State v. McVay, 47 R.I. 292, 132 A. 436 (1926)
State v. McVay is a foundational case in criminal law addressing whether accomplice liability can attach to an unintentional homicide.
Can a defendant be indicted and prosecuted as an accessory before the fact to manslaughter based on the defendant's counseling or procurement of the negligent conduct that caused the death, even though manslaughter does not require an intent to kill?
A person may be guilty as an accessory before the fact to manslaughter where he intentionally counsels, commands, procures, or otherwise facilitates the commission of the underlying negligent or unlawful act that proximately causes death. The accessory's liability does not require an intent that death occur; it is sufficient that he intentionally aided or encouraged the conduct constituting criminal negligence or the unlawful condition from which the homicide resulted.
Yes. The court held that one may be an accessory before the fact to manslaughter. The State's indictment stated a cognizable offense, and the demurrer should not have been sustained.
McVay is a touchstone for the proposition that accomplice liability can extend to crimes defined by negligence or recklessness. It teaches that the accessory's intent need only relate to assisting the prohibited conduct, not to producing the proscribed result. The case is frequently cited to rebut the claim that complicity logically fails for unintentional crimes and to show how criminal law assigns responsibility to those who intentionally facilitate dangerous, unlawful operations. It also anticipates modern statutes that abolish distinctions between principals and accessories while preserving the substantive principle that intentional facilitation of negligent conduct can ground liability for the resulting offense.