Do I need to memorize rule numbers for a closed-book PR exam?

Yes for the high-frequency rules — 1.1 through 1.18, 3.3, 3.4, 3.8, 4.1, 4.2, 5.5, 8.3, and 8.4 — because graders use rule numbers as shorthand for issue spotting. For lower-frequency rules like 2.3, 6.5, or 7.6, knowing the substance and describing it accurately is enough. If the exam is open-rules, memorization matters less and application matters more.

How do I answer when a rule permits disclosure but doesn't require it?

Say that explicitly and then analyze both paths. Write that Rule 1.6(b)(1) permits but does not require disclosure to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm, note that a substantial minority of states have made that disclosure mandatory, and then explain what a reasonable lawyer would do and why. Professors reward candidates who notice the permissive/mandatory distinction because it is the single most commonly missed feature of Rule 1.6.

What is the difference between a Rule 1.9 conflict and a disqualification motion?

Rule 1.9 is a disciplinary standard applied by bar authorities; disqualification is a remedy a trial court grants in pending litigation. Courts generally borrow the substantial-relationship test from Rule 1.9 but also consider prejudice to the client losing counsel, delay, and whether the motion is a tactical weapon. Say both on an exam: the conduct violates Rule 1.9(a), and separately, a court would likely or unlikely grant disqualification for these reasons.

How much case law should I include?

It depends on how your professor taught the course. If the syllabus was organized around cases, name them — Upjohn, Nix v. Whiteside, Ohralik, Gentile, Wheat — because they signal you did the reading. If the course was rule-driven, one or two cases used to resolve a genuinely close point is plenty, and padding your answer with case names costs you application time.

How do I handle a fact pattern where the client is a corporation?

Start with Rule 1.13(a): the organization is the client. Then check whether the lawyer gave a Rule 1.13(f) warning to a constituent whose interests conflict with the entity's, whether up-the-ladder reporting under 1.13(b) was required, and whether 1.13(c) reporting out is permitted. Add Rule 1.7 if the lawyer also represents an individual constituent, Upjohn for the privilege scope, and Rule 4.2 comment 7 if opposing counsel contacted an employee.

Is a rule violation enough to prove malpractice?

No. The Scope section of the Model Rules states that violation should not itself give rise to a cause of action or create a presumption that a legal duty was breached. Most jurisdictions do admit the rules as evidence of the applicable standard of care, and the plaintiff must still prove duty, breach, causation — usually through a case-within-a-case showing — and damages. Say this expressly whenever the call of the question asks about civil liability.

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What is a PR exam actually testing?

Two things, and weak answers conflate them. First, whether specific conduct violates a numbered Model Rule and is therefore subject to professional discipline. Second, whether that conduct produces some other legal consequence — civil liability, loss of a client's case, or an evidentiary result. The Scope section of the Model Rules says a rule violation does not itself create a cause of action and should not create a presumption of a breached legal duty, so you cannot answer 'the lawyer violated Rule 1.1, therefore she is liable for malpractice.' Many jurisdictions do let the rules in as evidence of the standard of care.

Before you start writing, run the call of the question against this grid: (1) discipline under the Model Rules; (2) legal malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty, which requires duty, breach, causation — usually proved by a 'case within a case' — and damages, and where a duty can arise without a fee or a signed agreement (Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keller); (3) disqualification, where the moving party invokes Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10 but courts also weigh tactical abuse and prejudice; (4) litigation sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, or the court's inherent power (Chambers v. NASCO); (5) attorney-client privilege and work product, which are evidence doctrines separate from Rule 1.6; and (6) ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington, or the conflict-based standard of Cuyler v. Sullivan.

What is the chronological checklist?

Walk the relationship start to finish. This ordering catches issues that a rule-number-first approach misses, because a single set of facts often triggers a duty at intake and a different duty at withdrawal.

Do not spend equal time on each step. Identify which two or three steps the professor loaded with facts and develop those.

