Master Warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a home to make a routine felony arrest violates the Fourth Amendment absent exigent circumstances. with this comprehensive case brief.
Payton v. New York is a cornerstone Fourth Amendment case that draws a bright constitutional line at the threshold of the home. The Supreme Court held that, absent exigent circumstances or consent, the police may not cross that line to arrest a suspect without first obtaining a warrant. In doing so, the Court reinforced the fundamental principle that the home is the heartland of privacy, and that the “chief evil” against which the Fourth Amendment is directed is the physical entry of the home by the government.
For law students and practitioners, Payton clarifies the distinction between public-place arrests (which may be conducted on probable cause without a warrant) and home arrests, which require prior judicial authorization unless an exigency exists. The decision structures modern arrest practice, interacts with doctrines like plain view, consent, and exigent circumstances, and anchors related rules governing third-party residences and protective sweeps. It is a staple of criminal procedure analysis and a frequent exam touchstone.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)
The case consolidates two New York prosecutions under a state statute authorizing police to enter a private residence without a warrant to make a felony arrest when supported by probable cause. In the Payton matter, officers investigating a murder had probable cause to believe Theodore Payton was the perpetrator. Without obtaining a warrant, they went to his apartment during the day, knocked and announced, received no response, forcibly pried open the door, and entered. Payton was not home, but officers observed and seized a shell casing in plain view that was later used as evidence. In the companion case, Riddick v. New York, officers, again without a warrant, went to Obie Riddick’s home based on probable cause for robbery. After the door was opened, officers entered and arrested Riddick inside. They then searched the residence and opened drawers, seizing narcotics. The New York courts upheld both entries and seizures under the state statute. The defendants challenged the statute’s constitutionality and sought suppression of the evidence as the product of unlawful home entries.
Does the Fourth Amendment permit the police to make a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home to effect a routine felony arrest based solely on probable cause, absent exigent circumstances?
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits warrantless, nonconsensual entries into a suspect’s home to make a routine felony arrest. Absent exigent circumstances, officers must obtain an arrest warrant and have reason to believe the suspect is within before entering the suspect’s dwelling; probable cause alone is insufficient to cross the home’s threshold.
No. The Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the home. Warrantless, nonconsensual entries to effectuate routine felony arrests are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances. New York’s statute authorizing such entries based solely on probable cause is unconstitutional, and the evidence obtained from the entries was inadmissible.
The Court emphasized that the home occupies a special constitutional status. The text and history of the Fourth Amendment reflect a central concern with governmental intrusions into the home. While United States v. Watson permits warrantless public arrests on probable cause, the heightened privacy interests in the home require prior judicial authorization—an arrest warrant—before the police may enter to arrest, unless exigent circumstances exist. The Court rejected the State’s contention that probable cause and the seriousness of felony investigations are sufficient safeguards, explaining that a neutral magistrate’s ex ante determination is the constitutionally preferred check on police discretion, particularly when the government seeks to cross the home’s threshold. The Court also found no sufficient practical impediment to obtaining warrants in most cases, especially where officers have time to do so. In Payton’s case, officers had ample opportunity to seek a warrant and faced no exigency. In Riddick’s case, the subsequent search of drawers likewise could not be justified because the initial entry and arrest were unconstitutional, and the evidence was the fruit of that unlawful entry. The Court reaffirmed that exceptions—such as exigent circumstances (e.g., hot pursuit, imminent destruction of evidence, risk of escape, or danger to persons) and consent—may justify entry, but the New York statute’s blanket authorization for warrantless home entries based on probable cause alone violated the Fourth Amendment.
Payton creates a bright-line rule protecting the sanctity of the home: no warrantless, nonconsensual entry for a routine arrest absent exigent circumstances. It clarifies the divide between public arrests (probable cause suffices) and home arrests (warrant generally required). The case underpins later doctrines: it pairs with Steagald v. United States (holding that entering a third party’s home to arrest a suspect generally requires a search warrant) and sits alongside Maryland v. Buie (permitting limited protective sweeps after a lawful in-home arrest). For exams, Payton frames analyses involving consent, exigent circumstances, plain view (which cannot validate evidence if the initial entry is unlawful), and the standard for entering a suspect’s own home with an arrest warrant when officers have reason to believe the suspect is inside.
They need an arrest warrant plus reason to believe the suspect is inside at the time of entry, unless an exigent circumstance or valid consent justifies entry. Probable cause alone is not enough to cross the threshold of the suspect’s home.
Common exigencies include hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, imminent destruction of evidence, immediate threats to safety, or a serious risk of escape. The government bears the burden to prove the exigency; mere convenience, routine scheduling, or generalized concerns do not suffice.
No. The plain-view doctrine applies only if the officers are lawfully present. If the initial entry violates Payton, evidence observed and seized inside is typically suppressed as fruit of the unlawful entry, subject to exceptions like independent source or inevitable discovery, if proven.
To enter a suspect’s own home to arrest the suspect, Payton requires an arrest warrant and reason to believe the suspect is inside. Entering a third party’s home to arrest a suspect generally requires a search warrant for that location (as clarified in Steagald v. United States).
The Supreme Court in Payton used the phrase “reason to believe” without precisely defining its quantum. Many courts treat it as equivalent to probable cause; some describe it as a slightly lower standard. On exams and in practice, identify your jurisdiction’s approach and apply specific facts showing a strong basis to think the suspect is presently inside.
Voluntary consent from someone with actual or apparent authority can justify entry, obviating the need for a warrant. After a lawful in-home arrest, officers may conduct a limited protective sweep for persons who could pose a danger (Maryland v. Buie), but a sweep cannot validate an entry that violates Payton.
Payton v. New York entrenches the principle that the home is the core of Fourth Amendment protection and that crossing its threshold requires prior judicial authorization absent a recognized exception. By invalidating New York’s statute permitting warrantless home entries for felony arrests, the Court reaffirmed that probable cause is not a sufficient substitute for a warrant when the government seeks to intrude into a private residence.
For students and practitioners, Payton offers a clear analytical framework: ask whether officers had consent or exigent circumstances; if not, require an arrest warrant to enter a suspect’s home and a search warrant to enter a third party’s home. The decision remains central to evaluating the admissibility of evidence seized following in-home arrests and to structuring constitutional arrest and entry practices.