411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
What is the proper allocation of burdens and order of proof in a Title VII disparate-treatment case based on circumstantial evidence challenging an employer's refusal to rehire, and may an employer lawfully refuse to rehire a former employee because of participation in illegal protest activities if that is the real reason?
In a Title VII disparate-treatment case proven by circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied and was qualified for a position for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants with his qualifications. Establishing this prima facie case creates an inference of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. If the employer does so, the inference created by the prima facie case dissipates, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's stated reason was a pretext for intentional discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion that the employer intentionally discriminated remains with the plaintiff at all times. The precise formulation of the prima facie elements may vary with the factual context and type of employment decision.
The Supreme Court established the burden-shifting framework described above and held that an employer's refusal to rehire an applicant because of his participation in illegal, disruptive protest activities is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason under Title VII if genuinely the reason for the decision. The case was remanded to allow Green an opportunity to prove that McDonnell Douglas's stated reason was a pretext for racial discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas is the bedrock framework for adjudicating circumstantial-evidence disparate-treatment claims under Title VII and, by extension, many analogous federal and state antidiscrimination statutes. It structures summary judgment and trial by allocating proof burdens and clarifying that the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. The decision also highlights the core contest in discrimination cases—whether the employer's proffered reason is genuine or pretext. The framework has been refined but reaffirmed in later cases: Furnco Construction v. Waters (1978) reiterated that the prima facie case is flexible; Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) clarified the employer's burden is one of production, not persuasion; St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks (1993) and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing (2000) explained how disbelief of the employer's reason, coupled with the prima facie case, can support a finding of discrimination. For students, mastering McDonnell Douglas is essential for analyzing litigation strategy, evidentiary showings, and judicial reasoning in employment discrimination matters.