Civil Procedure Issue Spotting
Identify jurisdiction, venue, joinder, discovery, and preclusion issues in litigation scenarios involving federal and state courts and multiple parties.
5 exercises across Beginner, Intermediate, and Advanced difficulty levels
Fact Pattern
Sarah, a citizen of Oregon, purchases a blender manufactured by KitchenPro Corp., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Ohio. Sarah buys the blender from MegaMart, a Washington corporation, at a store in Oregon. The blender malfunctions and injures Sarah, causing $60,000 in medical bills.
Sarah wants to sue both KitchenPro and MegaMart. She files in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, asserting diversity jurisdiction. KitchenPro files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing it has no offices, employees, or property in Oregon and that the blender was distributed through a national retail chain without any specific targeting of the Oregon market. MegaMart files a motion to transfer venue to the Western District of Washington, where its headquarters is located.
After the jurisdictional motions, KitchenPro files a third-party complaint against PartsCo, an Oregon-based component manufacturer that supplied the allegedly defective blade assembly to KitchenPro.
Issues to Spot (4)
1. Diversity Jurisdiction — Complete Diversity and Amount in Controversy
Sarah (Oregon) sues KitchenPro (Delaware/Ohio) and MegaMart (Washington). Complete diversity exists because no defendant shares citizenship with the plaintiff. The $60,000 in medical bills alone may not exceed the $75,000 threshold, but if Sarah can plausibly allege additional damages (pain and suffering, lost wages), the amount requirement may be met.
2. Personal Jurisdiction — Stream of Commerce
KitchenPro's motion raises the stream of commerce issue from Asahi and J. McIntyre. Under the O'Connor plurality in Asahi, merely placing a product in the stream of commerce is insufficient — there must be 'something more' targeting the forum state. Under the Brennan concurrence, awareness that products reach the forum through regular distribution channels suffices.
3. Venue and Transfer Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a)
Venue is proper in Oregon under 28 U.S.C. Section 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events (the purchase and injury) occurred there. MegaMart's motion to transfer under Section 1404(a) requires showing that the transferee court is more convenient for parties and witnesses and serves the interest of justice. The plaintiff's choice of forum is given significant weight.
4. Third-Party Practice — Rule 14 Impleader
KitchenPro's third-party complaint against PartsCo under Rule 14 is proper only if KitchenPro claims PartsCo is liable to KitchenPro for all or part of Sarah's claim (indemnity or contribution). A mere allegation that PartsCo was independently negligent is insufficient for impleader — the third-party claim must be derivative.
Fact Pattern
A group of 45 current and former employees of DataFlow Inc. allege that the company systematically underpaid overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and analogous state laws in California and Texas. The employees worked in three different departments (engineering, sales, and customer support) and were subject to different pay structures, supervisors, and overtime policies.
The named plaintiffs file a class action in the Northern District of California, seeking certification under Rule 23. DataFlow opposes certification, arguing that individual issues of each employee's job duties, hours worked, and applicable exemptions predominate over common questions. DataFlow also moves to compel arbitration against 20 of the employees who signed employment agreements containing mandatory arbitration clauses with class action waivers.
During discovery, DataFlow's counsel inadvertently produces a privileged internal memo from in-house counsel advising HR on how to classify employees to minimize overtime exposure. The plaintiffs' attorney reviews the memo and plans to use it as evidence of willful violation.
Issues to Spot (4)
1. Class Certification — Commonality and Predominance
Under Rule 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3), the plaintiffs must show common questions of law or fact that predominate over individual issues. Different pay structures, departments, and supervisors across three states create significant individualized inquiries. However, a common company-wide policy or practice of misclassification could satisfy the commonality requirement under Wal-Mart v. Dukes.
2. Mandatory Arbitration and Class Action Waivers
Under Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, mandatory arbitration agreements with class action waivers are generally enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act. The 20 employees who signed such agreements may be compelled to arbitrate individually, reducing the class size and potentially undermining numerosity. State unconscionability challenges have had limited success post-Epic Systems.
3. Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Material
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b), inadvertent disclosure does not waive attorney-client privilege if the disclosing party took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure and promptly attempted to rectify the error. DataFlow must show it had adequate privilege review procedures and acted quickly upon discovering the mistake. If the privilege is not waived, the plaintiffs must return or destroy the memo.
4. Federal Question vs. Supplemental Jurisdiction
The FLSA claim provides federal question jurisdiction. The state law overtime claims from California and Texas invoke supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1367. However, if the state claims substantially predominate, involve novel state law issues, or the federal claims are dismissed early, the court has discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction.
Fact Pattern
TechBuild LLC, a software company incorporated in Texas with its principal place of business in Austin, enters into a services agreement with CloudNet Corp., a Delaware company headquartered in New York. The contract contains a forum selection clause: "Any disputes arising under this agreement shall be resolved exclusively in the state or federal courts located in New York County, New York."
A dispute arises over CloudNet's alleged failure to deliver functional software. TechBuild sues CloudNet in the Western District of Texas (Austin division), arguing the forum selection clause is unenforceable because TechBuild had no bargaining power, the clause was buried in a 40-page click-through agreement, and litigating in New York would be prohibitively expensive for TechBuild, a 12-person company.
CloudNet moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue or, in the alternative, to transfer under 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). TechBuild responds by adding a tort claim for fraudulent inducement, arguing that CloudNet's sales team made false representations about the software's capabilities before the contract was signed.
Issues to Spot (4)
1. Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses
Under Atlantic Marine Construction v. U.S. District Court, forum selection clauses are presumptively enforceable and should be given controlling weight in most cases. The party opposing the clause bears a heavy burden to show the clause is unreasonable. Mere inconvenience or cost disadvantage is generally insufficient — TechBuild would need to show the clause is the product of fraud or overreaching, or that enforcement would contravene a strong public policy.
