576 U.S. 86 (2015)
Kerry v. Din is a cornerstone case at the intersection of constitutional due process, immigration law, and the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.
Does a U.S. citizen have a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in her spouse's immigrant visa application that entitles her to judicial review and a fuller explanation of the denial, and, if so, is a bare citation to a terrorism-related inadmissibility provision sufficient process?
Under the controlling concurrence (Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito), applying Kleindienst v. Mandel, when the Executive denies a visa to an alien spouse, courts limit review to confirming that the denial rests on a facially legitimate and bona fide reason; absent a plausible showing of bad faith, courts will not look behind the stated reason. A citation to a specific statutory ground of inadmissibility, including 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), ordinarily suffices as such a reason, particularly in light of Congress's limits on disclosure for security-based denials (see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(3)). The plurality (Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas) would hold there is no protected liberty interest in a spouse's admission; the dissent (Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) would recognize a liberty interest and require more process. Under Marks v. United States, Justice Kennedy's concurrence controls as the narrowest grounds supporting the judgment.
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that Din was not entitled to additional process. Either there is no protected liberty interest in a spouse's visa (plurality), or, assuming such an interest, the government satisfied due process by providing a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for the denial via citation to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), and Din alleged no plausible bad faith (controlling concurrence).
Kerry v. Din crystallizes the limits of constitutional due process in the visa context and entrenches the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. For practitioners and students, it clarifies that challenges to consular decisions are generally foreclosed beyond verifying a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, and that a statutory citation to terrorism-related inadmissibility typically suffices. The case also exemplifies use of Marks to identify a controlling opinion in a fractured Court and foreshadows later cases, such as Trump v. Hawaii, that invoke Mandel's deferential standard. In short, Din is essential for understanding how the Constitution's protections operate—narrowly—when national sovereignty, foreign affairs, and immigration control intersect.