529 U.S. 576 (2000)
Christensen v. Harris County is a pivotal Supreme Court case that addresses the degree of deference a court should give to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, particularly when the interpretation does not carry the force of law.
Does an agency's interpretation of its own regulation, articulated in a less formal context such as an opinion letter, warrant judicial deference under the Skidmore standard, particularly when the regulation is silent on the specific issue at hand?
An agency's interpretation of its own regulations is given deference based on the clarity of the regulation and the formality of the interpretative process. When an agency's interpretation lacks the force of law, as in opinion letters, it is entitled to respect under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., to the extent it has the 'power to persuade'.
The Supreme Court held that Harris County's policy of compelling employees to use their compensatory time did not violate the Fair Labor Standards Act, as the FLSA's language did not preclude such practices. The Court ruled that the Department of Labor's opinion letter was not entitled to deference under Chevron but could be persuasive under Skidmore.
Christensen v. Harris County is significant for its clarification of deference doctrines applicable to informal agency interpretations. Law students gain insight into differentiating between the Chevron and Skidmore standards of deference. Chevron deference applies to formal rulemaking, giving substantial weight to agency interpretations that have the force of law. Meanwhile, Skidmore deference allows courts to evaluate informal interpretations based on their persuasiveness. The decision underscores the importance of understanding administrative rulemaking processes and the judicial principles guiding agency interaction.