Master Pitcher’s throw at hecklers injures a bystander; intent (and transferred intent) vs. recklessness and employer vicarious liability. with this comprehensive case brief.
Manning v. Grimsley is a staple torts case for clarifying the difference between intent and recklessness, and for illustrating how the doctrine of transferred intent operates when an intentional act directed at one person injures another. The case arises from a professional baseball setting—an Orioles pitcher, irritated by hecklers while warming up at Fenway Park, threw a ball in their direction and struck an uninvolved spectator. The First Circuit’s analysis is frequently taught because it shows how intent can be inferred from purposeful conduct designed to cause apprehension or contact, even if the actual victim was not the actor’s target.
Beyond the intent point, Manning is also a key respondeat superior decision. It explains when an employer may be held vicariously liable for an employee’s intentional tort—namely, when the conduct occurs within the time and space of employment and is at least partially motivated by a purpose to serve the employer. For students, the case ties together core tort doctrines: intent vs. recklessness, transferred intent, assault/battery elements, and scope of employment.
643 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1981)
During a game at Fenway Park, Baltimore Orioles pitcher Ross Grimsley was warming up in the bullpen. Spectators behind the bullpen engaged in persistent heckling and taunting directed at Grimsley. In response, Grimsley turned and intentionally threw a baseball toward the hecklers’ area, purportedly to silence or frighten them so he could continue warming up. The ball passed through or over the protective barrier and struck the plaintiff, Manning, an uninvolved spectator, causing injury. Manning sued Grimsley and the Orioles in federal court (applying Massachusetts tort law), alleging assault and battery and vicarious liability against the team. The district court removed the vicarious liability claim from the jury (or otherwise entered judgment for the team) on scope-of-employment grounds. On appeal, the First Circuit considered whether the evidence could support findings that Grimsley committed an intentional tort, that intent could transfer to the bystander, and that the Orioles could be vicariously liable because the act was undertaken, at least in part, to further the employer’s interests by enabling Grimsley to perform his job.
Does a pitcher who intentionally throws a baseball toward hecklers act with the intent required for assault/battery (as opposed to mere recklessness), permitting transferred intent to a bystander who is struck, and can the employer be held vicariously liable if the conduct occurred within the scope of employment and was motivated in part to serve the employer?
Intent in assault and battery is satisfied if the actor either desires to cause a harmful or offensive contact or an imminent apprehension thereof, or knows with substantial certainty that such contact or apprehension will result. Under transferred intent, an intent to commit battery or assault against one person is treated as intent toward the person actually harmed. Recklessness—conscious disregard of a substantial risk—is distinct and does not negate intent when the actor’s purpose is to affect another’s interests as described above. Under respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for an employee’s intentional tort if the tortious conduct is of the kind the employee is employed to perform, occurs substantially within authorized time and space limits, and is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer.
Yes. Evidence that Grimsley intentionally threw toward hecklers to silence or frighten them supports a finding of intent sufficient for assault/battery, and that intent transfers to a bystander who is struck. A jury could also find that he acted within the scope of employment—responding to taunts interfering with his warm-up in order to perform his duties—so the Orioles could be held vicariously liable. The dismissal/directed verdict for the team was improper and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
The court distinguished recklessness from intent by focusing on Grimsley’s purpose. He did not merely disregard a risk; he purposefully threw toward nearby spectators to cause them to stop heckling—at least to place them in imminent apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact, i.e., an assault. That purposeful act is enough to establish the intent element for an intentional tort. When the ball actually struck Manning, an uninvolved spectator, transferred intent supplied the mens rea for battery: the intent to affect the hecklers (by causing apprehension or contact) is legally imputed to the actual victim. On vicarious liability, the court applied the scope-of-employment test. Grimsley was on duty, in uniform, warming up during the game, at the employer’s place and time. The heckling interfered with his ability to perform his assigned task (warming up to pitch). His act, though wrongful, could reasonably be viewed as at least partially motivated by a purpose to further the employer’s business—quelling the disturbance so he could continue warming up—rather than being a purely personal frolic. Intentional torts do not automatically fall outside the scope; the inquiry focuses on purpose and nexus to assigned duties. Because a jury could find these elements satisfied on the evidence, taking all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, judgment as a matter of law for the team was improper.
Manning is widely used to teach that intent in assault/battery turns on purpose or substantial certainty, not on the actor’s desire to injure the particular plaintiff. It underscores transferred intent when a bystander is the one actually struck. The case also highlights that intentional torts can be within the scope of employment—and thus support respondeat superior—when committed to further the employer’s business, even if the conduct violates rules or is ill-advised. Finally, it shows that the typical “baseball rule” about inherent risks (like foul balls) does not insulate defendants from liability for intentional, non-gameplay-related acts.
Intent exists when the actor’s purpose is to cause harmful/offensive contact or imminent apprehension of such contact, or the actor knows it is substantially certain to occur. Grimsley threw toward the hecklers to affect them—at least to frighten them into stopping—so the act was purposeful, not merely a reckless disregard of risk. His aim to cause apprehension constitutes intent for assault; when contact occurred with someone else, intent transferred to support battery.
Transferred intent allows the actor’s intent to commit an assault or battery against one person to be attributed to the actual victim if a different person is struck or placed in apprehension. Grimsley’s intent to at least assault the hecklers (by creating imminent apprehension through his throw) transferred to Manning when she was the one actually hit by the ball.
The baseball rule addresses inherent, ordinary risks of the game (e.g., foul balls). Manning was injured by an intentional, non-gameplay-related throw aimed at spectators, not by a ball put into play. Courts generally do not treat intentional misconduct of this kind as an inherent risk assumed by spectators.
Under respondeat superior, an employer is liable for torts committed within the scope of employment and at least partly motivated by serving the employer. Grimsley’s conduct occurred during the game while warming up—core job activity—and was arguably intended to stop interference with that activity. Although wrongful, the act could be seen as undertaken to facilitate job performance, satisfying the scope test for the jury.
Likely yes. If the conduct occurred after the game, away from the bullpen, and in circumstances disconnected from job performance, it would look like a purely personal frolic outside the time, space, and purpose limits of employment. In that scenario, vicarious liability would be far less likely.
Manning v. Grimsley teaches two enduring tort lessons. First, intent for assault and battery hinges on purposeful action to cause contact or apprehension (or substantial certainty thereof), not on who is actually injured; transferred intent bridges the gap when a bystander is harmed. Second, intentional torts may still fall within the scope of employment when undertaken, at least in part, to further the employer’s business during the time and space of employment.
For students and practitioners, the case is a reminder to analyze an actor’s purpose carefully and to separate intent from recklessness. It also counsels that vicarious liability turns on the nexus between the employee’s conduct and the employer’s interests—not on whether the act was wrongful—making Manning a powerful teaching tool across multiple tort doctrines.