The defendant, Hood, became highly intoxicated during an evening at an apartment gathering. Police officers were summoned after a disturbance. When officers attempted to restrain or arrest Hood, a violent struggle ensued. During the fracas, Hood wrested a service revolver from one of the officers and discharged the weapon, shooting an officer in the legs. Hood was charged with assault with a deadly weapon upon a peace officer engaged in the performance of official duties (a form of aggravated assault under California Penal Code section 245). At trial, there was substantial evidence that Hood was drunk. Hood sought to rely on his intoxication to negate the mental state required for assault, arguing that assault requires a specific intent—often described in earlier authorities as an intent to commit a battery—and that voluntary intoxication was therefore relevant under Penal Code section 22. The trial court rejected the view that intoxication could negate the requisite intent for assault with a deadly weapon, and Hood was convicted. He appealed, contending that the jury should have been allowed to consider voluntary intoxication on the issue of the crime's mental element.
Is assault (including assault with a deadly weapon) a specific intent offense such that evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to negate the required mental state, or is it a general intent offense to which voluntary intoxication affords no defense?
Under California Penal Code section 22 (as then in force), evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible only to negate a crime's specific intent or other particular mental state element; it is not a defense to general intent crimes. Assault, including assault with a deadly weapon, does not require a specific intent to injure; rather, it is a general intent offense satisfied by an intentional act that, under the circumstances, by its nature would likely and directly result in the application of physical force to another, combined with the present ability to apply such force. Accordingly, voluntary intoxication is not admissible to negate the mens rea of assault.
Assault and assault with a deadly weapon are general intent offenses. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to such crimes and may not be used to negate the required mental state. The conviction was affirmed.
The court began by surveying California's statutory scheme and common-law influences. Penal Code section 22 reflects a legislative policy judgment: voluntary intoxication can be considered only where a crime requires a specific intent beyond the intent to do the proscribed act. The court acknowledged that the specific/general intent distinction can be elusive and at times artificial. Nevertheless, the classification has practical bite because it determines the admissibility and legal effect of intoxication evidence. Turning to assault, the court emphasized the statutory and doctrinal understanding that assault is an attempt to commit a battery, and that battery itself requires only the unlawful application of force. Earlier formulations speaking of an "intent to commit a battery" were not properly read to require a purpose to injure or a further design beyond the volitional commission of an act that is likely to result in force. In this frame, the mens rea for assault is satisfied if the defendant intentionally engages in conduct that, under the circumstances known to him, would probably and directly result in the application of physical force to another, coupled with present ability. That mental state does not amount to a specific intent in the sense contemplated by section 22. The court also relied on policy considerations. Assaultive behavior is frequently intertwined with intoxication. Permitting voluntary intoxication to excuse or mitigate assault would immunize a considerable portion of dangerous conduct that the assault statutes are designed to deter, thereby undermining public safety. California's legislature, through section 22, drew a deliberate line: intoxication may negate a further or heightened intent (as in burglary's intent to commit a felony, or larceny's intent to permanently deprive), but not the simple intent to do the act that constitutes assault. Because assault with a deadly weapon does not require a specific intent to injure, the trial court correctly refused to treat voluntary intoxication as a defense to the charge.
People v. Hood is a cornerstone in California criminal law on two fronts. Doctrinally, it places assault, including assault with a deadly weapon, firmly in the general intent category and thereby bars defendants from using voluntary intoxication to negate assaultive liability. Pedagogically, it is a principal case for understanding how (and why) courts distinguish between specific and general intent, and how that distinction controls the relevance of intoxication evidence. Hood's framework informed later California cases—such as People v. Rocha and People v. Williams—that refined the precise mental state for assault while preserving Hood's core rule that intoxication does not defeat general intent.
People v. Hood stands as a leading authority on the interplay between intoxication and mens rea in California. By classifying assault—and assault with a deadly weapon—as general intent crimes, the court made clear that voluntary intoxication does not negate liability for assaultive conduct. The opinion preserves a principled space for intoxication evidence in specific intent offenses while anchoring assault firmly outside that domain.