
Absent exigent circumstances or valid consent, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to effect a routine felony arrest. To lawfully enter a suspect's own residence to make an arrest, officers must have an arrest warrant supported by probable cause and reason to believe the suspect is inside at the time of entry. Evidence obtained following an unlawful entry is subject to suppression unless an independent exception to the exclusionary rule applies.
No. The Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the home. Without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances, police may not cross that threshold to make a routine felony arrest. The New York statute authorizing such entries was unconstitutional as applied, and the entries in both cases violated the Fourth Amendment.
Payton is a cornerstone of search-and-seizure doctrine that defines the constitutional boundary at a home's threshold. It complements and limits Watson by making clear that public arrest authority does not extend into private dwellings without a warrant or exigency. For law students, it is essential for resolving home-entry questions on exams, structuring suppression analyses, and understanding how exceptions such as consent, exigent circumstances, and plain view interact. Payton also sets the stage for related doctrines: entry into a third party's home to execute an arrest warrant generally requires a search warrant (Steagald), a suspect voluntarily standing in a public doorway may be arrested without entry (Santana), and the gravity of the offense factors into exigency (Welsh).