Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (U.S. Supreme Court)
Sessions v. Dimaya is a landmark decision at the intersection of constitutional vagueness doctrine and immigration enforcement.
Does 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)'s residual definition of a "crime of violence," as incorporated into the INA's aggravated felony provision, violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause for vagueness?
Under the Due Process Clause, a statute is void for vagueness if it fails to provide ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes (or the consequences it triggers) and is so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement. Residual risk clauses are unconstitutional where, applying the categorical approach, courts must (1) imagine the "ordinary case" of a crime and (2) assess an indeterminate level of risk without clear metrics. The vagueness doctrine applies to civil removal proceedings, given their grave consequences. See Johnson v. United States (2015); Jordan v. De George (1951).
Yes. The Supreme Court held that § 16(b)'s residual clause, as incorporated into the INA's aggravated felony definition, is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's judgment.
Dimaya cements Johnson's void-for-vagueness analysis and extends it to civil immigration law, invalidating a common basis for removal predicated on the residual definition of a "crime of violence." It underscores that due process imposes meaningful limits on indeterminate risk-based statutory standards even outside criminal sentencing. The ruling influenced subsequent decisions, most notably United States v. Davis (2019), which struck down § 924(c)(3)(B)'s similar residual clause, and it reshaped removal litigation by eliminating § 16(b) as a path to "aggravated felony" status while leaving the elements clause (§ 16(a)) intact. For students, Dimaya is a keystone case on vagueness, the categorical approach, and the civil-criminal divide in constitutional protections.