Master A purely moral obligation, without a prior legal duty or bargained-for exchange, is not sufficient consideration to render a promise enforceable. with this comprehensive case brief.
Mills v. Wyman is a foundational case in contract law that sharply delineates the boundary between legal obligation and moral duty. It is frequently taught to illustrate that a promise grounded solely in conscience, sympathy, or gratitude does not create a legally enforceable contract unless linked to a recognized legal duty or bargained-for exchange. The case thus serves as a canonical example of the doctrine that "past consideration is no consideration" and that moral obligation, standing alone, does not supply consideration.
The case also frames enduring policy debates: Should the law enforce promises that respond to humanitarian acts? Mills rejects enforcement in the absence of a prior legal obligation or request from the promisor, signaling the common law’s preference for bargains over mere beneficence. It simultaneously catalogs traditional exceptions—such as promises to pay debts barred by the statute of limitations or discharged in bankruptcy—where a moral obligation is tethered to an antecedent legal duty. The opinion provides a springboard for comparing older consideration doctrine with modern developments like the material benefit rule and promissory estoppel.
For students, Mills is indispensable for mastering the architecture of consideration, for understanding the Good Samaritan problem, and for recognizing how courts police the line between moral suasion and legal enforcement. It prepares readers to evaluate when exceptions apply and how alternative theories—like restitution or reliance—might (or might not) rescue a promise.
Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (Mass. 1825)
Mills cared for and provided necessaries to Levi Wyman, an adult son of the defendant, after Levi fell ill following a sea voyage. The defendant, Seth Wyman, had not requested these services and bore no legal duty to support his adult son, who was living apart from him. After the services were rendered (and after Levi died, according to many accounts), the father wrote a letter to Mills promising to pay for the expenses incurred in caring for Levi. When the father later refused to pay, Mills brought an action in assumpsit to enforce the promise. The case thus presented a promise made after the benefit was conferred, to compensate a third party for care of the promisor’s adult child, with no prior request or legal duty on the promisor’s part.
Is a promise to pay for services previously rendered to the promisor’s adult son, made after the fact and without any prior legal duty or request by the promisor, enforceable when based solely on moral obligation?
A purely moral obligation does not constitute consideration and cannot render a promise enforceable absent a prior legal obligation or a bargained-for exchange. Traditional exceptions recognize enforceability when the moral obligation is tied to an antecedent legal duty that had become unenforceable for technical reasons (e.g., promises to pay debts barred by the statute of limitations, ratifications of debts incurred during infancy upon reaching majority, or debts discharged in bankruptcy).
No. The father’s promise, grounded only in moral obligation and made after the services were rendered without his request and absent any preexisting legal duty to support his adult son, is unenforceable for lack of consideration.
The court, per Parker, C.J., emphasized that enforceable contracts rest on consideration—either a bargained-for exchange or a duty recognized by law. Here, the services were rendered before the promise and without any request by the promisor, so there was no exchange or inducement. Because the son was an adult living apart from his father, the father owed no legal duty to support him; thus, there was no antecedent legal obligation to which the promise could attach. The court recognized that while moral impulses commend the father’s promise, such sentiments are not a substitute for legal consideration. Elevating purely moral obligations to legal enforceability would blur the line between ethical duties and legal duties, invite indefinite liability for spontaneous expressions of gratitude, and destabilize the consideration requirement. The court acknowledged limited exceptions—such as promises to pay debts barred by a statute of limitations, ratifications after infancy, or debts discharged in bankruptcy—because in those instances a prior legal obligation existed and the promise revives or recognizes that legal duty. None of those exceptions applied: the father never had a legal duty to pay for his adult son’s care, and he received no material benefit from the services. Because the promise lacked consideration and did not fall within a recognized exception, it was a “nudum pactum” and unenforceable. Judgment was entered for the defendant.
Mills v. Wyman is a bedrock authority for the proposition that moral obligation alone does not supply consideration. It is central to understanding the past consideration doctrine and the limited circumstances in which promises recognizing a moral duty are enforceable. The case is routinely contrasted with modern doctrines: restitution (which requires a benefit to the defendant), promissory estoppel (which can enforce certain promises based on reliance), and the material benefit rule (Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 86), under which some promises made in recognition of a benefit conferred may be enforceable. Mills helps students identify when those alternative theories might apply and, just as importantly, when they do not.
Consideration requires a bargained-for exchange or a prior legal duty. The caregiver rendered services before any promise and without the father’s request, so the services were not induced by the promise. The father had no legal duty to support his adult son. Moral sentiment—gratitude or sympathy—is not a legal detriment or benefit and therefore does not supply consideration.
Likely yes. Parents generally have a legal duty to support minor children. If a third party provides necessaries to a minor, the law can impose liability on the parent. A subsequent promise to pay could then be enforceable because it recognizes an antecedent legal duty, bringing the case within a traditional exception to the moral obligation rule.
A prior request would likely create a bargain: the caregiver’s performance in exchange for the father’s promise. That mutual assent and exchange would supply consideration, making the promise enforceable. The timing and inducement—promise leading to performance—are key to satisfying the consideration requirement.
Not against the father on these facts. Restitution requires a benefit conferred on the defendant that it would be unjust for the defendant to retain without paying. The benefit ran to the adult son, not the father; the father was not enriched. Any restitutionary claim would lie, if at all, against the son or his estate, not against the father.
Section 86 can enforce a promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor, to the extent necessary to prevent injustice. But the benefit must have been conferred on the promisor, not a third party, and enforcement is limited and discretionary. In Mills, the father personally received no material benefit; thus, even under § 86, enforcement would be doubtful. The case remains a strong example where neither consideration nor § 86 would likely validate the promise.
Mills v. Wyman cements the principle that the law of contracts protects bargains, not bare promises motivated by sympathy or gratitude. Without a prior legal duty or a bargained-for exchange, a purely moral obligation cannot transform a post hoc promise into an enforceable contract.
By mapping the narrow exceptions to this rule and foreshadowing later doctrines, Mills equips students to analyze when a promise recognizing past benefits might be enforceable and when the proper analytical path lies in alternative theories like restitution or reliance. The case remains a touchstone for the architecture of consideration and the limits of contract enforcement.