Plaintiff Vince was seriously injured when a car driven by a young man (the nephew) collided with her vehicle. The nephew was unlicensed, had failed his driving test on multiple occasions, and had a history of poor judgment and problems with alcohol or drugs. Despite this, his aunt, Wilson, helped him obtain a car by providing the funds (or arranging financing) and participating in the purchase, knowing he would be the primary operator even though he lacked a valid license. The car was acquired from a dealership whose personnel knew or had reason to know the vehicle was being procured for the nephew's use notwithstanding his lack of a license; the sale was structured in the aunt's name. Shortly after the purchase, the nephew negligently operated the car and injured Vince. Vince sued the nephew (the driver), the aunt (Wilson), and the dealership on a negligent entrustment theory. The trial court granted summary judgment for Wilson and the dealer. Vince appealed.
Can a financer or intermediary (such as an aunt who provides funds) and a dealer who sells a car through an intermediary be liable for negligent entrustment under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 when they know or have reason to know the intended driver is unlicensed and likely to use the vehicle in a manner creating an unreasonable risk of harm?
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390, one who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely, because of youth, inexperience, intoxication, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others is subject to liability for the resulting harm. The concept of "supplying" includes sales, gifts, loans, financing arrangements, or other facilitation of access to the chattel; liability turns on foreseeability and the supplier's actual or constructive knowledge of the user's likely dangerous use.
Yes. The court recognized negligent entrustment consistent with Restatement § 390 and held that a jury could find that both Wilson (the aunt/financer) and the dealer negligently entrusted the vehicle to an incompetent, unlicensed driver. The grant of summary judgment for those defendants was vacated and the case remanded.
The Law Court adopted Restatement § 390 as an accurate statement of Maine law, emphasizing that automobiles are inherently dangerous in the hands of incompetent or unlicensed drivers and that entrustment principles are designed to deter foreseeable, preventable harm. First, the court construed "supplies" broadly to include not only direct loans of a vehicle but also the act of enabling or facilitating the acquisition of a car through financing or intermediary purchases. Wilson's conduct—funding and arranging the purchase despite knowing the nephew lacked a license, had repeatedly failed the licensing test, and had a history suggestive of unsafe operation—fell within the ambit of supplying under § 390. Second, as to the dealer, the record contained evidence that the dealership knew or had reason to know the vehicle was intended for the nephew's use and that he did not possess a valid license; structuring title in the aunt's name did not absolve the dealer if the sale effectively entrusted the car to an incompetent operator. Those knowledge and foreseeability disputes precluded summary judgment. The court rejected arguments that the nephew's subsequent negligent driving was an intervening, superseding cause that broke the chain of causation. The entrustee's negligence was precisely the risk that made the entrustment unreasonable; therefore, a reasonable jury could find proximate causation. The court also underscored that negligent entrustment does not require continuous control over the chattel after the entrustment; once the supplier enables access to a dangerous instrumentality while knowing of the user's likely misuse, liability may attach if the foreseeable harm materializes. Because material factual disputes existed as to what Wilson and the dealer knew and whether their conduct was unreasonable in light of that knowledge, summary judgment was improper.
Vince v. Wilson is widely taught for its clear adoption and application of Restatement § 390 and its expansive, policy-driven view of who can be a negligent entrustor. It shows that ownership formalities are not determinative; liability turns on the practical reality of who enabled the incompetent driver to get behind the wheel with actual or constructive knowledge of the risk. The case is also a primer on proximate cause in entrustment claims: the entrustee's negligent driving is not a superseding cause but the very hazard contemplated by the duty. Procedurally, it highlights that summary judgment is inappropriate when reasonable jurors could differ on the extent of the supplier's knowledge and the foreseeability of harm.
Vince v. Wilson is a cornerstone negligent entrustment case, making clear that tort responsibility can reach beyond owners and direct lenders of vehicles to those who knowingly facilitate access by unlicensed or incompetent drivers. By adopting and applying Restatement § 390, the Maine Law Court framed negligent entrustment as a duty grounded in foreseeability and practical realities rather than formalities of title or possession.