Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006)
Gonzales v. Oregon is a leading Supreme Court decision at the crossroads of administrative law, federalism, health law, and statutory interpretation.
Does the Controlled Substances Act authorize the U.S. Attorney General to prohibit physicians from prescribing controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide in compliance with state law, and is the Attorney General's interpretive rule entitled to deference?
Under the Controlled Substances Act, the Attorney General's authority is directed primarily at preventing the diversion and abuse of controlled substances through registration, scheduling, and enforcement mechanisms. Absent a clear congressional delegation, the Attorney General may not define general standards of medical practice or displace state regulation of medical care by declaring a category of medical treatment illegitimate. Agency interpretations lacking the force of law (such as interpretive rules) are not entitled to Chevron deference under United States v. Mead Corp. Nor is Auer deference warranted where an agency's reading of its own regulation would effectively expand its statutory authority or where the regulation merely parrots the statute. At most, such interpretations may receive Skidmore deference to the extent they are persuasive.
The Controlled Substances Act does not authorize the Attorney General to prohibit physicians from prescribing controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide where state law permits it. The Ashcroft Directive is invalid and not entitled to Chevron or Auer deference; it is unpersuasive under Skidmore. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit was affirmed.
Gonzales v. Oregon is essential for understanding administrative law's limits on agency self-aggrandizement. It concretizes Mead's step zero: Chevron deference hinges on a genuine congressional delegation to make policy with the force of law. It also sharpens the boundaries of Auer deference and clarifies that vague statutory or regulatory phrases cannot be leveraged to upend state authority over medical practice. For federalism, the case exemplifies statutory interpretation informed by traditional state powers without invoking constitutional invalidation. For health law, it preserves state experimentation with medical aid-in-dying unless and until Congress clearly provides otherwise.