Taxpayer Myrtle H. Macomber owned common shares of Standard Oil Co. of California. In 1916, the corporation capitalized part of its accumulated surplus—profits earned after March 1, 1913—and declared a 50% pro rata stock dividend to all common shareholders. Macomber received additional shares proportionate to her existing holdings, leaving her aggregate proportionate interest in the company unchanged. Under the Revenue Act of 1916, as amended in 1917, Congress treated stock dividends as taxable income at their market value. The Collector of Internal Revenue (Eisner) assessed an income tax on the value of Macomber's stock dividend. Macomber challenged the assessment, arguing that a pro rata stock dividend is not "income" within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and that taxing it without apportionment is unconstitutional. The lower federal court enjoined collection, and the case reached the Supreme Court.
Whether a pro rata stock dividend, representing a capitalization of surplus that leaves each shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation unchanged, constitutes "income" within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and is therefore taxable without apportionment.
For Sixteenth Amendment purposes, "income" denotes a gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, and requires realization—a severance from capital—so that it is available for the taxpayer's separate use and benefit. The Amendment removed the apportionment requirement only for taxes that are, in fact, laid on income as so understood; it did not broaden the taxing power to permit non-apportioned direct taxes on capital. A pro rata stock dividend, which merely evidences the reallocation of corporate surplus into capital without altering the shareholder's proportionate ownership, is not income.
No. A pro rata stock dividend that capitalizes corporate surplus and leaves the shareholder's proportionate interest unchanged is not "income" under the Sixteenth Amendment; Congress may not tax it as income without apportionment.
The Court, per Justice Pitney, centered its analysis on the constitutional meaning of "income." Drawing on prior cases, it emphasized that income involves a realized gain—something severed from the capital and made available for the taxpayer's separate use. A pro rata stock dividend simply converts part of the corporation's surplus into capital and issues additional shares to evidence the same fractional interest each shareholder already held. Before and after the dividend, the shareholder owns the same proportionate slice of the enterprise; nothing has been extracted or distributed for the shareholder's personal use. The Court rejected the notion that market value accretions in the paper form of shares—absent realization—constitute income. Because the Sixteenth Amendment allows Congress to tax "incomes, from whatever source derived" without apportionment but does not authorize non-apportioned direct taxes on property or capital, the attempted taxation of a pro rata stock dividend exceeded constitutional bounds. The tax, as applied, operated in substance as a direct levy on capital, since it targeted a bookkeeping event that did not separate earnings from the corporate venture for shareholder consumption. The Court distinguished cash or property dividends—which are realized distributions properly taxable as income—from mere share issuances reflecting capitalization. It also found unpersuasive the argument that Congress could, by statutory definition alone, recharacterize a stock dividend as income; constitutional meaning cannot be altered by legislative fiat. In dissent, Justice Brandeis (joined by Justices Holmes and Clarke) argued that form should not govern substance: a stock dividend funded by earnings is economically equivalent to a cash dividend immediately reinvested, and Congress may choose to tax such accretions as income. The majority, however, adhered to a strict realization approach and the capital–income distinction to police the boundary of the Sixteenth Amendment.
Eisner v. Macomber is pivotal for three reasons. First, it constitutionalized a realization requirement for income by insisting on a severance from capital before a gain becomes taxable without apportionment. Second, it confirmed that the Sixteenth Amendment did not expand the nature of the taxing power to reach capital; it only eliminated apportionment for true income taxes. Third, it shaped statutory law: today, Internal Revenue Code § 305 generally excludes pro rata stock dividends from gross income (with exceptions), reflecting Macomber's core holding. Although later decisions—especially Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. (1955) and Koshland v. Helvering (1936)—narrowed Macomber's reach and adopted a broader, more functional notion of income and realization, Macomber remains a touchstone in debates over realization, mark-to-market taxation, and the constitutional limits of federal taxing power.
Eisner v. Macomber drew a bright constitutional line between income and capital by insisting that taxable income requires a realized gain severed from capital. In refusing to treat pro rata stock dividends as income, the Court anchored early federal income taxation to a realization principle and preserved the apportionment constraint for taxes on property or capital.