Most Important Property Cases to Know

Property is the most casebook-dependent 1L course, but the variation is smaller than it looks. Dukeminier, Singer, Merrill & Smith, and Sprankling all assign the same core: the capture cases, the finders cases, adverse possession, the estates system, the landlord-tenant revolution of the 1970s, servitudes, and the Supreme Court's regulatory takings line. What varies is emphasis. Singer front-loads Johnson v. M'Intosh, Shelley v. Kraemer, and fair housing; Merrill & Smith front-loads the right to exclude and the numerus clausus; Dukeminier gives you the fullest future-interests treatment.

Your professor's exam almost certainly tests rules, not case names. Cite a case only when it supplies the rule ("under Javins, the lease carries an implied warranty of habitability") or when it marks a real split ("the majority follows Mahrenholz's strict distinction; a minority construes ambiguous conditions as covenants"). Reciting facts earns nothing.

This is the first month of the course and the densest cluster of named cases. Each stands for one proposition.

Future interests is mostly rule application, so few cases matter, but the ones that do are heavily tested.

Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees, 417 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981), turns on whether 'this land to be used for school purposes only, otherwise to revert' creates a fee simple determinable (automatic reversion, possibility of reverter) or a fee simple subject to condition subsequent (entry required, right of entry). Learn the durational-versus-conditional language test. White v. Brown, 559 S.W.2d 938 (Tenn. 1977), applies the constructional preference for a fee simple absolute over a life estate when a will is ambiguous. Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Properties, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1996), applies the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities to a commercial repurchase option and voids it — the reason most states now exempt commercial options by statute.

For concurrent estates: Riddle v. Harmon, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1980), lets a joint tenant sever unilaterally by conveying to herself, abolishing the strawman requirement. Tenhet v. Boswell, 554 P.2d 330 (Cal. 1976), holds that a lease by one joint tenant does not sever, and the lease expires with the lessor's death. Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27 (Conn. 1980), prefers partition in kind over partition by sale where physical division is practicable and the interests of the parties are better served.

Four cases hold up the entire modern regime, and all four displaced older property-law doctrine with contract principles.

Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), implies a nonwaivable warranty of habitability into residential leases and makes rent obligations dependent on it. Sommer v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767 (N.J. 1977), imposes a duty to mitigate on residential landlords after abandonment, rejecting the old rule that the landlord may sit idle and sue for rent. Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145 (Minn. 1978), abolishes self-help repossession and makes judicial process the only lawful means of eviction. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985), holds that where a lease requires the landlord's consent to assign, consent may be withheld only on commercially reasonable grounds — a minority rule that is spreading, so flag the split.

Easements come in five flavors and each has a case. Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 498 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1972), permits reservation of an easement in a third party, rejecting the common-law bar. Holbrook v. Taylor, 532 S.W.2d 763 (Ky. 1976), recognizes an irrevocable license (easement by estoppel) after the licensee's substantial investment. Van Sandt v. Royster, 83 P.2d 698 (Kan. 1938), gives you the implied easement from prior use, requiring apparent and continuous use before severance plus reasonable necessity. Othen v. Rosier, 226 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. 1950), sets the elements of easement by necessity: unity of ownership, severance, and necessity existing at the moment of severance.

For running covenants, Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848), creates the equitable servitude enforceable against a purchaser with notice, dropping the privity requirement. Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938), holds that an affirmative covenant to pay HOA assessments touches and concerns the land and that the association may enforce as agent for the owners. Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925), recognizes the implied reciprocal negative servitude arising from a common scheme, with inquiry notice from the neighborhood's uniform character. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), holds that judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant is state action barred by the Fourteenth Amendment.

On conveyancing: Lohmeyer v. Bower, 227 P.2d 102 (Kan. 1951), defines marketable title and holds that an existing violation of a zoning ordinance or private restriction renders title unmarketable. Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985), imposes a seller's duty to disclose known material defects not readily observable, and Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1991), rescinds where the seller created a condition (a reputedly haunted house) that a buyer could not discover. Luthi v. Evans, 576 P.2d 1064 (Kan. 1978), holds a Mother Hubbard clause insufficient to give constructive notice to subsequent purchasers.

Nuisance runs on two remedy cases. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), awards permanent damages instead of an injunction when the defendant's economic value vastly exceeds the plaintiffs' harm. Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972), enjoins the feedlot but requires the developer who came to the nuisance to indemnify the cost of moving. Together they give you all four Calabresi-Melamed remedy options.

Zoning: Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), upholds comprehensive zoning against a facial due process challenge. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), holds exclusionary zoning invalid under the state constitution — a state-law outlier, not a federal rule.

Takings is the most heavily tested unit and the doctrine is now categorical. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982): any permanent physical occupation is a per se taking regardless of size. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992): a regulation depriving land of all economically beneficial use is a per se taking unless background principles of nuisance and property law already prohibited the use. Everything else runs through Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978): economic impact, interference with distinct investment-backed expectations, and character of the governmental action, assessed against the parcel as a whole. Exactions get Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (essential nexus), Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (rough proportionality), and Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 570 U.S. 595 (2013) (extends both to denials and to monetary exactions). For public use, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), apply deferential rational-basis review. Add Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139 (2021) (temporary right of access is a per se physical taking), Murr v. Wisconsin, 582 U.S. 383 (2017) (multifactor test for defining the relevant parcel), and Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019) (federal takings claims ripen at the taking, overruling Williamson County's state-litigation requirement).

Build a one-line index: case name, the single rule, and the trigger fact. 'Berg v. Wiley — no self-help eviction — landlord changes the locks.' If you cannot state the rule in one sentence, you do not know the case well enough to use it under time pressure.

Then learn the counter-case for each. Nearly every property rule has a paired opposition: Pierson against Ghen, Van Valkenburgh against Howard v. Kunto, Boomer against Spur, Lucas against Penn Central. Exam fact patterns are engineered to sit between the pair, and your grade comes from arguing both sides before you pick one.

Finally, keep track of which rules are majority and which are the professor's favored minority position. Kendall, Riddle, Willard, and Mount Laurel are all minority or state-specific holdings that casebooks feature because they are interesting. On a bar exam you would apply the traditional rule; on your final, apply what your professor taught and note the split.