The plaintiff, Schiedt, sued the defendant, Dimick, in federal district court (sitting in New Hampshire) for personal injuries arising from an automobile collision. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $500. Believing the award was grossly inadequate in light of the evidence, the plaintiff moved for a new trial on damages. Rather than order a new trial outright, the district judge stated that he would deny the motion if the defendant consented to an increase of the verdict to $1,500—an additur. The defendant, seeking to avoid the burdens of a new trial but preserving an objection to the court's power, consented to the additur under protest. The court then entered judgment for $1,500 without submitting the issue of damages to a new jury. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a federal court may constitutionally employ additur.
May a federal trial court, consistent with the Seventh Amendment, deny a motion for a new trial by conditioning it on the defendant's consent to an increased damages award (additur) and then enter judgment for the higher amount without a new jury determination?
The Seventh Amendment's Re-examination Clause prohibits federal courts from re-examining any fact tried by a jury, otherwise than according to the rules of the common law as they existed in 1791. At common law, federal courts may order a new trial for excessive or inadequate damages, and they may accept remittitur (a plaintiff's voluntary reduction of an excessive verdict) as an alternative to a new trial. But they have no power to increase a jury's award by additur; entering judgment for an amount the jury never found is an impermissible re-examination of facts.
No. Additur is not permitted in federal courts. A federal judge may not increase a jury's damages award and enter judgment for the higher sum; the proper remedy for an inadequate verdict is a new trial.
The Court, per Justice Sutherland, grounded its analysis in the Seventh Amendment's historical command that facts tried by a jury not be re-examined except according to the common-law rules in place at the Founding. Surveying English and early American practice, the Court found longstanding acceptance of remittitur—where a plaintiff voluntarily remits a portion of an excessive jury verdict to avoid a new trial—supported by decisions of this Court (e.g., Kennon v. Gilmer) and by the plaintiff's unilateral power to reduce a judgment in his or her favor. By contrast, the Court found no comparable common-law tradition allowing judges to increase a jury's award; at common law, the remedy for an inadequate verdict was a new trial, not judicial augmentation of the verdict. The Court rejected the argument that additur and remittitur are symmetrical practices. Remittitur can be conceptualized as a plaintiff's waiver of the excess, leaving intact the jury's factual determination at or below the reduced amount. In additur, however, there is no jury finding for the higher sum; the judge substitutes his own assessment of damages, thereby invading the jury's province. Consent of the defendant cannot cure the constitutional problem because the Seventh Amendment allocation of fact-finding to the jury is a structural limit on federal judicial power, not a waivable personal right in this context. Nor could the Court rely on efficiency or equity to justify additur; fidelity to the common-law baseline controls. Accordingly, the district court's use of additur violated the Seventh Amendment, and the proper course was to grant a new trial. Justice Stone, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Brandeis and Cardozo, dissented. He argued that there is no principled constitutional distinction between remittitur and additur where the parties consent, and that modern practice should allow federal courts to avoid unnecessary new trials when a judge can specify a minimum constitutionally acceptable award. The majority, however, found historical pedigree dispositive and maintained the categorical bar.
Dimick cements a bright-line rule in federal courts: no additur. It is foundational for Civil Procedure and Constitutional Law because it frames the permissible bounds of judicial control over jury verdicts under the Seventh Amendment. The case explains why remittitur survives (as a historically grounded, plaintiff-initiated reduction) while additur does not, and it guides Rule 59 new-trial practice. Post-Erie, the rule continues to bind federal courts even in diversity cases where state law might allow additur; the federal constitutional limit prevails. For law students, Dimick is a key citation whenever analyzing remedies for inadequate verdicts, the jury's role in civil trials, and the historical method the Court uses to interpret the Re-examination Clause.
Dimick v. Schiedt fixes the constitutional boundary for federal judges confronting inadequate jury awards: they may order a new trial but cannot increase the verdict. The decision rests on a historically anchored reading of the Seventh Amendment that preserves the jury's exclusive role in fixing damages.