Vanna White, the well-known hostess of the television game show Wheel of Fortune, sued Samsung Electronics America and its advertising agency over a print advertisement promoting Samsung VCRs. The ad was part of a campaign featuring futuristic scenes and depicted a metallic robot, adorned with a blonde wig, evening gown, and jewelry, posed next to a Wheel of Fortune-style game board and turning letters—an image designed to evoke White's well-known role. The ad copy suggested longevity (e.g., the longest-running game show in 2012), implying Samsung products would endure. Samsung did not use White's name, voice, signature, photograph, or an actual picture of her; rather, it used a robot in a similar setting and costume. White did not consent to the use. She filed suit alleging (1) California common-law right of publicity, (2) California statutory misappropriation (Cal. Civ. Code § 3344), (3) Lanham Act § 43(a) false endorsement/unfair competition, and (4) related state unfair competition claims. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on all claims, and White appealed.
Does a defendant violate a celebrity's right of publicity by appropriating her identity for commercial purposes through evocative imagery (a robot look-alike performing her signature role) even when the defendant does not use the celebrity's actual name or likeness, and how do California's statutory right and the Lanham Act apply to such conduct?
California common-law right of publicity requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) appropriation of plaintiff's name, identity, or persona to defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury. See Eastwood v. Superior Court. The protected interest is the celebrity's identity, which may be evoked without direct use of name or likeness. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.; Midler v. Ford Motor Co.; Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. California's statutory right (Cal. Civ. Code § 3344) imposes liability for knowing use of another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness for advertising without consent and requires a direct use of one of the enumerated attributes. Lanham Act § 43(a) prohibits use in commerce of any false or misleading representation likely to cause confusion as to affiliation, connection, association, sponsorship, or approval, and supports false endorsement claims by celebrities upon a showing of likelihood of consumer confusion.
The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on White's California common-law right of publicity claim, holding that a reasonable jury could find that defendants appropriated her identity even without using her name or likeness. It affirmed summary judgment on the § 3344 statutory claim because the ad did not use White's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness. The court also allowed related unfair competition theories to proceed insofar as they were derivative of the common-law claim, and recognized the viability of a Lanham Act false-endorsement theory premised on a likelihood of confusion created by evoking White's identity.
Common-law right of publicity. The court emphasized that the right of publicity protects a person's identity, not merely particular labels attached to that identity. Relying on Motschenbacher (distinctive race car livery identifying a driver), Midler (a sound-alike singer used to evoke Bette Midler), and Carson (use of the phrase "Here's Johnny" to evoke Johnny Carson), the court reasoned that defendants cannot avoid liability by cleverly sidestepping the use of a celebrity's literal name or face while still exploiting her persona. The robot's clothing, coiffure, jewelry, and the Wheel of Fortune-style set and act of turning letters unmistakably called to mind White's public identity as the show's hostess. Because the ad plainly traded on that identity for commercial advantage, a jury could find the elements of common-law misappropriation satisfied; summary judgment was therefore improper. Section 3344 statutory claim. The court distinguished the statute's narrower scope. Section 3344 enumerates specific attributes—name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness. A robot that only evokes a human celebrity's persona does not fit the statutory terms. The legislature's choice to list specific identifiers indicated a more confined statutory right than the broader common-law identity protection. The court thus affirmed summary judgment on the statutory claim. Lanham Act false endorsement. The court recognized that celebrity false endorsement claims may lie under § 43(a) when advertising creates a likelihood of consumer confusion regarding the celebrity's sponsorship or approval. Because the campaign's purpose was to evoke White and capitalize on her goodwill, a reasonable jury could find such a likelihood of confusion. This sufficed to defeat summary judgment on that theory. To the extent California unfair competition claims piggybacked on the common-law publicity claim and/or misrepresentation to consumers, those claims could proceed. Defenses and policy. While defendants invoked themes of parody and cultural reference, the ad was a commercial message using a celebrity's identity to sell a product, not a commentary or transformative work. Thus, any First Amendment interests were weaker than in noncommercial expressive contexts. The court underscored that permitting advertisers to use look-alikes and symbolic stand-ins would gut the right of publicity by allowing easy end-runs around its protections. In the subsequent denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Kozinski's well-known dissent warned that the ruling risked overprotecting celebrity identity at the expense of creativity; the panel majority, however, adhered to the principle that identity-based free-riding in commercial advertising falls within the right of publicity.
White v. Samsung is a staple of right-of-publicity doctrine for the proposition that liability can arise from evoking a celebrity's identity, even without using her name or face. It teaches the elements of California's common-law claim and highlights the important difference between that doctrine and the narrower statutory right under § 3344. The decision also situates right-of-publicity claims alongside Lanham Act false endorsement, showing how both can police unauthorized commercial exploitation of celebrity goodwill. For law students, the case is equally valuable for its policy debate: the majority's concern about end-runs through look-alikes and symbolic cues, and Judge Kozinski's countervailing warning about overprotection chilling parody, commentary, and cultural conversation. Together, they frame the enduring tension between protecting celebrity value and preserving space for creative reference.
White v. Samsung is a defining right-of-publicity case: it squarely rejects the notion that advertisers can sidestep liability by avoiding a celebrity's literal name or face while still trading on her identity. It clarifies the breadth of California's common-law protection, the narrower reach of § 3344, and the interplay with false endorsement under the Lanham Act.