Master Landmark case establishing the three-step burden-shifting framework for Title VII disparate treatment claims based on circumstantial evidence. with this comprehensive case brief.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green is the Supreme Court’s foundational decision setting out how courts analyze Title VII disparate treatment claims when a plaintiff relies on circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence of discrimination. Because discriminatory animus is rarely confessed or documented, the Court created a structured, three-step order of proof that permits plaintiffs to raise an inference of discrimination, requires employers to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, and then affords plaintiffs a fair opportunity to show that the employer’s stated reason is pretextual.
This framework—now known simply as the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test—has become the default analytic tool used at summary judgment and trial in a wide array of employment discrimination cases, not only under Title VII but also, by analogy, under related statutes such as § 1981 and the ADEA. Subsequent cases refined aspects of the framework, but McDonnell Douglas remains the starting point for understanding how courts structure proof and allocate burdens in disparate treatment litigation.
411 U.S. 792 (1973), Supreme Court of the United States
Percy Green, an African American mechanic and civil rights activist associated with CORE, worked for McDonnell Douglas until he was laid off in 1964 during a reduction in force. Believing McDonnell Douglas engaged in discriminatory employment practices, Green participated in protests, including a "stall-in" that impeded traffic to the plant and a "lock-in" that blocked access to company facilities—conduct that resulted in criminal charges. Shortly after, McDonnell Douglas publicly advertised for mechanics. Green applied for reemployment but was rejected. He filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that the refusal to rehire him was racially motivated and in retaliation for his civil rights activities. After conciliation failed, Green sued in federal district court under Title VII (and also asserted a § 1981 claim). The district court found for McDonnell Douglas, crediting the company’s explanation that it refused to rehire Green because of his participation in illegal protest activities. The Eighth Circuit reversed, faulting the employer’s justification and suggesting a far more stringent burden on the employer to prove its decision was not discriminatory. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the proper allocation of burdens and the order of proof in Title VII disparate treatment cases based on circumstantial evidence.
In a Title VII disparate treatment case relying on circumstantial evidence, what is the proper allocation of burdens and order of proof, and does an employer’s refusal to rehire a former employee because of his participation in illegal protest activities constitute a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason or a pretext for race discrimination?
McDonnell Douglas establishes a three-step burden-shifting framework for Title VII disparate treatment claims when direct evidence is lacking: (1) Prima facie case: The plaintiff must show (i) he belongs to a protected class; (ii) he applied and was qualified for a position for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) despite qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) after the rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons with the plaintiff’s qualifications. This creates a presumption of discrimination. (2) Employer’s articulation: The burden shifts to the employer to articulate (not prove by a heightened standard) a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. The burden here is one of production, not persuasion. (3) Pretext: The burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion at all times remains with the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. It held that: (1) Green could establish a prima facie case under Title VII using the identified elements; (2) McDonnell Douglas satisfied its intermediate burden by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason—Green’s participation in unlawful protest activities—for refusing to rehire him; and (3) Green must be afforded a fair opportunity to prove that this reason was pretextual. The Court rejected the appellate court’s imposition of an unduly stringent burden on the employer and clarified that the employer’s burden is one of production, not persuasion.
The Court reasoned that discrimination is often subtle and not accompanied by direct evidence, necessitating a structured order of proof to guide courts and litigants. The prima facie elements were designed to be flexible and context-sensitive, but in failure-to-hire or rehire cases they properly allow an inference of discrimination when a qualified applicant is rejected while the employer continues to seek similarly qualified candidates. Once the plaintiff raises this inference, it is fair and efficient to require the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, thereby dispelling the presumption if the reason is credible on its face. The Court emphasized that this is a burden of production only; the employer need not prove the absence of discriminatory motive by clear and convincing evidence. Requiring such proof would improperly shift the ultimate burden of persuasion away from the plaintiff and distort Title VII’s evidentiary scheme. Here, McDonnell Douglas’s reliance on Green’s participation in unlawful protest activities—conduct disrupting plant access and business operations—constituted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the refusal to rehire, because Title VII does not insulate an employee from the consequences of illegal acts. However, the analysis does not end with the employer’s articulation. The plaintiff must have a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that the stated reason is a pretext for discrimination, such as by showing that similarly situated white applicants who engaged in comparable misconduct were rehired, that the employer’s rationale is factually untrue or inconsistently applied, or that the sequence of events and comparative data support an inference of discriminatory intent. Because the lower courts misallocated burdens and did not fully consider pretext evidence under the correct standard, the case required remand for proceedings consistent with the clarified framework.
McDonnell Douglas supplies the analytic backbone for disparate treatment claims under Title VII when the proof is circumstantial. It has been widely adopted across federal courts and applied in analogous contexts (e.g., § 1981 and ADEA claims). The framework has been refined—but not displaced—by later cases, including Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine (clarifying the employer’s burden of production), St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks (holding that disbelief of the employer’s reason permits—but does not compel—a finding of discrimination), and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing (confirming that a prima facie case plus evidence of pretext can suffice to sustain a verdict). For law students, McDonnell Douglas is essential to analyzing summary judgment motions and trial burdens in employment discrimination cases and to understanding how to marshal and attack circumstantial evidence of intent.
A plaintiff generally must show: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) application for and qualification for a position for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) rejection despite qualifications; and (4) the position remained open or the employer continued to seek applicants with similar qualifications after the rejection. Courts adapt these elements to other adverse actions (e.g., termination or discipline) and to context.
Always the plaintiff. The employer’s intermediate step is only a burden of production to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The plaintiff must ultimately persuade the factfinder, by a preponderance of the evidence, that discrimination was the real reason (i.e., the employer’s proffered reason is pretext).
Plaintiffs commonly use comparative evidence (similarly situated employees outside the protected class treated more favorably), inconsistencies or contradictions in the employer’s explanations, deviation from established policies, shifting explanations over time, statistical patterns, credibility attacks on decisionmakers, or proof that the asserted misconduct did not occur. Any combination that undermines the employer’s stated reason and supports an inference of discriminatory intent can suffice.
Typically, no. When a plaintiff offers direct evidence that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor, courts apply mixed-motive analysis (originating in Price Waterhouse and modified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991). McDonnell Douglas is the default when proof is circumstantial. Some courts allow plaintiffs to proceed under either theory depending on the evidence.
Yes. The Supreme Court recognized that refusal to rehire due to an applicant’s illegal protest activities is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. However, that does not end the inquiry: the plaintiff may still prove pretext by showing, for example, that others who engaged in similar misconduct were treated more favorably or that the employer’s reliance on the misconduct is inconsistent or exaggerated.
McDonnell Douglas v. Green created a durable, three-step structure for analyzing Title VII disparate treatment claims where direct evidence of bias is absent. By balancing a plaintiff’s need to raise an inference of discrimination with an employer’s opportunity to provide a legitimate explanation—and preserving the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of persuasion—the decision supplies a workable, evidence-based roadmap for courts and litigants.
The framework remains central to employment discrimination practice. Law students should master not only the prima facie elements and burden allocations, but also how to develop and evaluate pretext evidence, recognizing that later Supreme Court decisions refine (but do not displace) McDonnell Douglas’s core architecture.