Master Washington Supreme Court clarifies that intent for battery includes acting with knowledge to a substantial certainty that harmful or offensive contact will result, and that a minor can possess such intent. with this comprehensive case brief.
Garratt v. Dailey is a foundational torts case that crystallizes the meaning of "intent" in the intentional tort of battery. Rather than limiting intent to a desire to harm, the Washington Supreme Court held that intent is also satisfied when an actor knows with substantial certainty that a harmful or offensive contact will occur as a consequence of their action. This doctrinal refinement is critical for distinguishing intentional torts from negligence and recklessness, which rely on lesser degrees of foresight and probability.
The case is also significant because it addresses whether a very young child can form the requisite intent for an intentional tort. By holding that age does not categorically bar intent, the court underscores that liability turns on the actor's mental state at the time of the act, not on capacity-based generalizations. Garratt v. Dailey is thus a staple in first-year torts courses for exploring the boundaries between purposeful conduct, substantial-certainty knowledge, and inadvertent risk-taking.
46 Wn.2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955)
Ruth Garratt, an adult, sued Brian Dailey, a five-year-old child, for battery after she attempted to sit in a lawn chair in a backyard and fell to the ground, fracturing her hip. According to testimony credited by the trial court, Dailey moved a metal lawn chair from the spot where Garratt was about to sit. The trial court found that Dailey moved the chair to sit in it himself and, upon realizing Garratt was attempting to sit, tried to move the chair back but failed to do so in time. The trial court concluded that Dailey did not intend to injure Garratt and dismissed the battery claim. Garratt appealed. The Supreme Court of Washington reviewed whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard for intent in battery and whether a child of Dailey’s age can form the intent necessary for an intentional tort.
Does the intent element of battery require a purpose to cause harm, or is it satisfied if the defendant knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would experience a harmful or offensive contact as a result of the defendant’s act, and can a young child possess such intent?
For battery, an actor is liable if he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another (or an imminent apprehension of such contact), and a harmful or offensive contact directly or indirectly results. Intent is satisfied by either (1) the purpose to cause the contact or (2) knowledge to a substantial certainty that such contact will occur. A defendant’s youth does not preclude forming the requisite intent for an intentional tort. See Restatement (First) of Torts §§ 13, 16.
Intent for battery includes knowledge to a substantial certainty that harmful or offensive contact will occur, and a minor can possess such intent. Because the trial court did not determine whether Dailey knew with substantial certainty that Garratt would attempt to sit and fall when he moved the chair, the case was remanded for findings on that question.
The court rejected the trial court’s apparent requirement that the defendant must have intended to injure the plaintiff to satisfy the intent element of battery. Drawing on the Restatement, the court explained that battery requires intent to cause contact, not necessarily intent to harm, and that intent can be established either by purpose or by knowledge to a substantial certainty that contact will result. This distinction sets intentional torts apart from negligence (mere foreseeability or unreasonable risk) and recklessness (conscious disregard of a high probability). Here, even if Dailey did not desire Garratt’s injury, he could still be liable if he knew with substantial certainty that removing the chair as Garratt sat would cause her to fall and make harmful contact (including indirect contact, such as striking the ground). The court further clarified that the defendant’s young age does not immunize him from intentional tort liability; the dispositive inquiry is his mental state at the time of the act. Because the trial court made no explicit finding on whether Dailey had substantial-certainty knowledge, remand was necessary for application of the correct standard.
Garratt v. Dailey is central to understanding the intent requirement in intentional torts. It cements the substantial-certainty test, distinguishing intent from negligence and recklessness, and illustrates that liability for battery turns on the actor’s mental state regarding contact, not on a desire to injure. The case also teaches that minors can be liable for intentional torts if they possess the requisite intent, making it a frequent vehicle for exam hypotheticals about child defendants, indirect contact, and the boundary between intentional and negligent conduct.
Not in the 1955 opinion. The Washington Supreme Court clarified the correct legal standard and remanded to determine whether Dailey knew with substantial certainty that Garratt would fall and make harmful contact when he moved the chair. On remand, the trial court found that he lacked such knowledge, and later proceedings affirmed that result. The key teaching of the 1955 case is the intent standard, not the ultimate liability outcome.
Negligence involves creating an unreasonable risk that harm might occur; recklessness involves conscious disregard of a high probability of harm. Intent, by contrast, is either a purpose to cause contact or knowledge to a substantial certainty that contact will follow from the act. Substantial certainty approaches inevitability, making the outcome effectively intentional even if the actor does not desire the harm.
Yes. The court held that age alone does not preclude the formation of intent for an intentional tort. A child can be liable for battery if, at the time of the act, the child either desired to cause a harmful or offensive contact or knew with substantial certainty that such contact would result. The inquiry is individualized and fact-specific.
Battery can be established by indirect contact. If the defendant’s act sets in motion a force that results in the plaintiff’s body being touched in a harmful or offensive manner—such as causing the plaintiff to strike the ground—that suffices. Moving a chair so that someone falls and hits the ground is a classic example of indirect harmful contact.
The trial court focused on whether Dailey intended to injure Garratt, effectively importing a purpose-to-harm requirement. The Supreme Court corrected this, explaining that intent for battery is satisfied if Dailey either intended the contact or knew with substantial certainty that contact would occur, regardless of any desire to injure.
It is often used to test the distinction between negligence and intentional torts, especially the substantial-certainty standard, indirect contact, and the capacity of minors to commit intentional torts. Exam hypos frequently mirror the chair-moving facts or involve similar setups where a defendant claims lack of desire to harm despite near-inevitable harmful contact.
Garratt v. Dailey defines the contours of intent in battery by recognizing that knowledge to a substantial certainty that contact will occur is legally equivalent to purpose. This framework prevents actors from evading intentional tort liability simply by disclaiming a desire to cause injury when the harmful contact was virtually inevitable.
By confirming that minors can possess intent and by validating indirect contact as sufficient for battery, the decision equips students and practitioners with a nuanced understanding of how courts separate intentional torts from negligence and recklessness. Its enduring value lies in the clarity it brings to the mental-state element that anchors the tort of battery.