Master Supreme Court held that a state civil rights commission violated the Free Exercise Clause by adjudicating a baker’s case with hostility toward religion, issuing a narrow, process-based ruling. with this comprehensive case brief.
Masterpiece Cakeshop sits at the intersection of religious liberty and public accommodations law, testing how the Free Exercise Clause operates in a commercial context governed by anti-discrimination statutes. Rather than announcing a broad right of businesses to refuse services involving same-sex weddings, the Supreme Court resolved the dispute on narrow, procedural grounds: the state adjudicator exhibited hostility toward the baker’s religious beliefs, undermining the neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause requires.
For law students, the case is essential for understanding how religious liberty claims are evaluated when private economic activity is regulated by generally applicable civil rights laws. It reinforces the Smith/Lukumi framework, emphasizing that even when a law is facially neutral and generally applicable, the government’s enforcement and adjudication must be free from religious animus and must treat comparable cases consistently.
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
In 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins asked Jack Phillips, owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, Colorado, to design a custom wedding cake celebrating their same-sex wedding. Phillips declined, citing his sincere religious belief that marriage is between a man and a woman and stating he would sell other baked goods but would not create a custom cake for a same-sex wedding. The couple filed a charge under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), which prohibits places of public accommodation from discriminating based on sexual orientation. An administrative law judge found that Phillips violated CADA. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission affirmed and ordered Phillips to cease and desist and implement staff training. During the Commission’s proceedings, some commissioners made remarks characterizing Phillips’s religious beliefs in disparaging terms and suggesting that religious rationales for discrimination are akin to justifications for slavery and the Holocaust. Around the same time, the Commission treated differently three other complaints: it permitted other bakers to refuse to create cakes bearing anti-gay messages, reasoning those requests were offensive and not discrimination against the customer’s religion. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
Did the Colorado Civil Rights Commission violate the Free Exercise Clause by adjudicating the application of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act to Masterpiece Cakeshop with hostility to the owner’s religious beliefs and by treating comparable cases inconsistently?
Under Employment Division v. Smith, neutral and generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious exercise ordinarily do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. However, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah requires that government decisionmakers remain neutral and not hostile toward religion. Adjudicative bodies must avoid statements or actions reflecting religious animus and must treat comparable cases alike. Where enforcement exhibits hostility or disparate treatment of analogous conduct, the Free Exercise Clause is violated and the state must, at a minimum, satisfy heightened scrutiny; the application of the law cannot stand.
Yes. The Commission’s proceedings lacked the religious neutrality required by the Free Exercise Clause, as evidenced by hostile statements about religion and inconsistent treatment of analogous cases. The Court reversed the judgment against Masterpiece Cakeshop.
The Court, per Justice Kennedy, emphasized that the Free Exercise Clause requires both formal neutrality in the text of the law and real neutrality in its enforcement. Although CADA is facially valid and states may protect gay persons’ equal access to goods and services, the Commission’s adjudication of Phillips’s case fell short of constitutional requirements. First, certain commissioners made statements disparaging Phillips’s religious beliefs, characterizing religious justifications for discrimination as “despicable” and linking them to historical injustices like slavery and the Holocaust. Such comments, made in the course of adjudication, evidenced hostility incompatible with Lukumi’s requirement of neutrality and respect for religious exercise. The Court noted that adjudicators must treat religious claims with tolerance rather than dismiss them as illegitimate in the public square. Second, the Commission’s differential treatment of similar cases underscored the lack of neutrality. When other bakers refused to create cakes bearing messages condemning same-sex marriage, the Commission found no violation, reasoning that those refusals targeted objectionable messages, not customers. But in Phillips’s case, the Commission failed to credit his assertion that he objected to the message of a custom wedding cake celebrating a same-sex marriage, not to serving gay customers generally. This inconsistency suggested that the state applied CADA in a way that disfavored religious motivations. The Court deliberately avoided resolving broader Free Speech and Free Exercise questions—such as whether creating a custom wedding cake is expressive conduct protected against compelled speech or whether a neutral, hostility-free application of CADA could require a baker to provide such a cake. The majority’s decision was narrow, turning on the particular record of religious hostility and inconsistent enforcement. Concurring opinions elaborated on speech concerns (Thomas, joined in part by Gorsuch) and on why the comparators were materially similar (Gorsuch, joined by Alito), while Justice Kagan (joined by Breyer) emphasized that neutral, consistent enforcement could constitutionally sustain liability. Justice Ginsburg (joined by Sotomayor) dissented, concluding that the record did not show impermissible hostility and that the comparators were meaningfully different.
Masterpiece Cakeshop is a process-based Free Exercise decision that signals two key points for cases at the religion-commerce boundary: (1) anti-discrimination laws covering public accommodations remain valid and important, including protections for LGBTQ customers, and (2) adjudicators must enforce such laws without religious animus and with consistency across analogous situations. The ruling does not create a general right for businesses to refuse services for same-sex weddings; instead, it polices government neutrality. For students, the case is an essential complement to Smith and Lukumi and a precursor to later decisions. It foreshadows questions later addressed in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (free exercise and individualized exemptions) and 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis (compelled speech in custom expressive services). On exams, be prepared to separate (a) facial validity and general applicability of the statute, (b) neutrality of enforcement and adjudication, and (c) distinct compelled speech arguments.
No. The Court expressly avoided a broad ruling. It held only that Colorado’s adjudication violated the Free Exercise Clause because of religious hostility and inconsistent treatment. The opinion cautioned that states may protect gay persons’ access to goods and services, but must do so neutrally and without animus.
A central one. Statements disparaging the baker’s religious beliefs and comparing religious justifications for discrimination to historical atrocities evidenced hostility. Under Lukumi, adjudicators must be neutral toward religion. These remarks, coupled with inconsistent treatment of similar cases, tainted the process and required reversal.
The majority did not decide it. Justice Thomas (joined in part by Justice Gorsuch) would have held that making a custom wedding cake is expressive and that compelling it violates the Free Speech Clause. The majority’s narrow Free Exercise ruling left speech issues for future cases, later addressed more directly in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis.
Other bakers refused to create cakes with anti-gay messages requested by a religious customer. The Commission found no violation, viewing those refusals as message-based, not customer-based. In Phillips’s case, however, the Commission did not similarly analyze his objection as message-based. The inconsistent treatment suggested a lack of neutrality toward religious motivations, supporting a Free Exercise violation.
Possibly. The Court indicated that a neutral and respectful application of a generally applicable public accommodations law could constitutionally require service, depending on the facts. Masterpiece does not resolve the merits of that question; it invalidates this adjudication because of hostility and inconsistency.
Apply Smith to assess neutrality and general applicability, then Lukumi to scrutinize enforcement for animus or selective treatment. Distinguish Free Exercise from compelled speech claims. Analyze whether the service is expressive, whether the objection is to message or status, and whether the government applied its law evenhandedly and with respect for religious beliefs.
Masterpiece Cakeshop stands as a cautionary tale about process in constitutional adjudication. Even when enforcing important anti-discrimination norms in commerce, the state must honor constitutional guarantees of neutrality toward religion. Hostile remarks by adjudicators and inconsistent treatment of analogous cases can invalidate otherwise lawful applications of generally applicable statutes.
The result preserves space for states to safeguard equal access to the marketplace while reminding officials that religious exercise must be treated with dignity and neutrality. The case thus frames—rather than resolves—the enduring tension between civil rights enforcement and religious or expressive objections in commercial settings.