Florida's Beach and Shore Preservation Act authorizes local governments to restore eroded beaches by depositing sand seaward of the mean high-water line (MHWL). When a renourishment project is approved and constructed, the statute fixes a permanent Erosion Control Line (ECL), generally at the pre-project MHWL, as the boundary between public and private ownership. The State, as trustee of submerged lands under the public trust doctrine, takes title to all newly created dry land seaward of the ECL. Upland littoral owners retain statutory rights of reasonable access to the water, view, and use, but they lose two incidents of common-law littoral ownership: direct contact with the water at the moving MHWL and the chance of future accretions shifting the boundary seaward. Walton County and the City of Destin obtained a permit from the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to restore 6.9 miles of Gulf beach. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., representing six beachfront owners, challenged the permit, claiming the project would take property by depriving them of littoral rights. The First District Court of Appeal agreed that the project would effect a taking. The Florida Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that, under Florida common law, littoral owners have no right to accretions against avulsive changes and that state-created additions of sand are treated as avulsive, leaving the boundary fixed; the Act therefore did not take property. The owners petitioned for certiorari, arguing that the Florida Supreme Court's reinterpretation of littoral rights itself effected a judicial taking. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Florida Supreme Court's judgment. Justice Stevens did not participate.
Can a state court decision that allegedly redefines established property rights constitute a judicial taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and, if so, did the Florida Supreme Court's decision upholding Florida's beach renourishment program effect such a taking of littoral rights?
No majority of the Court adopted a comprehensive judicial takings doctrine. A four-Justice plurality stated that the Takings Clause constrains all branches: a court commits a taking when it declares that what was once an established private property right no longer exists. Two Justices suggested that due process, rather than the Takings Clause, is the proper check on arbitrary or unpredictable judicial changes to property law. Applying settled principles of Florida property law, all Justices agreed there was no taking here: under Florida's avulsion doctrine, sudden changes to the shoreline—including state-created fill—do not move the boundary between private uplands and state-owned submerged lands, and the State may fix an Erosion Control Line and create public beach seaward of that line while preserving reasonable access for upland owners.
Affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court's decision did not effect a taking. Whether or not a judicial takings theory is valid, no established property right was eliminated because, under Florida law, the State's creation of new dry land seaward of the pre-project mean high-water line is treated as an avulsive event that does not shift private boundaries, and the Act preserves the core incidents of littoral ownership such as reasonable access.
Plurality (Scalia, joined by Roberts, Thomas, and in relevant parts Alito): The Takings Clause contains no textual exemption for courts; if a legislature or executive could not eliminate an established property right without compensation, neither can a court. The question thus becomes whether the Florida Supreme Court's decision erased an established right. It did not. Florida common law distinguishes between gradual accretion/reliction, which slowly move the boundary seaward or landward to the benefit or detriment of the littoral owner, and avulsion, a sudden change that leaves the boundary where it was. The State's placement of sand on its submerged lands to restore eroded beaches is an avulsive addition; title to the new land remains with the State, and private boundaries stay fixed at the pre-project MHWL. Florida precedent also subordinates the contingently expectant right to future accretions to the State's superior rights under the public trust and avulsion doctrines. The Beach and Shore Preservation Act largely codifies these principles and protects owners' core incidents of littoral ownership—reasonable access, view, and use—despite interposing state-owned dry sand between their uplands and the water. Because Florida law never guaranteed owners a right to maintain direct contact with the water or to acquire accretions resulting from avulsive changes, nothing 'established' was taken. Kennedy, joined by Sotomayor, concurred in part and in the judgment. He cautioned against embracing a judicial takings doctrine, which risks entanglement with federalism and separation-of-powers concerns. Instead, the Due Process Clause can safeguard against arbitrary or unpredictable judicial changes to property rules. On the merits, he agreed the Florida Supreme Court's decision was a reasonable application of longstanding state law and thus raised no due process concern. Breyer, joined by Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment. Emphasizing constitutional avoidance, he argued the case did not require addressing whether judicial takings exist. The record and briefing did not present a concrete necessity to resolve that novel question since the owners could not show that the Florida decision upset well-established property rights. Across the opinions, eight Justices (with Justice Stevens recused) agreed there was no compensable taking. The decisive analysis turned on the background principles of Florida property law—particularly the avulsion doctrine, the State's public trust in submerged lands, and the statutory preservation of reasonable littoral access.
The case leaves the existence and contours of a judicial takings doctrine unresolved while signaling that abrupt judicial redefinitions of property may face constitutional limits. Its practical teaching is twofold: first, background principles of state property law define the scope of protected property for takings purposes; second, littoral rights—especially accretion versus avulsion—are contingent and may yield to the State's public trust and coastal management powers. For students, Stop the Beach is a key bridge between property and constitutional law, a study in fractured Supreme Court reasoning, and a reminder to ground takings analysis in state-law definitions of property and in established common-law doctrines.
Stop the Beach Renourishment resolved the immediate dispute by concluding that Florida's coastal restoration program, as interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court, did not take established littoral property rights. The decision turned on Florida's background property principles—especially the avulsion doctrine and the State's public trust authority—and the statute's preservation of reasonable access to navigable waters.