What is the grader actually rewarding?
Points come from spotting issues and arguing contested elements, not from correct conclusions. Most criminal law rubrics assign credit per element discussed and per fact used. A confident "D is guilty of murder" with no element breakdown scores near zero; a careful analysis that concludes wrongly on a genuinely close question scores nearly full credit.
Argue both sides on any element where the facts are ambiguous, and only on those elements. If D shot V in the chest at point-blank range, do not spend a paragraph on causation—say it's satisfied and move on. Spend the time on whether D acted with premeditation or under extreme emotional disturbance. Triage is itself a graded skill.
Budget time before you write. A rough allocation is 10-15% reading and mapping, 75% writing, and the remainder on the weakest defendant. Write in compressed IRAC: rule, application to these facts, counterargument, conclusion. Never restate the fact pattern; use facts only inside application sentences.
How should you map the facts before you write?
Read the call of the question first. "Discuss the criminal liability of A, B, and C" demands a different structure than "You are a prosecutor; what charges can you bring and what defenses will you face?" The call also usually tells you the governing law—"in a common law jurisdiction," "in an MPC jurisdiction," or "discuss under both." If the call is silent, say early that you will apply common law and note MPC divergences where they matter.
Then build a two-axis grid: defendants down the side, victims and completed harms across the top. Fill each cell with candidate offenses. This catches the issues students miss—liability of the getaway driver, attempt liability where the victim survived, conspiracy separate from the substantive crime, and crimes against secondary victims like bystanders.
Build a timeline too. Concurrence problems and provocation cooling-off problems are invisible without one. Note every time gap the facts specify; the professor put "twenty minutes later" in the hypo for a reason.
Organize the answer by defendant, then chronologically by act, then by offense from most serious to least. Use headings. Graders read fast.
How do you break each crime into elements?
Every offense decomposes into actus reus, mens rea, concurrence, and—for result crimes—causation. State the elements before applying them.
Actus reus requires a voluntary act. Martin v. State (defendant carried onto a highway by police) and the MPC's list of non-voluntary acts in § 2.01(2) cover reflexes, seizures, and unconsciousness. But look backward for a voluntary act earlier in the chain: People v. Decina found a voluntary act in an epileptic driver's decision to get behind the wheel knowing he was subject to seizures. Omissions are actionable only where a legal duty exists—statute, contract, status relationship, voluntary assumption of care that isolates the victim, or creation of the peril. Jones v. United States is the standard citation for the duty categories.
Causation splits into but-for cause and proximate cause. But-for is usually easy. Proximate cause turns on foreseeability and intervening acts: negligent medical treatment rarely breaks the chain, grossly negligent or intentional intervening conduct sometimes does, and a victim's own reckless conduct may (contrast Commonwealth v. Root with Commonwealth v. Atencio). People v. Kibbe is the classic abandonment-in-the-cold case.
Concurrence is the requirement that the mens rea actuate the actus reus at the same moment. Flag it when the facts separate the intent from the act in time.
How do you pin down mens rea?
Under the MPC, do element analysis, not offense analysis. MPC § 2.02 defines purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence, and § 2.02(4) applies a stated mens rea to every material element unless a contrary purpose plainly appears. Where a statute is silent, § 2.02(3) supplies recklessness. So identify each element—conduct, attendant circumstance, result—and ask which mental state attaches to it.
At common law, sort the offense into specific intent, general intent, or strict liability, because the sorting drives the mistake rules. A mistake of fact negates specific intent whether or not it is reasonable; it must be reasonable to defeat a general intent crime; and it is irrelevant to a strict liability element (Garnett v. State, statutory rape). Regina v. Cunningham supplies the recklessness-as-malice reading; Regina v. Faulkner rejects unlimited transfer of intent across offenses.
There is a strong presumption against strict liability for serious offenses. Morissette v. United States and Staples v. United States both read a mens rea requirement into silent federal statutes. Public welfare offenses with light penalties are the exception (United States v. Balint).
