Cathy Costa worked as a warehouse/forklift operator for Desert Palace, Inc., the operator of Caesars Palace in Las Vegas. She was one of the few women (at times the only woman) in her department and alleged that she was subjected to discriminatory treatment compared to male coworkers, including harsher discipline for comparable conduct and an overall more punitive response to workplace incidents. Following a series of disciplinary events, Costa was terminated. She filed a Title VII action alleging sex discrimination. At trial, the district court gave a mixed-motive instruction, allowing the jury to find for Costa if sex was a motivating factor in the decision, even if other factors also played a role, and then to consider Desert Palace's "same-decision" defense, which if proven would limit remedies. The jury returned a verdict in Costa's favor. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether a plaintiff must offer direct evidence of discrimination to obtain a mixed-motive instruction under § 703(m).
Must a Title VII plaintiff present direct evidence of discrimination to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), or is circumstantial evidence sufficient?
Under Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, an unlawful employment practice is established when the plaintiff demonstrates—by direct or circumstantial evidence—that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for an employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (§ 703(m)). If the employer proves it would have made the same decision absent the impermissible motive, the plaintiff's remedies are limited to declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney's fees and costs; compensatory and punitive damages, backpay, and reinstatement are unavailable. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (§ 706(g)(2)(B)). No heightened requirement of direct evidence applies.
A plaintiff need not present direct evidence of discrimination to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction under Title VII § 703(m); circumstantial evidence is sufficient.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas grounded the decision in the text of § 703(m), which states that an unlawful employment practice is established when the plaintiff "demonstrates" that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor for an employment decision, even if other factors also motivated it. The 1991 Act defines "demonstrates" to mean meeting the burdens of production and persuasion—language that does not distinguish between types of evidence. Nothing in § 703(m) imposes a direct-evidence prerequisite, and grafting such a requirement onto the statute would contradict its plain terms. The Court contrasted the statutory regime enacted in 1991 with the earlier, judge-made framework from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Some lower courts, extrapolating from Price Waterhouse, had required a threshold showing of direct evidence to trigger mixed-motive analysis and burden-shifting. But Congress subsequently codified a different structure: (1) the plaintiff may establish liability by showing that a protected trait was a motivating factor (without specifying the form of proof), and (2) the employer may limit remedies by proving it would have taken the same action absent the illegitimate motive. Because Congress provided this detailed framework, importing a direct-evidence requirement from pre-1991 case law is unwarranted. The Court also emphasized general evidence principles: under the Federal Rules of Evidence, no hierarchy privileges direct over circumstantial evidence. Courts and juries routinely rely on circumstantial proof, which can be "more certain, satisfying, and persuasive" than direct testimony. Requiring direct evidence would not only contravene the statutory text but also disserve these foundational principles. Accordingly, a plaintiff who marshals circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor is entitled to a mixed-motive instruction. Finally, the Court confirmed the remedial structure Congress designed: once the plaintiff proves a motivating factor, the employer's same-decision showing is an affirmative defense that limits remedies rather than negates liability. This preserves Congress's balance between identifying discriminatory motive and calibrating relief when other, legitimate reasons independently would have led to the same employment action.
Desert Palace removes a major procedural and evidentiary barrier in Title VII litigation by rejecting any special requirement of direct evidence for mixed-motive claims. It permits plaintiffs to reach a jury and obtain a mixed-motive instruction based solely on circumstantial evidence, harmonizing Title VII with ordinary evidentiary rules. The decision also clarifies the post-1991 relationship among Price Waterhouse, § 703(m), and § 706(g)(2)(B), and it underscores that the employer's same-decision showing affects remedies, not liability. For law students, the case is essential to understanding modern Title VII causation, jury instructions, and strategic choices between mixed-motive and single-motive (pretext) theories.
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa reaffirmed that Title VII's text governs how discrimination claims are tried. By allowing circumstantial evidence to support a mixed-motive instruction, the Court aligned employment discrimination litigation with ordinary evidentiary practice and the remedial scheme Congress enacted in 1991. The result is a clearer, more accessible pathway for plaintiffs to prove that a protected characteristic played a motivating role in an adverse action.