What are the facts?
An elderly California couple, the Jacobys, wrote urgent letters to their niece, Mrs. Davis, and her husband, asking them to come promptly to California to assist, especially to care for Mrs. Jacoby, who was in poor health, and to help with personal and business affairs. The letters promised that, if the Davises would come and render this service, the Jacobys would leave them their property when the Jacobys were gone, and the letters asked for a prompt response confirming that the Davises would come. Within days, the Davises mailed a letter unequivocally promising that they would come at once and began making arrangements to relocate. Before the Davises arrived—and after the Davises' acceptance letter had been mailed—the husband, Mr. Jacoby, died by suicide. Subsequent testamentary arrangements did not leave the property to the Davises. The Davises sued, seeking specific performance of the contract to devise property—effectively, to impress a constructive trust on the estate—arguing that their mailed acceptance created a binding bilateral contract before Mr. Jacoby's death.
What is the legal issue?
When an offer requests that relatives come render care and states that the offerors will leave them their property if they do so, and asks for an immediate response, does the offeree's mailed promise to come create a binding bilateral contract before the offeror's death, or is the offer only acceptably by completed performance (a unilateral contract) such that the death revokes the offer?
What rule applies?
If an offer is reasonably susceptible of acceptance either by a promise or by performance, courts presume it invites a promise and forms a bilateral contract upon the offeree's return promise. Acceptance by mail is effective upon dispatch under the mailbox rule, unless the offer prescribes a different method. Death of the offeror revokes an unaccepted offer, but it does not terminate a contract already formed by acceptance. A clear and definite contract to make a will is specifically enforceable in equity, and courts may impress a constructive trust on the estate to effectuate the bargain.
What did the court hold?
The court held that the Jacobys' letters invited acceptance by promise, not only by performance; the Davises accepted by mailing their promise to come. A binding bilateral contract was formed upon dispatch of the acceptance before Mr. Jacoby's death. The contract to leave property was enforceable in equity against the estate.
What is the reasoning?
The court emphasized the language and context of the correspondence. The letters did not merely offer a reward for performance; they urgently solicited a prompt response confirming that the Davises would come. That request for an immediate, definitive assurance signaled that the Jacobys sought the security of a return promise. Construing the offer as inviting only performance would expose the Davises to the risk of preparing, traveling, and rendering service without any reciprocal obligation from the Jacobys until full performance—an outcome disfavored where the language reasonably permits bilateral acceptance. Invoking the Restatement's interpretive principle, the court adopted the presumption that ambiguous offers are bilateral. Once the Davises mailed their unequivocal promise to come, a contract formed under the mailbox rule. Although death ordinarily revokes unaccepted offers, the court underscored that Mr. Jacoby's death occurred after formation and therefore could not dissolve the contractual obligation. The court also found the promise sufficiently definite as a contract to make a will: the consideration was the Davises' rendering of personal services by relocating and caring for Mrs. Jacoby, which the letters specifically contemplated. Given the adequacy of proof and the equitable nature of the obligation, specific performance—implemented through a constructive trust on the estate—was an appropriate remedy to prevent unjust defeat of the bargain.
Why is this case significant?
For law students, Davis v. Jacoby anchors several first-year Contracts doctrines. It establishes a strong presumption that ambiguous offers invite a return promise (bilateral contracts), mitigating forfeiture risks and protecting reliance. It cleanly demonstrates the mailbox rule's operation even when the offeror dies before receiving acceptance. And it exemplifies the enforceability of contracts to make a will, highlighting equitable remedies like constructive trusts. On exams, Davis guides interpretation of offers that both request action and ask for an immediate commitment, and it counsels careful analysis of whether acceptance occurred—and by what mode—before an intervening event (like death) could terminate the offer.
What is the unilateral vs. bilateral contract distinction, and how did it affect the outcome?
A unilateral contract is accepted only by complete performance; a bilateral contract is accepted by a promise, creating mutual obligations immediately. In Davis, the court held the offer invited a promise, not just performance, so the Davises' mailed promise formed a binding bilateral contract before the offeror's death. Had the offer been unilateral, no contract would have formed until the Davises fully performed, and the death could have revoked the offer.
Why did the court apply the mailbox rule, and what was its effect?
The offer did not prescribe a different method of acceptance, and the parties used the mail for communications. Under the mailbox rule, acceptance by mail is effective upon dispatch. Thus, the Davises' acceptance letter formed the contract when mailed—before Mr. Jacoby's death—so the subsequent death did not invalidate the agreement.
How did the court infer that the offer invited a promise rather than performance?
The letters urgently asked the Davises to come and expressly requested an immediate commitment (e.g., a prompt response confirming they would come). That request for assurance indicates the offerors sought the security of a promise, not just the risk of waiting to see if performance materialized. The court applied the Restatement's presumption favoring bilateral construction when language is ambiguous.
Can a contract to make a will really be specifically enforced?
Yes. Where there is clear and definite evidence of a bargain supported by consideration (here, the Davises' promise to relocate and provide care), equity can specifically enforce a contract to devise property. The typical remedy is to impress a constructive trust on the estate or its assets to ensure the promisee receives the benefit of the bargain.
Would beginning performance without a promise have protected the Davises if the offer were unilateral?
Under Restatement principles, beginning performance on a unilateral offer creates an option contract that makes the offer temporarily irrevocable (protecting the offeree's reliance). But the Davis court did not need to rely on this doctrine because it found the offer invited a promise, and acceptance occurred by the mailed promise before any question of partial performance arose.
What practical drafting and exam tips come from Davis v. Jacoby?
For drafters: specify whether acceptance must be by performance only, or whether a return promise suffices, and prescribe the mode of acceptance if you want to avoid the mailbox rule. For exams: when an offer urges action and asks for a quick reply, argue that it invites a promise (bilateral), apply the mailbox rule to determine the moment of acceptance, analyze the effect of death or revocation, and consider equitable remedies for contracts to make a will.