141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021) (Supreme Court of the United States)
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid is a landmark modern Takings Clause decision clarifying when government-authorized physical invasions of private land are categorically compensable.
Does a government regulation that grants union organizers a limited right to physically enter private agricultural property constitute a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment, requiring just compensation?
When the government appropriates a right to physically invade private property—by authorizing third parties to enter and occupy land, even on an intermittent or time-limited basis—it effects a per se physical taking requiring just compensation. This per se rule applies regardless of the invasion's duration, unless the access falls within background limitations on property rights (such as health and safety inspections, emergency entries, or long-recognized privileges), is a condition voluntarily accepted in exchange for a government benefit and analyzed under Nollan/Dolan, or is otherwise consented to by the owner.
Yes. The California access regulation appropriates a right to physically invade private property and therefore effects a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit's judgment was reversed.
Cedar Point re-centers the right to exclude in takings analysis and establishes that government-created access rights are per se physical takings, even when intermittent. For law students, the case sharpens the boundary between per se physical takings and regulatory takings: when the government appropriates a right of entry, Penn Central balancing drops out. The decision also clarifies how to treat inspection regimes and exaction conditions, highlights the continuing vitality of Loretto and Kaiser Aetna, and narrows PruneYard to its public-access context. Practically, the case affects labor access rules, easement-by-regulation programs, and similar statutes that compel private land access without compensation.