Formation: Was there a client? Rule 1.18 governs prospective clients who consult but never retain — you owe confidentiality and a limited conflicts bar. Rule 1.13 makes the organization the client, not the constituent.
Competence and scope: Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4. Client decides objectives, settlement, plea, jury waiver, and whether to testify; lawyer decides tactics. Rule 1.2(d) bars assisting crime or fraud but permits discussing the legal consequences of proposed conduct.
Fees: Rule 1.5(a) reasonableness factors; 1.5(b) communication of the basis; 1.5(c) contingent fees in a writing signed by the client with a closing statement; 1.5(d) no contingent fee in a criminal case or for securing a divorce or an amount of alimony; 1.5(e) fee splitting outside the firm requires proportional services or joint responsibility plus the client's written agreement.
Property: Rule 1.15 — separate trust account, no commingling, prompt notice and delivery, keep disputed funds separate. Conversion of client funds is the classic disbarment fact pattern.
Diminished capacity: Rule 1.14 permits protective action, including a guardianship petition, and impliedly authorizes limited disclosure.
Exit: Rule 1.16(a) mandatory withdrawal (violation, physical or mental condition, discharge); 1.16(b) permissive; 1.16(c) tribunal permission; 1.16(d) return papers and unearned fees.

How do you handle confidentiality versus privilege?

Separate them in the first sentence of your analysis. Rule 1.6 covers all information relating to the representation, whatever the source, and binds the lawyer as a matter of discipline. The attorney-client privilege is narrower — confidential communications for the purpose of legal advice — and is defeated by waiver and by the crime-fraud exception. For corporations, apply Upjohn v. United States and reject any control-group argument. Work product traces to Hickman v. Taylor and Rule 26(b)(3).

Then walk Rule 1.6(b). Every exception is permissive, not mandatory: preventing reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; preventing or mitigating substantial financial injury from a client crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client used the lawyer's services; securing legal advice about the lawyer's own compliance; self-defense in a claim or fee dispute; complying with other law or a court order; and detecting conflicts on a lateral move. Note that Rule 1.6(b)(1) would permit, but not require, disclosure on Spaulding v. Zimmerman facts, and that many states make disclosure of imminent death mandatory. Flag that Rule 3.3 overrides Rule 1.6 by its own terms and Rule 4.1(b) does so only where disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a client crime or fraud and disclosure is not prohibited by Rule 1.6.

For securities practice, add Sarbanes-Oxley § 307 and the SEC's Part 205 up-the-ladder reporting rules, which run parallel to Rule 1.13(b)-(c).

How do you run the conflicts analysis?

Use a fixed sequence and never skip the waiver step; that is where most points live.

For a criminal defense conflict, add Wheat v. United States: the trial court may refuse a waiver and disqualify counsel even where the defendant consents.

Current clients: Rule 1.7(a)(1) direct adversity, or (a)(2) material limitation by another client, a former client, a third person, or the lawyer's own interest.
Waiver: Rule 1.7(b) requires the lawyer's reasonable belief in competent and diligent representation, no legal prohibition, no assertion of a claim by one client against another in the same litigation, and informed consent confirmed in writing.
Former clients: Rule 1.9(a) — same or substantially related matter, materially adverse interests, waivable by informed consent confirmed in writing. Rule 1.9(c) bars use or revelation of the former client's information.
Imputation: Rule 1.10(a) imputes conflicts firm-wide, with carve-outs for purely personal-interest conflicts and, under the 2009 amendment, timely screening of a lateral hire with written notice — an amendment many states did not adopt, so say so.
Special screening regimes: Rule 1.11 (former and current government lawyers), Rule 1.12 (former judges, clerks, arbitrators, mediators), Rule 1.18(d) (prospective clients).
Rule 1.8 transactional traps: business deals with clients (1.8(a) fairness, writing, advice to seek independent counsel, signed consent), gifts, literary rights, financial assistance, aggregate settlements, prospective limits on liability, and the flat ban on sexual relations begun after representation (1.8(j)).

What triggers the litigation and third-party rules?

