Johnson Controls, Inc. manufactured batteries in facilities where workers were exposed to lead, a substance known to carry risks to reproductive health, particularly potential harm to a developing fetus. In 1982, Johnson Controls adopted a fetal-protection policy that barred all women capable of bearing children from holding jobs that involved lead exposure above federal standards, unless the women could provide medical documentation of infertility. Women affected by the policy were forced to transfer out of higher-paying lead-exposed positions, and newly hired women were ineligible for such positions unless sterile. Men, despite evidence that lead exposure can impair male reproductive function, were not excluded from these jobs. The International Union, UAW, and several individual employees (both women and men) filed a Title VII complaint alleging that the policy constituted unlawful sex discrimination as amended by the PDA. The district court granted summary judgment to Johnson Controls, and the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed, accepting the company's arguments that its policy was justified by safety concerns and, alternatively, was a valid BFOQ. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Does an employer's fetal-protection policy that excludes women who are capable of bearing children from certain jobs constitute sex discrimination under Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and, if so, can it be justified as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)?
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination "because of sex." The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 clarifies that discrimination "because of sex" includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions and requires that women affected by such conditions be treated the same as other persons similar in their ability or inability to work. A policy that on its face classifies employees by sex or by childbearing capacity is disparate treatment and can be lawful only if sex is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). The BFOQ defense is extremely narrow and applies only where sex is reasonably necessary to the essence of the employer's business; generalized concerns about safety, customer preferences, or potential third-party harms or tort liability do not ordinarily satisfy BFOQ. Business necessity is not a defense to facial disparate treatment; it pertains to disparate impact claims.
Yes. Johnson Controls' policy is facial sex discrimination because it excludes women based on childbearing capacity, and it is not justified as a BFOQ. The policy violates Title VII as amended by the PDA.
The Court characterized the fetal-protection policy as facially discriminatory: it singled out women who are capable of becoming pregnant for exclusion from higher-paying, lead-exposed jobs while imposing no comparable exclusion on similarly situated men, even though lead also poses reproductive risks to men. Under Title VII and the PDA, employment decisions may not be based on pregnancy or potential for pregnancy; women affected by pregnancy or related conditions must be treated like others similar in their ability or inability to work. By conditioning job eligibility on the absence of childbearing capacity, the policy discriminated on the basis of sex. Because the policy was intentional disparate treatment, the relevant defense was not business necessity but BFOQ, which is strictly limited to situations where sex is reasonably necessary to the essence of the business. The essence of Johnson Controls' business is making batteries, not selecting employees based on sex or reproductive capacity. Fetal protection is not a job qualification or an element of job performance. The Court emphasized that an employer may not exclude an entire class of women based on paternalistic notions of protecting them or their potential offspring. Decisions about potential risks to a fetus belong to the parents, not the employer; Title VII does not permit employers to override a woman's choice to assume workplace risks that similarly situated men may assume. The company's asserted fear of tort liability for fetal injuries likewise did not convert sex into a BFOQ. Title VII's commands are not displaced by potential state tort claims. Employers must comply with neutral workplace safety laws (e.g., OSHA standards), provide information, and implement nondiscriminatory safety measures, but they may not adopt sex-specific bars. Allowing employers to discriminate based on hypothetical liability would swallow Title VII's rule. Moreover, the policy's asymmetry—excluding only women despite risks to male reproductive health—undermined any claim that sex itself was a legitimate job qualification tied to the core function of the business. Consequently, the policy violated Title VII and could not be saved by BFOQ.
The decision cements that excluding women because of their capacity to become pregnant is sex discrimination under Title VII and the PDA. It narrows the BFOQ defense by confirming that the "essence of the business" test is not satisfied by paternalistic safety concerns or fear of liability. For law students, the case illuminates: (1) the difference between disparate treatment and disparate impact frameworks; (2) the stringent limits of the BFOQ defense; (3) the PDA's role in prohibiting decisions based on pregnancy and childbearing capacity; and (4) how federal antidiscrimination law interacts with employer safety policies and tort-liability anxieties.
UAW v. Johnson Controls firmly establishes that fetal-protection policies excluding women on the basis of childbearing capacity are unlawful disparate treatment under Title VII as amended by the PDA. The Court's rigorous application of the narrow BFOQ defense ensures that employers cannot convert paternalistic safety rationales or fear of liability into sex-based employment qualifications.