489 U.S. 189 (U.S. Supreme Court 1989)
DeShaney v. Winnebago County is a foundational substantive due process and Section 1983 case that sharply delineates the Constitution's role as a restraint on government power rather than a mandate for protective government action.
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment impose an affirmative duty on a state or its social service agents to protect a child from private violence when the state knows of the risk but has not taken the child into custody?
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generally protects individuals from arbitrary government action; it does not impose an affirmative obligation on the state to ensure the safety and security of private individuals from private actors. An affirmative constitutional duty to protect arises only when the state has limited an individual's liberty by taking the person into custody or otherwise restraining the person's freedom so as to render him unable to care for himself (e.g., incarceration, institutionalization, or similar custodial settings). Mere knowledge of danger, expressions of concern, or the provision of protective services, without custody or comparable restraint, do not create such a duty. Without an underlying constitutional violation, there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
No. The State did not violate the Due Process Clause by failing to protect Joshua from his father's violence because the State had not taken Joshua into custody or otherwise imposed a restraint that created an affirmative constitutional duty to protect. The judgment for the defendants was affirmed.
DeShaney is a cornerstone of constitutional tort law and substantive due process. It cements the principle that the Constitution generally confers negative rights—freedom from government abuse—rather than positive rights to government protection from private actors. It clarifies the limited "special relationship" duty triggered by custody and has shaped § 1983 litigation across domains, including child welfare, domestic violence enforcement, and school safety. The case also frames debates over the (still unsettled at the Supreme Court) "state-created danger" theory adopted in varying forms by some circuits. For law students, DeShaney is essential to understanding the contours of substantive due process, the boundaries of government liability under § 1983, and the policy-constitutional divide: grievous government failures do not automatically translate into federal constitutional violations.