If the facts put a lawyer in front of a tribunal, sweep Rules 3.1 through 3.9. Rule 3.3 is the heavyweight: no false statements of law or fact, disclose adverse controlling authority in the controlling jurisdiction not disclosed by opposing counsel, take reasonable remedial measures for false material evidence including disclosure to the tribunal, and continue those duties to the conclusion of the proceeding. For the perjurious criminal defendant, cite Nix v. Whiteside and note the split among remonstrate/withdraw/narrative approaches. Rule 3.4 covers evidence tampering, obstruction, and improper witness payments; Rule 3.5 covers ex parte contact and juror communications; Rule 3.6 trial publicity, with Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada; Rule 3.7 lawyer as necessary witness, which is not imputed except through 1.7 or 1.9.

Prosecutors get Rule 3.8 plus the constitutional overlay of Brady v. Maryland and the Berger v. United States 'sovereignty' language; note that Rule 3.8(d) is broader than Brady because it has no materiality threshold, and that 3.8(g)-(h) impose post-conviction exoneration duties.

Outside the courtroom, run Rule 4.1 (truthfulness, plus the comment that estimates of price and settlement value are not statements of material fact), Rule 4.2 (no contact with represented persons; for organizations, comment 7 covers constituents who supervise, direct, or consult with counsel, whose acts may be imputed, or who can bind the entity), Rule 4.3 (unrepresented persons — no advice other than to secure counsel), and Rule 4.4(b) (inadvertently sent documents require prompt notice).

What about firms, marketing, and self-regulation?

Rule 5.1 imposes duties on partners and supervisors, and 5.1(c) creates ordering-or-ratifying liability. Rule 5.2 gives the subordinate a safe harbor only for reasonable resolutions of arguable questions of duty. Rule 5.3 extends to nonlawyer assistants, including vendors and AI or outsourced services. Rule 5.4 protects independence — no fee sharing with nonlawyers, no nonlawyer ownership, subject to the Arizona and Utah reforms your professor may flag. Rule 5.5 covers unauthorized and multijurisdictional practice; know the four temporary-practice safe harbors in 5.5(c). Rule 5.6 voids noncompetes among lawyers and restrictions in settlement agreements.

Advertising and solicitation were rewritten in 2018, collapsing the old rules into 7.1 (no false or misleading communications), 7.2 (permissible communications, the ban on giving anything of value for a recommendation and its exceptions, and the firm-name and contact-information requirements), and 7.3 (live person-to-person solicitation, with exceptions for lawyers, family, close personal or prior professional relationships, and routine users of the service). Anchor the doctrine in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, In re Primus, Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, and Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.

Close with Article 8: bar-admission candor (8.1), statements about judges (8.2), the mandatory reporting duty in 8.3 (knowledge of a violation raising a substantial question as to honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness, subject to the 1.6 exception), the misconduct catchall in 8.4 including criminal acts reflecting on fitness and dishonesty, and the choice-of-law provision in 8.5(b). If judicial conduct is on your syllabus, add Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11 disqualification, 28 U.S.C. § 455, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, and Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar.

How should you actually write the answer, and what varies by school?

Cite the rule number every time. Write 'Rule 1.7(a)(2)' rather than 'the conflicts rule.' Then state the operative language in a clause, apply it to two or three specific facts, and reach a conclusion. Where a rule permits but does not require action, say so — the difference between 'may reveal' and 'shall reveal' is a recurring grading line. Where waiver or consent is available, list every formality the rule requires and check whether the facts supply it.

What varies: some professors test the ABA Model Rules exclusively; California, New York, Texas, and a handful of other schools test their state's rules, and California's confidentiality rule is materially narrower than Model Rule 1.6 while its Business and Professions Code governs fee splitting and referrals. Some courses are heavily case-based and expect Spaulding, Togstad, People v. Belge, and In re Ryder; others are pure rule application. Some are MPRE-style multiple choice, where the tested answer is always the disciplinary answer under the ABA rules. Ask which body of rules governs and whether you may bring the rules in — an open-rules exam shifts the grading weight entirely to application.

For citation in a paper rather than an exam, the Bluebook form is Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.6(b)(1) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2020) — the 21st edition abbreviates 'Professional' as 'Pro.' — and Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 60 (Am. L. Inst. 2000).

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