Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011)
Judulang v. Holder is a cornerstone administrative law decision in the immigration context that polices agency decisionmaking under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Is the Board of Immigration Appeals' comparable-grounds (statutory counterpart) approach for determining a deportable lawful permanent resident's eligibility to seek a § 212(c) waiver arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act?
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a court shall set aside agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. An agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously if it relies on factors Congress did not intend it to consider, fails to consider an important aspect of the problem, offers an explanation contrary to the evidence, or adopts a rationale so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to a difference in view or agency expertise. Agency policies must be reasonable and reasonably explained, and they must be tied to the statutory text, structure, and purposes they purport to implement.
Yes. The BIA's comparable-grounds approach to § 212(c) eligibility is arbitrary and capricious because it makes eligibility turn on distinctions that have no bearing on the purposes of § 212(c) and produces irrational, happenstance-driven outcomes. The Court reversed and remanded.
Judulang is a leading example of the Supreme Court enforcing reasoned decisionmaking under the APA in the immigration arena. It rejects an eligibility screen that divorced relief from the statute's remedial purpose and from the alien's actual offense and equities. Practically, the decision ensured that St. Cyr's preservation of § 212(c) relief could not be gutted by an arbitrary gatekeeping device. Doctrinally, Judulang teaches that courts review agency policy choices for arbitrariness even when not couched as pure statutory interpretation, and that agencies must justify categorical rules with logic tied to statutory objectives. On remand from Judulang, the BIA eventually adopted a more offense-focused approach, culminating in Matter of Abdelghany (2014), which broadened access to § 212(c) for eligible LPRs with pre-1996 pleas.