Landon, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (U.S. Supreme Court)
Landon v. Plasencia is a foundational Supreme Court decision at the intersection of immigration and constitutional due process.
What due process protections does the Fifth Amendment require for a returning lawful permanent resident subjected to exclusion proceedings at the border, and who bears the burden of proof regarding admissibility?
A returning lawful permanent resident is entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment in exclusion proceedings. The scope of the required procedures is determined by the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test—considering (1) the private interest affected by the official action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation under current procedures and the probable value of additional safeguards, and (3) the government's interest, including fiscal and administrative burdens. However, by statute in exclusion proceedings, the applicant for admission—the alien—bears the burden of proving admissibility, including, where relevant, showing eligibility to be admitted and the absence of a ground of inadmissibility. A returning LPR is generally considered an applicant for admission unless the trip falls within the "brief, casual, and innocent" exception of Rosenberg v. Fleuti (as the doctrine stood at the time).
A returning lawful permanent resident is entitled to due process in exclusion proceedings, but the specific procedures due are not categorically the same as in deportation proceedings and must be determined under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test. The statutory allocation of the burden of proof in exclusion proceedings remains on the alien to establish admissibility. The Court rejected the lower court's blanket imposition of deportation-style procedures and remanded for application of Mathews to the particular procedural claims.
Landon v. Plasencia firmly establishes that returning lawful permanent residents are constitutionally entitled to due process when subjected to exclusion at the border, but it channels the inquiry through Mathews v. Eldridge rather than through categorical importation of deportation procedures. It preserves the statutory framework placing the burden of proof on the applicant for admission and clarifies the limited role of the Fleuti doctrine in such cases. For law students, Landon is a key case on the scope of the Fifth Amendment in immigration proceedings, the limits of the entry fiction, and the use of Mathews balancing to calibrate process in administrative adjudications involving significant liberty and property interests. It also provides historical context for later statutory reforms that refined the admission framework for returning LPRs.