During a game at Fenway Park, Baltimore Orioles pitcher Ross Grimsley was warming up in the bullpen. Spectators behind the bullpen engaged in persistent heckling and taunting directed at Grimsley. In response, Grimsley turned and intentionally threw a baseball toward the hecklers' area, purportedly to silence or frighten them so he could continue warming up. The ball passed through or over the protective barrier and struck the plaintiff, Manning, an uninvolved spectator, causing injury. Manning sued Grimsley and the Orioles in federal court (applying Massachusetts tort law), alleging assault and battery and vicarious liability against the team. The district court removed the vicarious liability claim from the jury (or otherwise entered judgment for the team) on scope-of-employment grounds. On appeal, the First Circuit considered whether the evidence could support findings that Grimsley committed an intentional tort, that intent could transfer to the bystander, and that the Orioles could be vicariously liable because the act was undertaken, at least in part, to further the employer's interests by enabling Grimsley to perform his job.
Does a pitcher who intentionally throws a baseball toward hecklers act with the intent required for assault/battery (as opposed to mere recklessness), permitting transferred intent to a bystander who is struck, and can the employer be held vicariously liable if the conduct occurred within the scope of employment and was motivated in part to serve the employer?
Intent in assault and battery is satisfied if the actor either desires to cause a harmful or offensive contact or an imminent apprehension thereof, or knows with substantial certainty that such contact or apprehension will result. Under transferred intent, an intent to commit battery or assault against one person is treated as intent toward the person actually harmed. Recklessness—conscious disregard of a substantial risk—is distinct and does not negate intent when the actor's purpose is to affect another's interests as described above. Under respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for an employee's intentional tort if the tortious conduct is of the kind the employee is employed to perform, occurs substantially within authorized time and space limits, and is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer.
Yes. Evidence that Grimsley intentionally threw toward hecklers to silence or frighten them supports a finding of intent sufficient for assault/battery, and that intent transfers to a bystander who is struck. A jury could also find that he acted within the scope of employment—responding to taunts interfering with his warm-up in order to perform his duties—so the Orioles could be held vicariously liable. The dismissal/directed verdict for the team was improper and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
The court distinguished recklessness from intent by focusing on Grimsley's purpose. He did not merely disregard a risk; he purposefully threw toward nearby spectators to cause them to stop heckling—at least to place them in imminent apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact, i.e., an assault. That purposeful act is enough to establish the intent element for an intentional tort. When the ball actually struck Manning, an uninvolved spectator, transferred intent supplied the mens rea for battery: the intent to affect the hecklers (by causing apprehension or contact) is legally imputed to the actual victim. On vicarious liability, the court applied the scope-of-employment test. Grimsley was on duty, in uniform, warming up during the game, at the employer's place and time. The heckling interfered with his ability to perform his assigned task (warming up to pitch). His act, though wrongful, could reasonably be viewed as at least partially motivated by a purpose to further the employer's business—quelling the disturbance so he could continue warming up—rather than being a purely personal frolic. Intentional torts do not automatically fall outside the scope; the inquiry focuses on purpose and nexus to assigned duties. Because a jury could find these elements satisfied on the evidence, taking all inferences in the plaintiff's favor, judgment as a matter of law for the team was improper.
Manning is widely used to teach that intent in assault/battery turns on purpose or substantial certainty, not on the actor's desire to injure the particular plaintiff. It underscores transferred intent when a bystander is the one actually struck. The case also highlights that intentional torts can be within the scope of employment—and thus support respondeat superior—when committed to further the employer's business, even if the conduct violates rules or is ill-advised. Finally, it shows that the typical "baseball rule" about inherent risks (like foul balls) does not insulate defendants from liability for intentional, non-gameplay-related acts.
Manning v. Grimsley teaches two enduring tort lessons. First, intent for assault and battery hinges on purposeful action to cause contact or apprehension (or substantial certainty thereof), not on who is actually injured; transferred intent bridges the gap when a bystander is harmed. Second, intentional torts may still fall within the scope of employment when undertaken, at least in part, to further the employer's business during the time and space of employment.