2. Rule 12(b)(3) vs. Section 1404(a) Transfer
Atlantic Marine clarified that a forum selection clause should be enforced through a Section 1404(a) transfer motion, not a Rule 12(b)(3) dismissal, when the designated forum is another federal court. Under Section 1404(a) with a valid forum selection clause, the court gives no weight to the plaintiff's choice of forum and considers only public interest factors.
3. Contract of Adhesion / Procedural Unconscionability
TechBuild's argument that the clause was buried in a click-through agreement raises procedural unconscionability. However, courts routinely enforce click-through agreements, and sophistication of the parties matters — a commercial entity is held to a higher standard than a consumer. TechBuild's 12-person size does not automatically make it the weaker party in a B2B transaction.
4. Scope of Forum Selection Clause — Tort Claims
TechBuild's fraudulent inducement claim raises whether the forum selection clause covers tort claims arising out of the contract. Broadly worded clauses ('any disputes arising under or relating to this agreement') typically encompass related tort claims. The 'arising under' language here is narrower and may not reach pre-contractual fraud claims, creating a scope dispute.
Fact Pattern
In a breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, plaintiff MedTech Investors LLC sues former CEO Robert Crane, alleging he diverted corporate opportunities to a competing entity he secretly controlled. During discovery, MedTech requests production of all emails between Crane and the competing entity for the prior three years.
Crane's attorney produces 2,000 emails but withholds 150 emails under attorney-client privilege, providing a privilege log. MedTech challenges 50 of the privilege log entries as insufficient, arguing the descriptions are too vague ("email re: legal matter" or "communication regarding business strategy"). MedTech also learns that Crane's personal Gmail account — which he used for some business communications — was subject to an automatic deletion policy, and approximately 300 emails were destroyed after the litigation hold letter was sent.
MedTech files a motion for sanctions under Rule 37(e) for spoliation and seeks an adverse inference instruction. Crane argues the deletions were automated and not intentional, and that the lost emails were cumulative of information already produced.
Issues to Spot (4)
1. Spoliation of ESI Under Rule 37(e)
Rule 37(e) governs failure to preserve electronically stored information. MedTech must show Crane had a duty to preserve the Gmail emails (triggered by the litigation hold), the emails were lost because Crane failed to take reasonable steps to preserve them, and the emails cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery. The automatic deletion policy does not excuse the duty to preserve once litigation is reasonably anticipated.
2. Adverse Inference Instruction — Intent to Deprive
Under Rule 37(e)(2), the severe sanction of an adverse inference instruction requires a finding that the spoliating party 'acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information's use in litigation.' Mere negligence is insufficient. Crane's failure to disable the auto-delete after receiving the litigation hold may indicate recklessness, but proving actual intent to destroy evidence is the critical threshold.
3. Privilege Log Sufficiency
Vague privilege log descriptions like 'email re: legal matter' fail to provide the opposing party with sufficient information to challenge the privilege designation. Under Rule 26(b)(5)(A), the log must describe the nature of the withheld communication with enough detail to assess the privilege claim. Insufficient log entries risk waiver of the privilege for those documents.
4. Crime-Fraud Exception to Attorney-Client Privilege
If any of the withheld communications involved Crane seeking legal advice to further the alleged scheme to divert corporate opportunities, the crime-fraud exception could pierce the attorney-client privilege. MedTech can request in camera review of the disputed emails to determine whether the exception applies.
Fact Pattern
In 2023, Greenfield Corp. sues Rivera Manufacturing in New Jersey state court for breach of contract, alleging Rivera delivered nonconforming goods worth $150,000. The case goes to trial, and the jury returns a verdict for Rivera, finding no breach occurred. The judgment is entered and becomes final after all appeals are exhausted.
In 2025, Greenfield files a new lawsuit against Rivera in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey under diversity jurisdiction. This time, Greenfield alleges fraud — claiming Rivera's sales team knowingly misrepresented the quality of the goods before the sale. Greenfield argues this is a separate claim that was not and could not have been litigated in the prior breach of contract case. Rivera moves to dismiss, arguing claim preclusion bars the fraud claim.
During the motion briefing, Greenfield also seeks to introduce newly discovered internal Rivera emails showing the sales team discussed quality concerns before the sale. Rivera argues issue preclusion prevents Greenfield from relitigating the quality of the goods.
Issues to Spot (4)
1. Claim Preclusion (Res Judicata)
Under claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits bars relitigation of any claims that were or could have been raised in the prior action between the same parties involving the same transaction or occurrence. The fraud claim arises from the same sale as the breach of contract claim, and Greenfield likely could have asserted fraud in the first lawsuit, making claim preclusion a strong defense for Rivera.
2. Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel)
Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessarily decided in a prior action. If the 2023 jury found the goods were conforming, Greenfield may be estopped from arguing the goods were nonconforming in the fraud case. However, fraud involves a different legal theory — the issue is whether Rivera knowingly misrepresented quality, not whether the goods actually conformed.
3. Newly Discovered Evidence
Greenfield's newly discovered emails do not create an exception to claim preclusion in most jurisdictions. The proper remedy for newly discovered evidence after a final judgment is a motion under Rule 60(b)(2) in the original court, not a new lawsuit. The new evidence must also have been unavailable through due diligence during the original litigation.
4. Full Faith and Credit — State to Federal Court
Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1738, federal courts must give state court judgments the same preclusive effect they would have in the courts of the rendering state. The District of New Jersey must apply New Jersey preclusion law to determine the effect of the prior state court judgment, which may differ from federal common law preclusion standards.