In 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins asked Jack Phillips, owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, Colorado, to design a custom wedding cake celebrating their same-sex wedding. Phillips declined, citing his sincere religious belief that marriage is between a man and a woman and stating he would sell other baked goods but would not create a custom cake for a same-sex wedding. The couple filed a charge under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), which prohibits places of public accommodation from discriminating based on sexual orientation. An administrative law judge found that Phillips violated CADA. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission affirmed and ordered Phillips to cease and desist and implement staff training. During the Commission's proceedings, some commissioners made remarks characterizing Phillips's religious beliefs in disparaging terms and suggesting that religious rationales for discrimination are akin to justifications for slavery and the Holocaust. Around the same time, the Commission treated differently three other complaints: it permitted other bakers to refuse to create cakes bearing anti-gay messages, reasoning those requests were offensive and not discrimination against the customer's religion. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
Did the Colorado Civil Rights Commission violate the Free Exercise Clause by adjudicating the application of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act to Masterpiece Cakeshop with hostility to the owner's religious beliefs and by treating comparable cases inconsistently?
Under Employment Division v. Smith, neutral and generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious exercise ordinarily do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. However, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah requires that government decisionmakers remain neutral and not hostile toward religion. Adjudicative bodies must avoid statements or actions reflecting religious animus and must treat comparable cases alike. Where enforcement exhibits hostility or disparate treatment of analogous conduct, the Free Exercise Clause is violated and the state must, at a minimum, satisfy heightened scrutiny; the application of the law cannot stand.
Yes. The Commission's proceedings lacked the religious neutrality required by the Free Exercise Clause, as evidenced by hostile statements about religion and inconsistent treatment of analogous cases. The Court reversed the judgment against Masterpiece Cakeshop.
The Court, per Justice Kennedy, emphasized that the Free Exercise Clause requires both formal neutrality in the text of the law and real neutrality in its enforcement. Although CADA is facially valid and states may protect gay persons' equal access to goods and services, the Commission's adjudication of Phillips's case fell short of constitutional requirements. First, certain commissioners made statements disparaging Phillips's religious beliefs, characterizing religious justifications for discrimination as "despicable" and linking them to historical injustices like slavery and the Holocaust. Such comments, made in the course of adjudication, evidenced hostility incompatible with Lukumi's requirement of neutrality and respect for religious exercise. The Court noted that adjudicators must treat religious claims with tolerance rather than dismiss them as illegitimate in the public square. Second, the Commission's differential treatment of similar cases underscored the lack of neutrality. When other bakers refused to create cakes bearing messages condemning same-sex marriage, the Commission found no violation, reasoning that those refusals targeted objectionable messages, not customers. But in Phillips's case, the Commission failed to credit his assertion that he objected to the message of a custom wedding cake celebrating a same-sex marriage, not to serving gay customers generally. This inconsistency suggested that the state applied CADA in a way that disfavored religious motivations. The Court deliberately avoided resolving broader Free Speech and Free Exercise questions—such as whether creating a custom wedding cake is expressive conduct protected against compelled speech or whether a neutral, hostility-free application of CADA could require a baker to provide such a cake. The majority's decision was narrow, turning on the particular record of religious hostility and inconsistent enforcement. Concurring opinions elaborated on speech concerns (Thomas, joined in part by Gorsuch) and on why the comparators were materially similar (Gorsuch, joined by Alito), while Justice Kagan (joined by Breyer) emphasized that neutral, consistent enforcement could constitutionally sustain liability. Justice Ginsburg (joined by Sotomayor) dissented, concluding that the record did not show impermissible hostility and that the comparators were meaningfully different.
Masterpiece Cakeshop is a process-based Free Exercise decision that signals two key points for cases at the religion-commerce boundary: (1) anti-discrimination laws covering public accommodations remain valid and important, including protections for LGBTQ customers, and (2) adjudicators must enforce such laws without religious animus and with consistency across analogous situations. The ruling does not create a general right for businesses to refuse services for same-sex weddings; instead, it polices government neutrality. For students, the case is an essential complement to Smith and Lukumi and a precursor to later decisions. It foreshadows questions later addressed in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (free exercise and individualized exemptions) and 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis (compelled speech in custom expressive services). On exams, be prepared to separate (a) facial validity and general applicability of the statute, (b) neutrality of enforcement and adjudication, and (c) distinct compelled speech arguments.
Masterpiece Cakeshop stands as a cautionary tale about process in constitutional adjudication. Even when enforcing important anti-discrimination norms in commerce, the state must honor constitutional guarantees of neutrality toward religion. Hostile remarks by adjudicators and inconsistent treatment of analogous cases can invalidate otherwise lawful applications of generally applicable statutes.