Mistake of law is generally no defense, with narrow exceptions: reliance on an official interpretation, no notice for a wholly passive regulatory offense (Lambert v. California), and offenses where knowledge of the law is itself an element (Cheek v. United States on willfulness in tax crimes).
How do you run the homicide ladder?
Never jump to a conclusion on homicide. Climb the ladder in fixed order so you cannot skip a theory.
Start with intent-to-kill murder and ask about premeditation and deliberation for first degree. Jurisdictions split sharply: some require only that the intent be formed before the act (Commonwealth v. Carroll), others require real reflection shown by planning, motive, and manner (State v. Guthrie; People v. Anderson's three-factor framework). Say which approach you are using and argue the other.
Then run the other malice theories. Intent to inflict grievous bodily harm supports common law murder. Depraved-heart or abandoned-heart murder covers extreme recklessness plus indifference to human life (Commonwealth v. Malone; People v. Knoller). Felony murder requires an inherently dangerous felony that does not merge with the killing (People v. Ireland's merger doctrine) and a death within the res gestae; jurisdictions divide between the agency rule and proximate cause rule when a co-felon or bystander is killed by police or a victim (State v. Sophophone).
Next, mitigate. Common law voluntary manslaughter requires adequate provocation, actual heat of passion, no cooling off, and causal connection—words alone traditionally insufficient (Girouard v. State), though Maher v. People takes a broader, jury-focused view. The MPC replaces this with extreme mental or emotional disturbance judged from the actor's situation under § 210.3(1)(b), which People v. Casassa shows is far more forgiving.
Finally, involuntary manslaughter: criminal (gross) negligence or recklessness, as in Commonwealth v. Welansky and State v. Williams, plus misdemeanor manslaughter where recognized.
How do you handle attempt, conspiracy, and accomplice liability?
Attempt requires specific intent to commit the target offense—so attempted felony murder and attempted depraved-heart murder generally do not exist. For actus reus, name the test: dangerous proximity (People v. Rizzo), last act, unequivocality, or the MPC's substantial step strongly corroborative of criminal purpose, § 5.01(1)(c), with its list of examples in § 5.01(2). Factual impossibility is no defense; pure legal impossibility is; hybrid impossibility is largely abolished under the MPC and cases like People v. Dlugash. Abandonment is a defense under MPC § 5.01(4) only if voluntary and complete.
Conspiracy requires an agreement plus intent to agree and intent to achieve the object; most jurisdictions add an overt act. Discuss scope—single conspiracy versus multiple, chain versus wheel (Kotteakos v. United States)—and Pinkerton v. United States liability for foreseeable crimes committed in furtherance by co-conspirators, which the MPC rejects.
Accomplice liability needs assistance or encouragement plus the purpose that the crime succeed. State v. Gladstone shows mere knowledge is not enough. Note the split on natural-and-probable-consequences liability, which the MPC does not recognize.
How do you argue defenses and burdens?
Reach defenses only after establishing a prima facie offense, and label each as justification (conduct was right) or excuse (actor is not blameworthy). Self-defense requires an honest and reasonable belief in imminent unlawful force and proportional response; People v. Goetz holds the belief must be reasonable but assessed with the defendant's relevant circumstances in view. Address retreat rules, the initial-aggressor limit, and imperfect self-defense as a mitigator to manslaughter. State v. Norman is the case for battered-spouse imminence problems.
Duress traditionally excuses everything but murder and requires a threat of imminent death or serious bodily harm; MPC § 2.09 uses a person-of-reasonable-firmness standard and does not categorically exclude homicide. Necessity requires a choice of the lesser evil and is unavailable to kill an innocent under Regina v. Dudley and Stephens. For insanity, name the test—M'Naghten, irresistible impulse, or MPC § 4.01's substantial capacity—and apply the facts to each prong.
Close with burdens. In re Winship requires the prosecution to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt, but Patterson v. New York permits states to place the burden of persuasion for affirmative defenses on the defendant, while Mullaney v. Wilbur bars shifting the burden on a fact the statute makes an element. Martin v. Ohio upheld shifting self-defense to the defendant.