Pankajkumar S. Patel, a citizen of India, entered the United States without inspection and later sought to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). While his application was pending, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings on the ground that he was present without admission or parole. Patel sought adjustment as relief from removal, asserting he had an approved visa petition and was otherwise eligible. During proceedings, a factual dispute arose regarding a prior Georgia driver's license application in which Patel had checked a box indicating he was a U.S. citizen. Patel testified that this was an error; the immigration judge found he knowingly made a false claim to U.S. citizenship to obtain a benefit under state law, rendering him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)—and thus ineligible for adjustment. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. On petition for review, an en banc Eleventh Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) deprived it of jurisdiction to review Patel's challenge to the immigration judge's factual finding. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the scope of § 1252(a)(2)(B).
Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bar federal courts from reviewing factual findings and other non-discretionary determinations underlying denials of discretionary relief (such as adjustment of status), or does it strip jurisdiction only over the ultimate discretionary grant or denial?
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), "no court shall have jurisdiction to review any judgment regarding the granting of relief" under enumerated provisions, including §§ 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, and 1255. This bar extends to any authoritative determination bearing on the grant of such relief, encompassing factual findings and non-discretionary eligibility determinations, not just the ultimate exercise of discretion. Section 1252(a)(2)(D) preserves jurisdiction for constitutional claims and questions of law raised in a petition for review, but not for factbound disputes. The bar applies regardless of whether the agency decision occurs inside or outside removal proceedings, thereby foreclosing APA review in district court for covered forms of relief.
Yes. The Supreme Court held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars judicial review of factual findings and other determinations underlying denials of discretionary relief, not only the final discretionary decision itself. The Eleventh Circuit therefore lacked jurisdiction to review the immigration judge's factual finding that Patel had falsely represented U.S. citizenship, and its judgment was affirmed.
The Court, focusing on statutory text and structure, concluded that the phrase "any judgment regarding the granting of relief" in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) is broad. In ordinary usage, "judgment" refers to any authoritative decision, and "regarding" sweeps in decisions related to the grant of relief, including predicate findings of fact and statutory eligibility. The enumerated forms of relief—adjustment of status, cancellation, voluntary departure, and certain waivers—are discretionary in their final disposition, but they all depend on antecedent eligibility determinations. Reading "judgment" to include only the final discretionary act would render Congress's broad phrasing and structure largely superfluous. The Court contrasted subparagraph (B)(i) with subparagraph (B)(ii), which refers to "any other decision or action" in the discretion of the Attorney General or Secretary. The different language suggests Congress knew how to limit the bar to discretionary decisions when it wished; by using "any judgment" in (B)(i), Congress intended a wider sweep for the specifically listed forms of relief. The saving clause in § 1252(a)(2)(D) further confirms the reading: it carves out review of constitutional claims and questions of law only, implying that factual disputes are not reviewable. Addressing scope, the Court held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) is not confined to removal proceedings. The statute contains a "Notwithstanding any other provision of law" clause and speaks in terms of jurisdiction over "any" covered judgment, indicating that district courts lack jurisdiction under the APA to review denials of the enumerated forms of relief by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services as well as those arising in removal proceedings. The Court acknowledged that the result can leave some agency factual errors uncorrected by Article III courts, but emphasized that Congress chose this jurisdictional scheme. Dissenting Justices warned of the harsh consequences of insulating factual mistakes from review, but the majority found the textual command controlling.
Patel reshapes judicial review in immigration law by foreclosing federal-court review of factual and other non-discretionary determinations underlying denials of key discretionary relief. It resolves a circuit split in favor of a broad jurisdictional bar, confirms the limited reach of § 1252(a)(2)(D)'s saving clause, and extends the bar to decisions made outside removal proceedings—limiting APA challenges to USCIS denials of adjustment, cancellation, voluntary departure, and certain waivers. For law students, Patel is central to understanding jurisdiction-stripping, statutory interpretation, and the balance between agency authority and judicial oversight in immigration and administrative law.
Patel v. Garland cements a broad reading of Congress's jurisdiction-stripping in immigration cases, channeling review of discretionary relief denials away from federal courts when the dispute is factual. The Court's textual analysis places significant weight on the words "any judgment regarding the granting of relief," the structure distinguishing subparagraphs (B)(i) and (B)(ii), and the limited saving clause for legal and constitutional issues.