What are the facts?
Federal agents conducted a sting operation in which undercover officers represented that a truckload of merchandise had been stolen from an interstate shipment. The defendants negotiated to purchase the goods at a cut-rate price, repeatedly discussed their stolen character, arranged logistics, and took concrete steps to consummate the transaction—meeting the agents, inspecting the goods, and moving toward delivery and payment. In truth, the goods had never been stolen; law enforcement had supplied them and merely pretended they were stolen to test the defendants' willingness to receive stolen property. The government charged the defendants with conspiracy and with attempt to receive goods stolen from an interstate shipment, in violation of federal law. At trial, the defense argued impossibility: because the goods were not actually stolen, an essential element of the completed offense (that the property be stolen) was missing, and therefore the defendants could not be guilty of attempt. The district court rejected that defense and the jury convicted. The defendants appealed.
What is the legal issue?
Is impossibility a defense to an attempt charge for receiving stolen goods when the goods were not, in fact, stolen, but the defendants believed and acted as if they were?
What rule applies?
Factual impossibility—where the intended substantive crime is impossible to complete because of some factual condition unknown to the defendant (e.g., the goods are not actually stolen)—is not a defense to attempt. A defendant is guilty of attempt if he acts with the requisite intent to commit the substantive offense and engages in conduct constituting a substantial step strongly corroborative of that criminal purpose. The critical inquiry is whether the defendant's conduct would be criminal if the circumstances were as he believed them to be.
What did the court hold?
No. The impossibility that the goods were not actually stolen does not bar attempt liability. The defendants' intent to receive stolen goods and their substantial steps toward that end suffice for an attempt conviction. The convictions were affirmed.
What is the reasoning?
The court emphasized that the completed offense of receiving stolen goods requires, among other things, that the property be stolen and that the defendant know it is stolen. In sting operations like this, the latter mental state may be proven by the defendant's own statements and conduct, but the former objective circumstance (that the goods be stolen) is engineered to be absent. The court refused to allow this absence to defeat attempt liability. It classified the defendants' claim as one of factual impossibility, which is not a defense to attempt. The relevant test asks: if the facts were as the defendants believed them to be (namely, that the goods had been stolen from an interstate shipment), would their conduct constitute the target crime? Because the answer is yes, the law punishes the dangerous conduct at the attempt stage. In reaching this conclusion, the court underscored that the line between "legal" and "factual" impossibility is often elusive and, in practical terms, unhelpful. What matters is culpability and dangerousness, demonstrated here by negotiations for stolen merchandise, arrangements for transfer, and acts objectively corroborating the defendants' criminal purpose—the kind of "substantial steps" that modern doctrine (and the Model Penal Code) regards as sufficient. The court also noted that accepting an impossibility defense in these circumstances would unduly hinder legitimate undercover investigations, allowing those who are fully willing and prepared to commit crimes to evade liability simply because the government prudently ensured no actual harm occurred.
Why is this case significant?
Jackson is a staple in the attempt/impossibility unit. It confirms the modern rule that factual impossibility is no defense and frames the correct analysis: would the conduct be criminal if the circumstances were as the actor believed? It also supplies the template for evaluating undercover stings: the government's creation of an impossible completion does not negate attempt liability where intent and substantial steps are present. For law students, Jackson clarifies the doctrinal move away from formalistic impossibility categories toward a focus on culpability and strong corroboration of the criminal purpose, harmonizing with the Model Penal Code's Section 5.01.
What is the difference between factual and legal impossibility, and which did Jackson address?
Factual impossibility occurs when the intended crime cannot be completed because of some unknown factual circumstance (e.g., the goods are not actually stolen, the gun is unloaded, the victim is already dead). Legal impossibility arises when the defendant's intended conduct—even if completed exactly as intended—would not constitute a crime. Jackson squarely addressed factual impossibility and held it is not a defense to attempt.
How does Jackson's approach relate to the Model Penal Code?
Jackson's analysis mirrors MPC § 5.01: attempt liability turns on purpose to commit the offense plus conduct constituting a substantial step strongly corroborative of that purpose, and impossibility is not a defense if the crime would have occurred had the circumstances been as the defendant believed. The decision thus aligns federal attempt doctrine with the MPC's functional, culpability-focused framework.
What counts as a "substantial step" in cases like Jackson?
Negotiating price, acknowledging the illicit nature of the goods, arranging logistics, inspecting the goods, coordinating delivery, and moving toward payment and transfer are all objective acts that strongly corroborate criminal intent. In Jackson, these cumulative actions crossed the line from mere preparation to a substantial step.
Does it matter that the government created the impossibility through a sting operation?
No. The use of undercover agents and contrived circumstances does not defeat attempt liability. So long as the defendant voluntarily formed the criminal purpose and took substantial steps toward its realization, the impossibility that no actual stolen goods existed is irrelevant. Entrapment is a distinct defense, but Jackson did not find it applicable.
How does Jackson compare to older cases recognizing legal impossibility, like People v. Jaffe?
People v. Jaffe treated the absence of truly stolen goods as a form of legal impossibility, but modern courts—including Jackson—reject that characterization, calling it factual impossibility and denying the defense. Jackson exemplifies the contemporary trend to collapse formal labels and ask whether, if the facts were as the defendant believed, the conduct would be criminal.
What exam tip does Jackson offer for attempt-impossibility questions?
First, identify the target offense and the specific attendant circumstances. Second, state whether, if circumstances were as the defendant believed, the conduct would satisfy the target offense. Third, show substantial steps that strongly corroborate purpose. Conclude that factual impossibility is no defense; only true legal impossibility (where the completed conduct would not be a crime) bars attempt liability.