Most Important 1L Cases to Know

The variation is driven by three things: your casebook, your professor's scholarly commitments, and whether your school teaches Constitutional Law in the first year. Casebooks are edited collections, so a Dukeminier property class and a Merrill & Smith property class share maybe seventy percent of their cases. Professors who write about products liability will spend three weeks on cases another professor assigns as a footnote. And Con Law is a 1L course at Harvard, Yale, Michigan, and many others, but a 2L requirement elsewhere.

What does not vary is the doctrine. Every American law school teaches minimum contacts, the Erie doctrine, proximate cause, consideration, the estates system, mens rea, and the Commerce Clause. The cases below are the ones that carry those rules. If a case appears on your syllabus and is not on this list, it still matters for your exam — your professor's cases are your cases. Treat this as a checklist for gaps, not a substitute for your reading.

Civ Pro is the most standardized 1L course in the country, and its canon is tight. Personal jurisdiction is the largest block. Start with Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), for the territorial baseline, then Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), which replaced presence with minimum contacts and fair play. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), supplies purposeful availment and the reasonableness factors. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), shows contacts can be contractual and relationship-based. Then the modern general jurisdiction line: Goodyear (2011) and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014), narrowing general jurisdiction to where a defendant is 'essentially at home.' Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) loosened the relatedness requirement for specific jurisdiction. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), governs notice.

For the Erie problem, know Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), which gives you the two-track analysis: if a valid Federal Rule is on point, it applies; if not, run outcome-determinativeness against the twin aims. For subject matter jurisdiction, Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), gives the well-pleaded complaint rule. For pleading, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), replaced Conley v. Gibson's 'no set of facts' standard with plausibility. For summary judgment, the 1986 trilogy: Celotex, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, and Matsushita.

Intentional torts run on Vosburg v. Putney (Wis. 1891) for the eggshell plaintiff and intent to contact, and Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197 (1955), for substantial certainty intent. Negligence starts with the standard of care and United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), where Learned Hand wrote B < PL. Byrne v. Boadle (1863) is res ipsa loquitur. Duty is best learned through MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916), which killed privity in negligence, and Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976), for affirmative duties arising from special relationships.

Proximate cause is Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928) — Cardozo's duty-to-the-foreseeable-plaintiff majority versus Andrews's dissent framing it as proximate cause. Read both; most exams reward the ability to argue either. Causation-in-fact burden shifting is Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80 (1948), with Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980), for market share. Strict liability traces from Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) through Traynor's concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453 (1944), to Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57 (1963), which adopted strict products liability outright.

Remedies usually come first. Hawkins v. McGee (N.H. 1929) is the hairy hand case and the expectation measure. Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) limits consequential damages to what was foreseeable at contracting. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239 (1921), pairs substantial performance with diminution-in-value damages; Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. (Okla. 1962) is the standard counterpoint on cost of performance.

For formation, Lucy v. Zehmer (Va. 1954) supplies objective assent, and Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (1893) the unilateral-offer-by-advertisement problem. Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538 (1891), defines consideration as legal detriment. Promissory estoppel runs through Ricketts v. Scothorn (Neb. 1898), Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409 (1958), for reliance on subcontractor bids, and Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores (Wis. 1965) for precontractual reliance. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88 (1917), gives you implied obligations and illusory promises. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), is unconscionability. Excuse doctrines come from Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) for impossibility and Krell v. Henry (1903) for frustration of purpose. Throughout, cite the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and UCC Article 2 sections alongside the cases — your professor almost certainly wants both.

Acquisition begins with Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), on capture and rules versus standards, and Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), on the discovery doctrine and the origins of American title. Armory v. Delamirie (1722) gives relative title in found property. Adverse possession is usually taught through a hostility case and a tacking case; Howard v. Kunto (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) is the common tacking and continuity vehicle.

Landlord-tenant turns on Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), which imported an implied warranty of habitability into urban leases. Servitudes: Tulk v. Moxhay (1848) for equitable servitudes and Sanborn v. McLean (Mich. 1925) for implied reciprocal negative easements. Land use and takings are the back half of most courses: Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), for zoning; Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), for the regulatory takings balancing test; Loretto (1982) for permanent physical occupations; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), for total economic wipeouts; and Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), for public use. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), on racially restrictive covenants and state action, appears in both Property and Con Law.

Criminal Law is organized around elements, so the cases are element-illustrations. Martin v. State (Ala. Ct. App. 1944) is the voluntary act requirement. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), and Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), presume mens rea into statutes that are silent. Regina v. Cunningham (1957) gives the recklessness definition many courts use. Commonwealth v. Welansky (Mass. 1944) is involuntary manslaughter by wanton omission. Regina v. Dudley and Stephens (1884) rejects necessity as a defense to murder. People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96 (1986), sets the objective-with-subjective-circumstances self-defense standard. M'Naghten's Case (1843) is the baseline insanity test, and Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), is conspiracy liability for foreseeable substantive crimes. Know your jurisdiction's homicide grading and the Model Penal Code § 2.02 culpability levels better than any single case.

If Con Law is a 1L course for you, the structural canon is Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); and Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). For rights, know Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), on discriminatory purpose; and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), for intermediate scrutiny.

Most 1L exams are closed-universe issue-spotters. Graders award points for identifying an issue, stating the correct rule, and applying it to the facts. Case names earn points only when they do work the rule statement cannot — signaling which side of a doctrinal split you are on, or supplying a memorable analogy to the fact pattern. Writing 'under Carroll Towing, the burden of untaken precautions was less than the probability times the magnitude of harm' is efficient. Writing three sentences of Carroll Towing's barge facts is not.

Build a one-page outline per course listing the rule first and the case in parentheses after it. If you cannot state a case's rule in a single sentence without looking at the facts, you do not know it yet. Reserve full-brief treatment for cases your professor spent more than one class session on, cases with strong dissents you may be asked to argue (Palsgraf, Lopez), and cases your professor criticized in class — that criticism is often a hint about the exam.

On citation format: in an exam answer, short-form names are fine and expected. In a memo or brief for Legal Writing, use full Bluebook Rule 10 form on first reference — case name, volume, reporter, page, court and year in parentheses — then short cite. Confirm your professor's preference; some legal writing programs use ALWD instead.