444 U.S. 996 (1979) (per curiam)
Goldwater v. Carter is a cornerstone separation-of-powers and justiciability case arising from President Jimmy Carter's decision to unilaterally terminate a Senate-ratified defense treaty with Taiwan (the Republic of China) as part of normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China.
Does a challenge by individual Members of Congress to the President's unilateral termination of a Senate-ratified treaty present a justiciable controversy for federal courts, and, absent formal congressional action, should courts decide whether the Constitution requires Senate or congressional approval to terminate a treaty?
No single majority rule emerged. A four-Justice plurality concluded that disputes over treaty termination are nonjusticiable political questions where the Constitution commits foreign affairs to the political branches and there are no judicially manageable standards for resolving interbranch disputes. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment on ripeness grounds, reasoning that courts should not adjudicate the constitutional allocation of treaty-termination authority absent a concrete, institutional confrontation between Congress and the President—such as formal legislative action—creating a constitutional impasse. Because the Court lacked a majority on rationale, the case establishes no binding merits rule on presidential power to terminate treaties.
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. The Court declined to reach the merits of whether the President may terminate a treaty without Senate or congressional approval; at least five Justices agreed that the case should be dismissed (four on political question grounds and one on ripeness).
Goldwater v. Carter is a leading case on the political question doctrine and ripeness in the foreign affairs context. It stands for the proposition that courts often decline to resolve separation-of-powers disputes over foreign policy absent a concrete, institutional confrontation between Congress and the President. The case does not establish a binding rule on whether the President may unilaterally terminate treaties, but it instructs that justiciability barriers—political question and ripeness—can preclude judicial review in such disputes. For law students, Goldwater illustrates how fragmented Supreme Court decisions can shape constitutional practice indirectly, and it frames later cases—such as Zivotofsky v. Clinton and Zivotofsky v. Kerry—that refined the scope of justiciability and the President's foreign affairs powers.