Proximate Cause (Foreseeability)
What is the Proximate Cause (Foreseeability)?
Proximate cause limits liability to consequences that are a foreseeable result of the defendant's negligent conduct. It serves as a policy-based limitation on the scope of liability beyond actual causation.
Source: Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928)
Definition
Proximate cause, also called legal cause or scope of liability under the Restatement (Third) of Torts, is the doctrine that limits a defendant's liability to harms that bear a sufficiently close connection to the defendant's negligent conduct. Even if the defendant's act was an actual cause (but-for cause) of the plaintiff's injury, the defendant is not liable unless the harm was a foreseeable consequence of the negligent conduct.
The dominant test for proximate cause is foreseeability. Under this approach, a defendant is liable only for the type of harm that was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence. The seminal case is Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, in which Judge Cardozo held that liability is limited to risks that were reasonably foreseeable. The competing approach, from Judge Andrews's dissent, treats proximate cause as a flexible, policy-driven inquiry into whether the connection between conduct and harm is too attenuated.
Important sub-rules govern proximate cause analysis. Under the thin skull (eggshell plaintiff) rule, a defendant takes the plaintiff as found — if the type of harm was foreseeable, the extent of harm need not be. Superseding causes may break the chain of proximate causation if an intervening force is unforeseeable and independent. However, foreseeable intervening causes (such as medical malpractice following an injury) generally do not break the chain. Courts distinguish between dependent intervening causes (set in motion by the defendant's act) and independent intervening causes (arising from separate origins).
Key Elements
- 1The defendant's conduct was an actual cause of the harm
- 2The type of harm suffered was a foreseeable consequence of the negligent conduct
- 3No unforeseeable superseding cause broke the causal chain
- 4The plaintiff was a foreseeable victim (within the zone of danger)
- 5The harm was not too remote or attenuated from the defendant's conduct
Landmark Cases
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.
248 N.Y. 339 (1928)
Judge Cardozo framed proximate cause through foreseeability, limiting liability to risks within the scope of the duty owed to foreseeable plaintiffs.
Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. (Wagon Mound No. 1)
[1961] AC 388 (Privy Council)
Replaced the direct causation test with a foreseeability test for proximate cause in negligence, holding that liability is limited to foreseeable types of harm.
Doughty v. Turner Manufacturing Co.
[1964] 1 QB 518
Applied Wagon Mound foreseeability analysis, holding the defendant not liable where the specific mechanism of harm was unforeseeable even though burn injuries might be foreseeable.
Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp.
51 N.Y.2d 308 (1980)
Held that an intervening act (driver having seizure) did not constitute a superseding cause because it was foreseeable that third parties might enter the work zone.
Exam Tips
- Separate actual cause from proximate cause in your analysis — always address but-for causation first, then move to foreseeability.
- Remember the eggshell plaintiff rule: the type of harm must be foreseeable, but the extent of harm need not be.
- When you see an intervening force on an exam, analyze whether it is foreseeable (not superseding) or unforeseeable (potentially superseding).
- Note whether the jurisdiction follows the Cardozo majority or the Andrews dissent — this can change the outcome.
Common Mistakes to Avoid
- Conflating actual cause (but-for) with proximate cause — they are separate inquiries and both must be satisfied.
- Forgetting the eggshell plaintiff rule and incorrectly arguing that unforeseeable extent of harm defeats proximate cause.
- Treating all intervening causes as superseding — only unforeseeable, independent intervening forces break the causal chain.
Memory Aid
Proximate cause asks: Was this harm in the SCOPE of the risk? Type of harm foreseeable = liable. Extent of harm unforeseeable = still liable (eggshell plaintiff).