Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (Mass. 1825)
Mills v. Wyman is a foundational case in contract law that sharply delineates the boundary between legal obligation and moral duty.
Is a promise to pay for services previously rendered to the promisor's adult son, made after the fact and without any prior legal duty or request by the promisor, enforceable when based solely on moral obligation?
A purely moral obligation does not constitute consideration and cannot render a promise enforceable absent a prior legal obligation or a bargained-for exchange. Traditional exceptions recognize enforceability when the moral obligation is tied to an antecedent legal duty that had become unenforceable for technical reasons (e.g., promises to pay debts barred by the statute of limitations, ratifications of debts incurred during infancy upon reaching majority, or debts discharged in bankruptcy).
No. The father's promise, grounded only in moral obligation and made after the services were rendered without his request and absent any preexisting legal duty to support his adult son, is unenforceable for lack of consideration.
Mills v. Wyman is a bedrock authority for the proposition that moral obligation alone does not supply consideration. It is central to understanding the past consideration doctrine and the limited circumstances in which promises recognizing a moral duty are enforceable. The case is routinely contrasted with modern doctrines: restitution (which requires a benefit to the defendant), promissory estoppel (which can enforce certain promises based on reliance), and the material benefit rule (Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 86), under which some promises made in recognition of a benefit conferred may be enforceable. Mills helps students identify when those alternative theories might apply and, just as importantly, when they do not.