What are the facts?
Ruth Garratt, an adult, sued Brian Dailey, a five-year-old child, for battery after she attempted to sit in a lawn chair in a backyard and fell to the ground, fracturing her hip. According to testimony credited by the trial court, Dailey moved a metal lawn chair from the spot where Garratt was about to sit. The trial court found that Dailey moved the chair to sit in it himself and, upon realizing Garratt was attempting to sit, tried to move the chair back but failed to do so in time. The trial court concluded that Dailey did not intend to injure Garratt and dismissed the battery claim. Garratt appealed. The Supreme Court of Washington reviewed whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard for intent in battery and whether a child of Dailey's age can form the intent necessary for an intentional tort.
What is the legal issue?
Does the intent element of battery require a purpose to cause harm, or is it satisfied if the defendant knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would experience a harmful or offensive contact as a result of the defendant's act, and can a young child possess such intent?
What rule applies?
For battery, an actor is liable if he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another (or an imminent apprehension of such contact), and a harmful or offensive contact directly or indirectly results. Intent is satisfied by either (1) the purpose to cause the contact or (2) knowledge to a substantial certainty that such contact will occur. A defendant's youth does not preclude forming the requisite intent for an intentional tort. See Restatement (First) of Torts §§ 13, 16.
What did the court hold?
Intent for battery includes knowledge to a substantial certainty that harmful or offensive contact will occur, and a minor can possess such intent. Because the trial court did not determine whether Dailey knew with substantial certainty that Garratt would attempt to sit and fall when he moved the chair, the case was remanded for findings on that question.
What is the reasoning?
The court rejected the trial court's apparent requirement that the defendant must have intended to injure the plaintiff to satisfy the intent element of battery. Drawing on the Restatement, the court explained that battery requires intent to cause contact, not necessarily intent to harm, and that intent can be established either by purpose or by knowledge to a substantial certainty that contact will result. This distinction sets intentional torts apart from negligence (mere foreseeability or unreasonable risk) and recklessness (conscious disregard of a high probability). Here, even if Dailey did not desire Garratt's injury, he could still be liable if he knew with substantial certainty that removing the chair as Garratt sat would cause her to fall and make harmful contact (including indirect contact, such as striking the ground). The court further clarified that the defendant's young age does not immunize him from intentional tort liability; the dispositive inquiry is his mental state at the time of the act. Because the trial court made no explicit finding on whether Dailey had substantial-certainty knowledge, remand was necessary for application of the correct standard.
Why is this case significant?
Garratt v. Dailey is central to understanding the intent requirement in intentional torts. It cements the substantial-certainty test, distinguishing intent from negligence and recklessness, and illustrates that liability for battery turns on the actor's mental state regarding contact, not on a desire to injure. The case also teaches that minors can be liable for intentional torts if they possess the requisite intent, making it a frequent vehicle for exam hypotheticals about child defendants, indirect contact, and the boundary between intentional and negligent conduct.
Did the court hold that Dailey was liable for battery?
Not in the 1955 opinion. The Washington Supreme Court clarified the correct legal standard and remanded to determine whether Dailey knew with substantial certainty that Garratt would fall and make harmful contact when he moved the chair. On remand, the trial court found that he lacked such knowledge, and later proceedings affirmed that result. The key teaching of the 1955 case is the intent standard, not the ultimate liability outcome.
Why is knowledge to a substantial certainty considered intent rather than negligence or recklessness?
Negligence involves creating an unreasonable risk that harm might occur; recklessness involves conscious disregard of a high probability of harm. Intent, by contrast, is either a purpose to cause contact or knowledge to a substantial certainty that contact will follow from the act. Substantial certainty approaches inevitability, making the outcome effectively intentional even if the actor does not desire the harm.
Can a five-year-old form the intent required for battery?
Yes. The court held that age alone does not preclude the formation of intent for an intentional tort. A child can be liable for battery if, at the time of the act, the child either desired to cause a harmful or offensive contact or knew with substantial certainty that such contact would result. The inquiry is individualized and fact-specific.
How is the contact element satisfied if the defendant never physically touches the plaintiff?
Battery can be established by indirect contact. If the defendant's act sets in motion a force that results in the plaintiff's body being touched in a harmful or offensive manner—such as causing the plaintiff to strike the ground—that suffices. Moving a chair so that someone falls and hits the ground is a classic example of indirect harmful contact.
What mistake did the trial court make in analyzing intent?
The trial court focused on whether Dailey intended to injure Garratt, effectively importing a purpose-to-harm requirement. The Supreme Court corrected this, explaining that intent for battery is satisfied if Dailey either intended the contact or knew with substantial certainty that contact would occur, regardless of any desire to injure.
How is Garratt v. Dailey used on law school exams?
It is often used to test the distinction between negligence and intentional torts, especially the substantial-certainty standard, indirect contact, and the capacity of minors to commit intentional torts. Exam hypos frequently mirror the chair-moving facts or involve similar setups where a defendant claims lack of desire to harm despite near-inevitable harmful contact.