550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Does a complaint alleging an antitrust conspiracy under § 1 of the Sherman Act survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion when it pleads parallel conduct and a bare assertion of agreement, or must it include enough factual matter to make the existence of an unlawful agreement plausible rather than merely conceivable under Rule 8(a)(2)?
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain enough factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim is plausible when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice; nor do naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. The oft-quoted Conley v. Gibson phrase that a complaint should not be dismissed unless there is "no set of facts" consistent with the allegations was retired as an inaccurate description of Rule 8 pleading.
No. Allegations of parallel conduct coupled with a conclusory assertion of agreement do not state a plausible § 1 conspiracy claim. Because the complaint failed to allege sufficient factual matter to suggest an agreement, it did not cross the line from conceivable to plausible. The Second Circuit's decision was reversed and the complaint dismissed.
Twombly reshaped federal pleading by establishing the plausibility standard under Rule 8, displacing Conley's "no set of facts" formulation. It instructs lawyers to plead concrete factual matter—not just legal conclusions—sufficient to allow a reasonable inference of liability. In antitrust, it underscores that parallel conduct alone does not plead a § 1 agreement without plus factors. For law students, Twombly is indispensable in Civil Procedure and beyond. It governs Rule 12(b)(6) motions, influences how complaints are drafted, and, as clarified by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, applies to all civil cases. It affects access to discovery and case strategy, prompting careful attention to the difference between well-pleaded facts and conclusory assertions, and to the need for factual enhancement that makes liability plausible.